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THE STATUS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS UNDER NEW
YORK'S BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW: A COMPARATIVE
VIEW
SAMUEL HOFFMAN*
C OMPRESSING the protean subject matter of Articles 6 and 7 of the new
Business Corporation Law, dealing with 'shareholders and directors, into
some eighty or ninety law review pages strikes one at the outset as an awesome
if not insuperable, assignment. The necessary and, indeed, unique solution-
once the originally-induced paralysis has abated-is to jettison or, to put it
perhaps more professionally, to yield materials in this symposium to the ex-
pertise of collaborating brethren. So,' for example, one may, with maximum
confidence, cede to Dean Stevens those sections of Articles 6 and 7 designed
exclusively, or of primary importance, for the close corporation, and to Dean
de Capriles the subject matter of corporate finance affecting the dividend, re-
demption, conversion, option and related financial rights of shareholders.
Likewise, the mechanics of shareholder meetings, voting and quorum require-
ments, and related materials in-Article 6, as well as similar areas in Article 7
dealing with the number, election, classification, vacancies, removal, and meet-
ings of directors will be left to discussion elsewhere in this symposium. After
such extensive abdication of materials (purely in self-defense), there remains
for evaluation in this paper the still impressive area of basic shareholder rights
and liabilities, and the duties, rights and liabilities of directors.
Although the subject matter selected for discussion, particularly in Article
7, impinges squarely on sensitive and crucial areas of policy, reflecting very
directly the legislative inclination with respect to the regulatory (or policing)
function of corporate statutes, this paper will not attempt a critique of the
policy orientation of the legislature, nor will it assume an advocate position on
the embattled (and rather wearisome) issue of the "paternalistic" versus the
"permissive" system of corporate statutes. There is no gainsaying the fact that
New York has adopted a more permissive system under the new law. The die
has been cast, although not irretrievably, and the ultimate "wisdom of the
legislature" in its policy formulations must await the test of time. The deci-
sions that have been made are not so clearly erroneous or dangerous that one
is obliged, as a matter of professional or social conscience, to cavil at them.
On the assumption that the major emphasis of this symposium is the
enlightenment of the New York practising bar, the provisions of the new law
in the areas selected for discussion will be contrasted with their counterparts, if
any, under existing law, evaluated critically where necessary, and generally
explored. Spatial considerations preclude any, but the most trifling, compara-
tive analysis of the new law and the law throughout the country.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Drafting Consultant on Articles 7 and 9
of the new Business Corporation Law to the New York Joint Legislative Comnmitee to
Study Revision of Corporation Laws. The views expressed herein are personal, not official
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THE STATUS OF SHA aOLDERS
I. Shareholder Rights
The shareholder's "equity" in the corporation is represented by his com-
ponent rights of participation in the corporate enterprise, traditionally referred
to as the "bundle of rights" constituting full share ownership. Time was when
the New York courts tended to define the several component rights, such as
voting, dividend, preemption, etc., as vested rights of property. More recently,
however, the Court of Appeals in Davidson v. Park, Austin & Lipscomb' took
another look at the "vested rights" concept as it related to the state's reserve
power-and decided that it was no longer feasible, in light of the realities of
the modern corporate world, to go along with the past rigid definition of
component shareholder rights as vested rights of property, guaranteed against
impairment or even total destruction from the exercise of the state's reserve
power. Such definition, it said, was disfunctional and misleading, and "only
confusion results from saying that 'vested rights' are not within the contempla-
tion of the statute. All preferential rights of stockholders are in a sense vested.
They are all property rights founded upon contract. . . .The inadequacy of
the 'vested rights' test is further demonstrated by the fact that new stock
may be issued with preferential rights to the assets of the corporation upon
dissolution and to dividends superior to the preferential rights of the then out-
standing shares . .. , even superior to the right of preferred stockholders to
dividends in arrears. . . . The judicial problem is not whether a particular
preferential right is vested or not, but rather what was the legislative intent as
to it."12 (Emphasis added.) Yet, so strongly and ineradicably entrenched was
the traditional sense of the vested property character of the component share-
holder rights that, when in 1943, under the influence and authority of the
Davidson case and in reaction to strong pressure from organized business, the
legislature enacted the present paragraph 3 of Section 35 of the N.Y. Stock
Corporation Law authorizing certificate of incorporation amendments to alter
or eliminate voting, preemptive, redemption, and sinking fund rights, and
rights to undeclared cumulative or non-cumulative dividends, whether or not
accrued, it provided shareholders adversely effected with a correlative right of
appraisal. 3 Other rights, such as the right of inspection and the right to main-
tain a derivative action, remained solidly entrenched, unimpaired by amend-
ment and judicially protected. What has happened to the more important
shareholder rights under the new law?
A. The right to maintain a derivative suit; security for expenses
The real office of the controversial derivative suit, that ingenious invention
of equity, has perhaps never been put more astutely or accurately than in the
following comment:
1. 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E.2d 618 (1941).
2. Id. at 509, 35 N2.2d at 622.
3. See N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 38(11).
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.Despite the numerous abuses which have developed in connection with
such suits they have accomplished much in policing the corporate
system especially in protecting corporate ownership as against cor-
porate management. They have educated corporate directors in the
principles of fiduciary responsibility and undivided loyalty. They
have encouraged faith in the wisdom of full disclosure to stockholders.
They have discouraged membership on boards by persons not truly
interested in the corporation .... The measure of effectiveness of the
stockholder's derivitive suit cannot be taken by a computation of
money recovery in the litigated cases. The minatory effect of such
actions has undoubtedly prevented diversion of large amounts from
stockholders to management and outsiders. Corporate attorneys now
have an arsenal of authorities to support their cautioning advice to
clients who may be disposed to risk evasion of the high standard the
courts have imposed upon directors.4
It is indeed surprising that so sensitive an instrument for regulating the internal
tensions of the highly complex corporate system should, particularly in New
York-the financial mecca of the world, have been heretofore solely the product
of judicial engineering. It has now by virtue of Section 626 of the New York
Business Corporation Law come under statutory regulation-mainly a codifica-
tion of existing judicial authority.
The very definition of the derivative action, has been a source of confusion
in the courts. Traditionally, such suits have involved accounting actions
brought to recover corporate funds allegedly wasted or converted by faithless
directors or officers, or expended by the corporation as a result of their negli-
gence or breach of fiduciary duty.5 Title to such a fund being in the corpora-
tion alone, the right to sue for its recovery has been held uniformly to belong
primarily to the corporation-the injury to the shareholders being indirect and
secondary.a In the recent case of Gordon v. Elliman,6 the Court of Appeals
by a closely divided court fixed a broader and very different standard for
defining the derivative action. The case involved an action brought by a share-
holder to compel the corporation and its directors to declare a dividend. The
corporation sought security for expenses under Section 61-b of the N.Y. General
Corporation Law (which in terms applies only to derivative suits) and the
character of the action was put in issue. The majority held the action to be
derivative on the ground that in declaring or refusing to declare a dividend the
board performs a duty which it owes primarily to the corporation and sec-
ondarily to the shareholders. The majority suggested that "the idea is too
restricted that derivative actions are limited to such as are brought to compel
the directors to pay or restore money to the corporation .... In general, it may
4. Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
5. judge Desmond's individual dissent in this case is based squarely on this view of
the derivative action.
5a. See, for example, Niles v. N.Y.C. & HR.R.R. Co., 176 N.Y. 119, 68 N.E. 142(1903).
6. 306 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E.2d 331 (1954).
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be said that an action is in the right of the corporation which invokes the equi-
table powers of the Supreme Court to direct the management of its affairs
... the object is for the court to chart the course for the corporation which
the directors should have selected .. the court substitutes its judgment ad hoc
for that of the directors in the conduct of its business. That applies to the
establishment of a suitable dividend policy for the corporation as much as
anything else. A stockholder has no individual cause of action to recover
dividends that have not been declared. All that he can do is sue in equity
to cause the court to perform a corporate function which the directors would
have done except for their bad faith."7 (Emphasis added.) A distinction was
drawn between an action to recover a dividend already declared or a "guar-
anteed" dividend and one to compel the declaration of a dividend. In the
latter case, it is "an over-simplification to treat such an action ... as being by
individual stockholders against the corporation to enforce a contract right"8 and
the notion that the corporation is simply an adversary interested only in defeat-
ing the shareholder's claim is erroneous. "A corporation has an interest of its
own in being well managed." 9 In a sharp dissent in which he spoke for a 3-judge
minority, Judge Fuld alluded to the test selected by the majority as turning on
whether the shareholder was suing to enforce a chose in action belonging to
him or to compel the directors to perform a duty which they owe to the cor-
poration and, through it, to th6 shareholders, and suggested that "the vice
of the test is that it presupposes that every duty owed by corporate directors
runs exclusively to the corporation as such and never directly to the stock-
holders in their personal and individual right. The law is otherwise."1 0 All
suits brought against the corporation, as was this one, necessarily involve the
conduct of directors (or responsible officers) and an attack upon such conduct
is not automatically converted into the assertion of a corporate cause of action.
The shareholder's interest in the corporation is fundamentally contractual,
comprehending a number of component rights, and actions brought in the vindi-
cation of such rights have been traditionally treated as brought primarily in
the right of the shareholder. So, in Witherbee v. Bowles" a suit brought to
enforce a preemptive right was held personal to the shareholder, and in Horowitz
v. Balaban,12 a federal court held such an action outside the ambit of Section
61-b. Similarly, an action to compel an inspection of the corporate books, to
vote, to compel registration on the corporate books, or to restrain a wrongful
issuance of shares would be personal to the shareholders bringing such actions.
Said Judge Fuld, "I can conceive of no more important or generally understood
right of the stockholder in a modern corporation, where he is primarily an
7. Id. at 461-462, 119 NE.2d at 335.
8. Id. at 465, 119 NE.2d at 337.
9. Id. at 466, 119 N.E.2d at 338.
10. Id. at 470, 119 N.E2d at 340.
11. 201 N.Y. 427, 95 N.E. 27 (1911).
12. 112 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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investor, than of receiving dividends on his investment."' 3 The fact that in
the case of common stock this contractual right to dividend is not spelled out
in the certificate of incorporation, as is generally true for preferred stock,
does not make it any less a right of the shareholder and a correlative duty of
the corporation. "And the corporation's duty does not become its right merely
through the omission of express language in the certificate, for the law reads
in the words as clearly as if they were spelled out. The right is the stockholders',
whether the promise to pay the dividends is expressed or implied."'14 Finally,
in an action to compel a dividend declaration, the corporation may be sued as
sole defendant---"nothing can be more patent than that the lone defendant in
an action is not the owner of the right upon which the suit is grounded. The
circumstance that no other defendant than the corporation is necessary is ex-
plainable only by recognizing that the corporation is in reality the true
adversary."' 5
The lower courts have not displayed any marked tendency to apply the
broad standard of Gordon v. Elliman in cognate cases. For example, in Lehr-
man v. Godchaux Sugar,16 security for expenses under Section 61-h was sought
in an action brought by a Class A shareholder to enjoin a proposed recapitali-
zation. Under the proposed plan, the Class A shares would preserve their
previous dividend preferences but would lose their previous right to participate
in any additional dividends with Class B shares. In exchange for the loss of
participating rights, Class A was made convertible at its option into Class B
shares within a prescribed period of time. Changes were made as well in the
liquidation amounts receivable by the Class A and Class B shares, generally
detrimental to Class A. The court held that the action was not derivative and
alluded to the circumstance that Judge Fuld in his dissenting opinion in Gordon
v. Elliman had used a similar contest between two classes of shares to illustrate
a situation which would concern the shareholders involved rather than the
corporation. The court commented that "In a sense, of course, the corpora-
tion and its stockholders usually have the same interests. This normal com-
munity of interest must not, however, obscure the line of demarcation between
the juridical basis of their respective rights."' 7 In similar vein, it has been
held that an action to procure the dissolution of a corporation is not deriva-
tive.18 Nor have the federal courts been persuaded by the majority view in
Gordon v. Elliman-both the third' 9 and fifth circuit20 courts of appeals having
recently expressly repudiated it and held squarely that an action to compel the
13. Supra note 6 at 471, 119 N.E.2d at 341.
14. Id. at 472, 119 N.E.2d at 341.
15. Id. at 475, 119 N.E.2d at 343.
16. 207 Misc. 314, 138 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
17. Id. at 318, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 167.
18. Fontheim v. Walker, 141 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Davidson v. Rabinowitz,
140 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
19. Knapp v. Bankers Securities Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956).
20. Doherty v. Mutual Warehouse Co., 245 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1957).
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declaration of a dividend is brought in the primary right of the shareholder.
Law review commentators have been equally unimpressed.21
Gordon v. Elliman is reactionary in effect. To impose upon the minority
shareholder, seeking judicial review of the corporation's failure to declare a
dividend, the burden of securing the corporation's expenses in the action is to
throttle the cause of action in its infancy. Paragraph (a) of Section 626 au-
thorizes the maintenance of an action in the right of a domestic or foreign
corporation to procure a judgment in its favor. The reviser's note to Section
626 indicates that the addition of the language "in its favor" is designed to
overrule Gordon v. Elliman. In the writer's opinion it does not, standing
alone, accomplish this laudatory purpose-it is "question-begging" language.
Whether an action is brought in favor of the corporation or the shareholder
is precisely the question to be decided in each case. Perhaps, however, the
evidence of legislative intent reflected by the reviser's note to Section 626
will induce the Court of Appeals to reconsider Gordon v. Elliman upon some
future occasion-a consummation devoutly to be desired.
Paragraph (a) provides expressly that derivative actions may be brought
by a holder of voting trust certificates or of a beneficial interest in the shares.
This is representative of existing case law.2 2 Practica- difficulties may arise
with respect to the authority conferred upon beneficial owners to initiate such
suits in view of the "contemporaneous ownership" provision in paragraph (b),
the counterpart of present Section 61 of the General Corporation Law, that
"in any such action, it must be made to appear that the plaintiff is such a
holder at the time of bringing the action and that he was such a holder at the
time of the transaction of which he complains, or that his interest devolved
upon him by operation of law." Where the shares are held by a broker, as
nominee, the shareholder may believe himself* in possession of continuous
beneficial ownership of shares in the corporation but the broker's record
ownership (representing a large number of beneficial owners) may fluctuate
considerably, or he may even have withdrawn record ownership altogether
on a temporary basis, pursuant to contractual arrangements with the cus-
tomer-a customary practice. Should the transaction complained of occur
during a period when the broker's record holding in the corporation is lowered
(below the amount of plaintiff shareholder's beneficial ownership) or has been
temporarily withdrawn,. can it be said that the shareholder so represented
held a beneficial interest in the shares at the time of the transaction of which
he complains? Nor is it dear, under the formulation in paragraph (b), that
21. These comments were uniformly in opposition. See 19 Brooklyn L. Rev. 312
(1953); 38 Cornell L.Q. 244 (1953); 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 534-5 (1955); 19 Albany L. Rev.
84 (1955); Note, 30 Ind. L.. 118 (1955).
22. See White v. National Bondholder's Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
Lewin v. New York Ambassador, 61 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 271 App. Div.
927, 67 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1st Dep't 1947); Braman v. Westaway, 60 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct.
1945). See also Mattheis v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 962 (1960).
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the shareholder must not have continuous (record) ownership from the time
of the transaction until the time he brings the action.
The clause in paragarph (b) authorizing the initiation of a derivative
suit by a holder whose "shares or his interest devolved upon him by operation
of law" perpetuates a parallel clause in the present Section 61 of the General
Corporation Law that has received considerable construction. There is uniform
agreement in the decisions that "equitable" ownership suffices to enable such
holder to sue derivatively-legal or record ownership not being indispensable.
Thus, in Braman v. Westaway,23 the beneficiary of a testamentary trust was
held to have a sufficient equitable interest in the trust shares to sue derivatively.
However, a derivative suit may not be maintained by a plaintiff who is neither
the legal nor equitable owner of shares but is merely interested as beneficiary
in an estate of which the shares are an asset. In Steuer v. Hector's Tavern, -2 4
the Appellate Division, First Department, recently held that plaintiff-widow
of a deceased shareholder, who had consented to accept shares in the corpora-
tion (as yet undistributed) in part payment of her elective share in the estate,
could not bring a derivative suit because she had acquired only an interest
in the estate of which the shares were an asset, not an interest in the shares
themselves. The same rule was recently followed by the Appellate Division,
Second Department, in Faiello v. Li Castri2 5 where a statutory distributee of
a one-ninth interest in an intestate estate was held disabled from commencing
a derivative action. Of course, the specific legatee of shares acquires his inter-
est by operation of law,26 as does an executor of an estate of which the shares
are an asset.27 It has been held, however, that the interest of trustee-remain-
dermen of an inter-vivos trust does not devolve by operation of law but vests
pursuant to the grant.28 A number of questions related to the "contempo-
raneous ownership" rule remain unresolved under the new law. The Model
Act formulation, followed in several states, that where an interest in shares
devolves upon plaintiff by operation of law, his predecessor in interest must
have been a holder at the time of the transaction complained of, has not been
adopted. The omission to do so is rather perplexing since, although no square
New York case in point has been found, the Model Act formulation would
seem dictated by a consistent application of the contemporaneous ownership
rule.- In addition, the recent Appellate Division, Second Department holding
23. Supra note 22.
24. 1 A.D.2d 1003, 151 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1st Dep't 1956).
25. 2 A.D.2d 749, 153 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1956).
26. See Singer v. State Laundry, 188 Misc. 583, 68 N.Y.S.2d 808 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
27. See Salter v. Columbia Concerts, Inc., 191 Misc. 479, 77 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. CL
1948).
28. Myer v. Myer, 271 App.'Div. 465, 66 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1st Dep't 1946), aff'd, 296
N.Y. 979, 73 N.E.2d 562 (1947).
29. It was suggested in Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 13, 99 N.E.
138, 140 (1912) that the shares are tainted in the hands of plaintiff-shareholder if his pre-
decessor in interest had acquiesced in the wrong. For the rule that the complicity of plain-
tiff-shareholder in the wrong precludes his bringing the suit, see Diamond v. Diamond, 307
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in Richman v. Felmus3" has muddied what had seemed to be a clear rule to
the contrary in New York30 a by holding that intervenors in a derivative suit, as
well as its originator, had to be contemporaneous owners. Although interven-
tion by non-contemporaneous owners was disallowed by the court for the
purpose of escaping the need to secure the corporation's expenses in the suit,
it appears to have been permitted with respect to the second cause of action
for which there was ostensibly sufficient contemporaneous ownership to
satisfy the security for expenses requirement. This area might have been
clarified.
In addition to contemporaneous ownership, paragraph (b) imposes the
requirement that the plaintiff must likewise be a holder of shares at the time
of bringing the derivative suit. The New York decisions impose the added
requirement that the plaintiff preserve his shareholder status for the duration
of the proceedings until final judgment, or his right to continue prosecuting
the action is lost. In the recent case of Tenney v. Rosenthal,31 the Court of
Appeals recognized the foregoing rule but distinguished the case of the
director who is deposed pending the final determination of a suit he has
brought on behalf of the corporation against other derelict directors. In such
case, the deposed director may proceed with his suit because "His right to sue
is based on the public policy declared by the legislature upon enactment of
the statute.3 2 We may assume that the right to bring suit has been granted
in order to facilitate and improve the director's performance of the 'stewardship
obligation' which he owes to the corporation and its stockholders and to
protect him from possible liability for failure to proceed against those
responsible for improper management of the corporate affairs."3 3 The Court
stated by way of contrast that the shareholder in bringing a derivative suit
is a volunteer who sues to defend his own interests as well as those of the
corporation and that "By the voluntary abandonment of his personal interest
in the ligation, he has also by implication abandoned the cause of the corpo-
ration. However, no such abandonment of, the corporate cause is inferable
when the plaintiff director has failed of re-election as a director." 34
Paragraph (c) adopts that portion of Rule 23 (b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides that the complaint set forth with particularity
the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure the initiation of such action by the
board of directors or the reaspns for not making.such effort. This restates the
N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954). See also Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277
App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704
(1951); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 112 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
30. 8 A.D.2d 985, 190 N.Y.S.2d 920 (2d Dep't 1959).
30a. See, authorities cited infra note 53.
31. 6 N.Y.2d 204, 160 NME.2d 463 (1959). See, also, Gleicher v. Times-Columbia Dis-
tributors, Inc., 283 App. Div. 709, 128 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1st Dep't 1954).
32. This alludes to N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61 (see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 720(b)).
33. Supra note 31 at 211, 160 N.E2d at 467.
34. Id. at 212, 160 N.E.2d at 467.
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New York common law rule.35 What is significant, however, is te absence
from paragraph (c) of that portion of Rule 23 (b) requiring a statement in
the complaint of similar efforts to secure action "if necessary, from the
shareholders." It is noteworthy that this "demand upon the shareholders"
requirement appeared in the study bill prepared for the 1960 legislative
session but was removed from the bill presented for passage at the 1961
legislative session after argument was advanced at a public hearing that the
added requirement of a demand upon shareholders was too onerous, par-
ticularly in the case of suits brought against directors and officers of large
corporations with farflung stockholdings. It should be observed that in both
the federal Rule 23 (b) and the (1960) study bill, the demand upon share-
holders is required only "if necessary." This rather ambiguous qualification
presumably means "if necessary" under the (common) law of the state. In
New York, the leading case on the subject is the often-cited Continental
Securities Co. v. Belmont3" in which the Court of Appeals rejected the
demand on the body of shareholders as a general requirement for the initiation
of a derivative action on the ground that the corporate body (to which the
action belongs) is represented by the directors and that the "demand on
shareholders" argument misconceives the essential role of the shareholders as
a collective group. Their role, said the Court, is not to initiate corporate action
but rather to recommend action or, in some cases, to assent to certain corporate
undertakings under authority conferred by statute. The Court noted that
certain actions of the board of directors which are legal, but voidable, can be
ratified and made binding on the corporation by vote of a majority of the body
of the shareholders as the ultimate parties in interest. Such right to ratify
is confined, however, to acts voidable by reason of irregularities in the make-up
of the board or by reason of transactions between an interested director and
his corporation but does not extend to board actions prohibited by law or
against public policy, and surely not to frauds and the misappropriation of
corporate funds. The Court concluded that "[A] complaining stockholder
must go to such board for relief before he can bring an action, unless it clearly
appears by the complaint that such application is useless. If the subject-
matter of the stockholder's complaint is for any reason within the immediate
control, direction or power of confirmation of the body of stockholders, it
should be brought to the attention of such shareholders for action, before an
action is commenced by a stockholder unless it clearly appears by the complaint
that such application is useless. . . .If the body of stockholders has no ade-
quate power or authority to remedy the wrong asserted by the individual stock-
holders it is unreasonable and unnecessary to require an application to it to
redress the wrong before bringing a representative action."37  (Emphasis
35. See Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 19, 99 N.E. at 142.
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added.) It is patent that under the foregoing "ratification" theory of the
Belmont case the "demand upon the body of shareholders" requirement will
ordinarily be of little consequence in derivative suits which generally are
premised on allegations of fraud or other non-ratifiable wrongdoing. In a
recent case, Gottesman v. General Motors Corporation,38 Chief Judge Clark
speaking for the majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the second
circuit, after rejecting the demand upon shareholders as unrealistic for the
large corporation and bahed on a fundamental misconception of the role of the
body of shareholders in corporate management, downgraded the approach of
Continental Securities v. Belmont with the remarkably cynical comment that
"at best a ratification by the body of shareholders merely compels the
minority shareholder plaintiffs to shift slightly the legal theories on which they
rely so as to raise charges of fraud, waste of corporate assets, or the like."39
The reviser's note to Section 626 states laconically that the demand upon the
shareholders has been omitted from the section. The requirement for such a
demand when necessary having been included in the (1960) study bill version
of the derivative action section, the interesting (and perplexing) question is
the effect its omission from the present (1961) section will have on the future
of Continental Securities v. Belmont in New York.
Paragraph (d) overrules Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. of
Rhode Island v. Hopson40 and an old dictum in Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick4l
to the effect that the plaintiff in a derivative action may discontinue such action
at will at any time prior to the intervention of another shareholder or the entry
of a final judgment in the action. The change, fashioned after Rule 23(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is long overdue. The statute now
provides that "such action shall not be discontinued, compromised or settled
without the approval of the court having jurisdiction of the action." This
provision fixes for New York, in certain terms, the policy that an action once
commenced remains open for intervention by other shareholders until such
time as the court allows its discontinuance, and settles beyond peradventure
the rule that out-of-court settlements are invalid as a matter of law (and
clearly not res judicata). A logical extension of this policy is found in sub-
paragraph (f) (3) of Section 72541a which disallows any indemnification to
directors and officers for expenses incurred in defending or amounts paid in
disposing of any pending derivative action without court approval. These pro-
visions will have the sure effect of completing the process begun by Clark v.
Greenberg2 of discouraging collusive extra-judicial settlements. The mandatory
38. 268 F2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959).
39. Id. at 197.
40. 176 Misc. 220, 25 N.YS.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 731, 29
N.YS.2d 139 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 668, 43 N.E.2d 71 (1942).
41. 99 N.Y. 185, 1 N.E. 663 (1885).
41a. See, infra note 344.
42. 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E2d 443 (1947).
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requirement under federal Rule 23 (c) that notice of a proposed discontinuance
or compromise be given to all shareholders has been varied by paragraph (d)
which makes the giving of such notice discretionary "if the court shall deter-
mine that the interest of the shareholders or any class will be substantially
affected by such discontinuance, compromise or settlement. . . ." Since the
notice is customarily given in any case, it is perhaps preferable to allow the
court some discretion to eliminate unnecessary expenses where notice is clearly
not required.
In Clark v. Greenberg,43 a pending derivative action was discontinued
and settled before trial without notice to the shareholders and without court
approval. Plaintiff received, by virtue of the settlement, the sum of $9,000 for
the transfer and delivery of his stock which had a market value of $51.88.
The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division which had dismissed
the complaint in reliance on Manufacturers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Rhode
Island v. Hopson,44 held that the effect of the Hopson case was limited to the
right of the plaintiff in a derivative suit to discontinue such suit, but that the
essential nature of the derivative suit was such that the recovery of any
proceeds therefrom, whether by way of judgment, settlement with court
approval, or private settlement was to be impressed with a trust in favor of
the corporation, to which the action belonged in the first instance. The
requirement of an accounting by the plaintiff "introduces no new element. It
simply amounts to a logical application of a fundamental principle inherent
in a representative relation. When one assumes to act for another . . . he
should be willing to account for his stewardship. ' 45 Paragraph (e) of Section
626 seeks to codify the general principle of Clark v. Greenberg and, in addition,
restores former Section 61-a of the General Corporation Law46 in part by
providing that upon the successful prosecution of a derivative action or the
receipt by plaintiff of a fund as a result of a compromise or settlement, the
court may (1) award plaintiff the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, of maintaining the action and (2) direct plaintiff to account to the
corporation for the remainder of the proceeds received by him as consequence
of the action. Some question may arise, in implementing paragraph (e),
whether it purported to codify the rule of Clark v. Greenberg with respect to
the proceeds of a private settlement. "Settlement" as used in this paragraph
must perforce be construed in terms of the requirement in paragraph (d) that
all settlements be court-approved because the very language of the provision
relating to settlements in paragraph (e) assumes a court-directed application
of the proceeds. Were a different definition of settlement intended in para-
graph (e), language appropriate to this purpose would have been utilized. The
43. Ibid.
44. Supra note 40.
45. Supra note 42 at 150, 71 N.E.2d at 445.
46. Repealed by the laws of 1945.
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ambiguity is compounded by the failure to include any clarifying comment on
Clark v. Greenberg in the reviser's note. Paragraph (e) was apparently drafted
on the assumption that the rule incorporated in paragraph (d), that all settle-
ments were to be approved by the court, would not be violated. If an out-of-
court settlement is made after the effective date of the new law, the question
of the residual vitality of Clark v. Greenberg in such a context will surely
provide grist for the appellate mill.
The last line of paragraph (e) provides that the contents of the paragraph
"shall not apply to any judgment rendered for the benefit of injured share-
holders only and limited to a recovery of the loss or damage sustained by
them." This constitutes a statutory restatement of a line of cases in New
York47 in which the courts, despite the derivative nature of the suit, have
tailored the judgment to allow a pro-rata award to the innocent plaintiff-share-
holders only-to compensate them for their personal injury (rather than a full
recovery on behalf of the corporation in which the guilty defendant directors-
shareholders might share). Thus, in the now celebrated Perlman v. Feldmann'8
the court stated "And plaintiffs, as they contend, are entitled to a recovery in
their own right, instead of in the right of the corporation (as in the usual
derivative actions), since neither Wilport nor their successors in interest should
share in any judgment which may be rendered. . . . Defendants cannot well
object to this form of recovery, since the only alternative, recovery for the
corporation as a whole, would subject them to a greater total liability."149
It is, of course, obvious that this type of special recovery will not be tolerated
when intervening creditors' rights are involved, and is to be clearly delineated
from a recovery obtained by a shareholder as a result of the direct action brought
in his primary right.
Security for expenses in derivative suits: It is perhaps bromidic to restate
the now familiar proposition that Section 61-b of the General Corporation Law,
the present "security for expenses" statute, was ushered into the New York
Law in 1944 along with its companion piece, the "contemporaneous ownership"
rule, to discourage the "strike suit." That this highly controversial piece of
legislation performed this office in an exemplary manner is likewise a familiar
proposition-although, of course, no one will ever be able to say with any
measure of certainty how many legitimate suits were discouraged in the process.
The rough edges of the statute were honed to some extent by two developments:
first, the decision in Baker v. McFadden Publicaions, Inc.50 which ameliorated
the plight of the benighted less-than-5% shareholder by allowing him, at any
47. See Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y. Supp. 912 (Zd Dep't
1937), ail'd, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 70 (1937); Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 107, 179
N.E. 310 (1932); Geltman v. Levy, 11 A.D.2d 411, 207 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1st Dep't 1960);
Harris v. Rogers, 190 App. Div. 208, 179 N.Y. Supp. 799 (4th Dep't 1919); see also Perl-
man v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
48. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
49. Id. at 178.
50. 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876 (1950).
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time during the pendency of the action, to either avoid or vacate an order
requiring the posting of a "security for expenses" bond if he could interest
other shareholders with the requisite percentage of shares or share-equity to
join him in the action; second, a series of lower court decisions, commencing
with Noel Associates, Inc. v. Merrill,51 which implemented Baker v. McFadden
by allowing non-contemporaneous owners to intervene in the action and their
shares to be counted in determining whether a bond should be posted or vacated.
MHore recently, the Appellate Division, Second Department in the case of'Rich-
man v. Felmus52 has disallowed intervention by non-contemporaneous owners
for the purpose of determining whether the requirements of Section 61-b have
been met. This decision constitutes the only appellate determination of this
question and should normally be persuasive, except that in the very latest deci-
sion in which the question was raised, Sorin v. Shamoon Industries,5 3 the Su-
preme Court, First Department, refused to follow Rickman v. Felmus and
allowed the intervention of non-contemporaneous owners in applying the rule of
Baker v. McFadden. It is noteworthy that the prefiled (1960) version of the
new law incorporated the following provision in the derivative action section:
"Holders of shares of the corporation or of voting trust certificates or of bene-
ficial interests in shares may be permitted to intervene as plaintiffs in such
action, whether or not they were holders thereof at the time of the wrong
complained of." A great deal of opposition developed against the inclusion of
this provision in the new law on the ground that it would bring back the "strike
suit," and it was eliminated from the bill as finally presented for passage as a
result of this pressure. What effect will the elimination from the new law of the
attempted codification of Noel Associates, Inc. v. Merrill have on the ultimate
decision in the Court of Appeals when the question is deliberated there, as soon
it must be? One may speculate that it will balance the scales in favor of the
view taken in Rickman v. Felmus.5 4 The same paragraph in the (1960) study
51. 184 Misc. 646, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
52. Supra note 30.
53. 30 MLisc. 2d 408, 220 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1961). See, also, Perry v. Shahmoon
Industries, Inc., 11 Misc. 2d 137, 172 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1958) which allowed inter-
vention. Richman v. Felmus stands as the solitary authority, at the state level, which dis-
allows intervention by non-contemporaneous owners. The trend in the federal courts under
Rule 23(b)(1) is to disallow intervention. See on this point Bauer v. Servel, Inc., 168
F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Elkins v. Bricker, 147 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Kauf-
man v. Wolfson, 136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Contra, Fuller v. American Machine
& Foundry Co., 95 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
54. A number of interesting questions relating to "security for expenses" and inter-
vention by non-contemporaneous owners remain essentially unresolved. Is it sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of section 61-b (or N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 627) as to one cause of
action in a complaint setting forth multiple causes of action? Compare on this point, Rich-
man v. Felmus, supra note 30, with Perry v. Shahmoon Industries, Inc., supra note 53,
and Sorin v. Shahmoon Industries, Inc., supra note 53. Further, can the plaintiff escape
posting a bond, under the Felmus case, by increasing his own holdings? Compare on this
point, Richman v. Felmus, supra note 30, and Purdy v. Humphrey, 187 Misc. 40, 60 N.Y.S.
2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1946) with Weinstein v. Behn, 68 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd,
272 App. Div. 1045, 75 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1st Dep't 1947), appeal dismissed, 298 N.Y. 506, 80
N.E.2d 656 (1948).
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bill version of the new law which contained the foregoing "intervention by non-
contemporaneous owners" provision likewise included the following: "For
the purposes of section 626 (Security for expenses in shareholders' derivative
action) the value of the holdings of the plaintiff or plaintiffs shall be the
market value thereof on the day the action is brought. The value of the hold-
ings of the intervenors shall be the market value thereof on the day that inter-
vention is permitted." The elimination of this provision from the new law is
rather puzzling since it was an effective restatement of the decisional law of
the state as set forth in- Weinstein v. Behn55 and more recently in Sorin v.
Shamoon Industries, Inc.56 In the Sorin case, the court quoted from Noel
Associates v. Merrill5" to the effect that "'the legislature clearly did not intend
to have the right to security fluctuate with the market after the action was
started.' "58
Although the continuing need for a "security for expenses" statute is open
to very serious question, particularly in light of the inclusion in the new law
of paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 626 which eliminate for all practical
purposes the threat of the "strike suit," the provisions of Section 61-b have
been perpetuated in almost their precise form in Section 627 of the Business
Corporation Law. Two changes should be noted: (1) holders of a beneficial
interest in shares, included in Section 626 as persons who may bring a deriva-
tive action, are added as persons from whom security for expenses may be
sought; and (2) a drafting ambiguity in Section 61-b has been corrected by
making it clear that security for expenses may be sought from a plaintiff-
voting trust certificate holder unless he holds a certificate representing at least
five percent of the outstanding shares (of any class). The provision in Sec-
tion 626 that the plaintiff must hold at least five percent of the outstanding
shares (rather than such percentage of the outstanding shares of any class)
is an oversight which is certain to be corrected at the 1962 legislative session.58a
It would appear that Section 627 was not drafted with an eye to the double
or multiple derivative action. Such interestng (and complex) questions arise
in such suits as whether the plaintiff-shareholder need hold the requisite per-
centage of shares or equity in the corporation in whose right the action is
brought where his own corporation has (or doesn't have) sufficient holdings
in such other corporation to meet the requirements of the statute, or whether
plaintiff-shareholder need only hold the requisite percentage of shares or equity
in his own corporation (which is not the corporation in whose right the action
is brought), or whether he must meet the requirements of the security for
expenses statute as to both corporations. 9 It is rather a pity that an attempt
55. Supra note 54.
56. Supra note 53.
57. Supra note 51.
58. Supra note 53 at 438, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
58a. An amendment to Section 627 incorporating this change was approved at the
1962 session of the legislature.
59. See for interesting discussions of these and other problems involved in multiple
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was not made in the new law to resolve these questions, one way or another,
although, concededly, the drafting problems would be very knotty. That there
,was a similar omission to consider the implications of the current Section 61-b
for the multiple derivative suit is reflected in Altman v. Autocar Company0 in
which plaintiff-shareholders had sufficient holdings in their own corporation to
satisfy Section 61-b, but not in the corporation in whose right the action was
brought. The court held that the latter corporation could demand security for
its expenses in the suit on the ground that the language of Section 61-b clearly
required ownership of shares in the corporation in whose right the action is
instituted (which the court construed to be the corporation whose directors
were being sued as the real defendants in the action). It seems very likely that
Section 627 will receive a similar construction.
In concluding the discussion of the "security for expenses" area, it
is perhaps necessary to comment on the basic proposition that while the small
shareholder who cannot meet the requirements of the statute is, unless suc-
cessful in the suit, saddled with the often enormous expenses of both sides of
the litigation (which may include indemnification rights of all defendant direc-
tors and officers as well as the expenses of the corporation), the large share-
holder who can satisfy the statute will, even if unsuccessful, be obliged to pay
only nominal court costs. Although it was suggested in Neuwirth v. Wymano'
that the court has the power, where warranted, to assess larger costs against an
unsuccessful plaintiff who controls sufficient equity in the corporation to avoid
the consequences of Section 61-b, the unquestionably better view is that taken
in Isensee v. Long Island Motion Picture Co.62 that such power does not exist.
The apparently unequal treatment of the small shareholder in this respect has
been held to present no constitutional difficulties.63
B. The voting right
The new law provides a comprehensive and detailed treatment of the share-
holder's voting rights by which the existing law affecting such rights is retained
in some cases, altered in others, and generally expanded.
Qualification of Voters: Section 612 of the Business Corporation Law,
dealing with the qualification of voters, is structurally new although it incor-
porates certain features of Sections 47, 48 and 51 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law. The prime qualification, included in paragraph (a), that
every share is born with the right to vote unless shorn of that right by provi-
derivative suits: Note, Examination of the Multiple Derivative Suit and Some Problems
Involved Therein in Light of the Theory of the Single Derivative Suit, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
932 (1956) ; Note, Suits by a Shareholder of a Parent Corporation to Redress Injuries to
the Subsidiary, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1313 (1951).
60. 133 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
61. 119 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 1044, 126 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1st Dep't 1953).
62. 184 Misc. 625, 54 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. CL 1945).
63. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Lapchak v.
Baker, 298 N.Y. 89, 80 N.E.2d 751 (1948).
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sion of the certificate of incorporation, retains the existing statutory formula-
tion. Other qualifications (or disqualifications) set forth in the section are not
currently embodied in statutory form:
(1) Under paragraph (b), "treasury shares" are neither entitled to vote
nor to be counted in determining the total number of outstanding shares. This
represents current decisional law as reflected in Vail v. Hamilton4 and similar
cases. 65 However, it is important to note the distinction drawn in the Vail
case between treasury shares treated by the corporation as inactive or retired,
and shares reacquired by the corporation which it has pledged as collateral
security for a bona fide debt that it owes; in the latter case, the corporate stock
may be counted and voted.66 Quaere, whether this distinction will survive the
general disqualification of treasury shares from voting and being counted as
outstanding under paragraph (b)?
Paragraph (b) likewise disqualifies from voting "shares held by another
domestic or foreign corporation of any type or kind, if a majority of the shares
entitled to vote in the election of directors of such other corporation is held
by the corporation.1 6 This codifies the rule of Italo Petroleum Corporation of
America v. Producers' Oil Corporation.68 The extent to which shares of a parent
corporation owned by its subsidiary may be counted as outstanding and voted
has not been judicially clarified in New York. In Lazenby v. International
Cotton Mills,6 the ruling of a referee which sahctioned the voting of the
subsidiary corporation's shares was affirmed in the appellate court. However,
since the Appellate Division made no specific reference to this question, the
Lazenby case is at best inconclusive authority. In the recent case of Dal-Tran
Service Co. v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.." in which the very provision
(paragraph (b) of Section 612), under discussion was called to the court's
attention for the'purpose of establishing that the common law rule authorized
the voting of a parent corporation's shares held by~a subsidiary in an election
of directors of the parent, the lower court rejected Lazenby as a controlling
precedent. At the appellate level, after stating that circular voting is of doubtful
validity in New York, the court commented: 'Nor, in our view, is Lazenby v.
International Cotton Mills Corp. clear authority in support of the validity or
64. 85 N.Y. 453 (1881).
65. See Ex parte Holmes, 5 Cow. 426 (N.Y. 1826); Ex parte Desdoity, 1 Wend. 99
(N.Y. 1828).
66. See also Swan v. Stiles, 94 App. Div. 117, 87- N.Y. Supp. 1089 (4th Dep't 1904).
67. Note that under paragraph (g) of Section 612, any other corporation (a majority
of whose shares entitled to vote in the election of directors are not owned by the corpora-
tion whose directors are to be elected) is free to vote. Was it intended to authorize voting
the shares of a subsidiary corporation, less than a majority of whose shares are owned by
its holding company, in an election of the directors of the holding company?
68. 20 Del. Ch. 283, 174 At!. 276 (1934).
69. 174 App. Div. 906, 160 N.Y. Supp. 1 (Ist Dep't 1916), aff'd, 226 N.Y. 645, 123
N.E. 875 (1919).
70. 14 A.D.2d 349, 220 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1st Dep't 1961), reversing,' 30 Misc. 2d 236,
217 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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the invalidity of circular voting."71 The general tenor of related precedents
would appear to support the principle embodied in paragraph (b) that directors
ought not, as a matter of policy, be afforded the opportunity of perpetuating
-themselves in office by such indirect control of a large block of their corpora-
tion's shares.7 -
(2) Under paragraph (c), shares held by an administrator, executor,
guardian conservator, committee or other fiduciary (other than a trustee) may
be voted in person or by proxy without registration of such shares on the
corporate books. This provision is clearly in line with decisional authority in
New York.73 Shares held by a trustee are given somewhat different treatment.
They may be voted in person or by proxy only if the trustee's name has been
transferred to the books of the corporation. This represents the effective rule
in New York.74 The distinction drawn between the legal representative and
the trustee in terms of the need for registration is presumably based on the
consideration that in the case of the legal representative there is only one
person who can effectively exercise the voting right. The testamentary or
inter-vivos trustee is not generally in a parallel situation75
It is interesting to observe that legal representatives and trustees are
authorized in paragraph (c) to vote by proxy. This would appear to represent
a distinct departure from the common law rule affecting fiduciaries. That
trustees owe a duty of independent judgment and may not delegate the exercise
of such judgment or discretion for which they have assumed personal responsi-
bility is so well established as not to require citation of authority. The voting
of shares under a fiduciary's control would surely fall within the general rule
and it has been so held.76 The extent to which statutory sanction of proxy
voting by fiduciaries authorizes the delegation of discretionary (as contrasted
with purely ministerial or mechanical) duties may not be as clear as appears
71. Id. at 357, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
72. It is to be noted that Section 612 does not include in the category of non-votable
shares, shares of its own which the corporation holds in a fiduciary capacity. Such shares
were not votable under the New York common law rule (see Ex parte Holmes, supra note
65). It is interesting to observe that such shares were made non-votable under the original
Model Act provision (Section 31) but such provision has since been eliminated.
73. See In re Bruder & Son, 302 N.Y. 52, 96 N.E.2d 84 (1950); Benkard v. Leonard,
231 App. Div. 625, 248 N.Y. Supp. 497 (1st Dep't 1931). In both cited cases, it was held
that the shares did not have to appear on the books of the corporation in the name of the
legal representative.
74. See Benkard v. Leonard, supra note 73.
75. In the case of the inter vivos trustee, the settlor is normally in a position to vote
the shares. In the case of the testamentary trustee, there is normally an executor available
to represent the estate. See Benkard v. Leonard, supra note 73, where an inter vivos trustee
who held shares as security for the performance by decedent of a separation agreement
was subordinated in the right to vote such shares to the legal representative of decedent-
shareholder's estate.
76. See In re Dodge, 39 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Surr. Ct. 1943), aft'd, 266 App. Div. 845, 132
N.Y.S.2d 315 (1st Dep't 1943), leave to appeal denied, 291 N.Y. 828, 52 N2E.2d 119 (1943);
In re Green, 166 Misc. 800, 2 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1937); In re Palmer, 132 N.Y.S.2d
311 (Surr. Ct. 1954); see generally, Allison v. Ver Vilen Co., Inc, 170 Misc. 144, 9 N.Y.S.
2d 708 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
STATUS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS
on the surface. In Delaware, for example, where voting trustees have been
authorized for some time, by statute, to vote by proxy, the courts have tended
to give a rather restrictive construction to the statute as being in derogation of
common law. In Brady v. Mexican Gulf Sulphur Company,77 a Delaware court
refused to construe the voting trust statute as authorizing the creation of an
irrevocable proxy and suggested that clear provision for 'Such extensive delega-
tion must be made by the express terms of the voting trust agreement. Although
wholesale delegation of fiduciary responsibilities is not, as a matter of policy,
to be lightly sanctioned, there is much to be said for statutory authorization
of proxy voting by fiduciaries in cases where they do not have the necessary
competence to vote in the best interests of their cestuis-que-trust, or in
emergencies.
(3) Under paragraph (d), shares held by or under the control of a receiver
may be voted by him without registration on the corporate books if authorized
in the order of the court by which he was designated. The right of a receiver
to vote shares held by him in that capacity with court approval has been
judicially recognized in New York,7 8 although some question exists concerning
the voting rights of a receiver in supplementary proceedings.7 9
(4) Under paragraph (e), the pledgor shall be entitled to vote the pledged
shares until the shares have been transferred into the name of the pledgee or
his nominee. This is an effective retention of the provision currently embodied
in Section 47 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, under which the pledgor
retains the right to vote the pledged shares unless he has relinquished such
right under the contract of pledge or has allowed the pledgee to register his
name on the corporate books.
(5) Under paragraph (f), special provision is made for the voting dis-
qualification of redeemable shares which have been called for redemption."
It is designed to fix the precise time when such shares shall no longer be
deemed outstanding and entitled to vote (and, correlatively, have become
treasury shares subject to paragraph (b)). This time is set "on or after the
date on which written notice of redemption has been sent to holders (thereof)
and a sum sufficient to redeem such shares has been deposited with a bank or
trust company with irrevocable instruction and authority to pay the redemption
price to the holders of the shares upon surrender of certificates therefor." This
paragraph admirably serves a practical end. Although no New York case has
been found in which the voting rights of redeeniiable shares (that have been
called) has been in issue, the fairly recent case of Kantor v. Stendig,8s in which
a lower court held that a derivative action brought by a shareholder, whose
77. 32 Del. Ch. 372, 88 A.2d 300 (1952).
78. See American & British Mfg. Co. v. International Power Co., 173 App. Div. 319,
159 N.Y. Supp. 582 (1st Dep't 1916).
79. In re D. J. Salvatore, Inc., 268 App. Div. 919, 51 N.Y.S.2d 342 (2d Dep't 1944).
80. This provision was borrowed from Section 31 of the Model Act.
81. 190 Misc. 861, 76 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup; Ct. 1947).
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shares were redeemed and retired during the pendency of the action, was not
extinguished by such redemption, points up the desirability of fixing for voting
purposes the precise time when shareholder status shall be deemed lost upon
a redemption of shares.
(6) Under paragraph (h), the provisions of Section 48 of the New York
Stock Corporation Law are retained without any substantive change. It pro-
vides, in sum, that when shares are registered on the corporate books in the
names of two or more fiduciaries, a majority of them control the voting of the
shares unless they shall be evenly decided, in which case any court having
jurisdiction of their accounts, upon the petition of any fiduciary or other party
in interest, may direct the voting of the shares in the best interest of the bene-
ficiaries. The provision has no application "where the instrument or order of
the court appointing such fiduciaries shall otherwise direct how such shares
shall be voted." It is very important to note that paragraph (h) retains the
provision in Section 48 precluding its application to any fiduciaries designated
by "any deed of trust or other instrument" made prior to May 1, 1956 or to
shares at any time transferred to or held by fiduciaries so designated. Prior to
May 1, 1956, Section 48 in terms applied only to shares that "(have) passed
by operation of law or by virtue of any last will and testament" (essentially
only to testamentary trustees or other fiduciaries); the statute was amended
on that effective date to include fiduciaries designated under "any deed of trust
or other instrument" (designed to cover inter-vivos trustees, and broad enough
to include voting trustees) and expressly barred retroactive application. This
paragraph (as did Section 48) changes the common law rule, reflected in
Townsend v. Winburn,8 2 that fiduciaries had to act as a unit,8 3 that any dis-
agreement among them prevented the effective voting of the shares they con-
trolled, and that there was no power in the court to vote shares in behalf of
fiduciaries who could not agree.8 4
(7) Under paragraph (i), the corporation is protected in treating the
persons in whose names shares stand on the books of the corporation as the
owners thereof "for all purposes." This latter clause would appear to be stated
too brpadly-what was undoubtedly intended was to make record ownership
the exclusive test for all purposes of voting. So understood, this paragraph
would retain the essence of Sections 47 and 62 of the New York Stock Cor-
poration Law and Section 164 of the New York Personal Property Law.8 5
82. 107 Misc. 443, 177 N.Y. Supp. 757 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
83. See In re Kirkman, 143 Misc. 342, 346, 256 N.Y. Supp. 49S, 501 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
84. Note, National Liberty Insurance Co. v. Bank of America, 126 Misc. 753, 214
N.Y. Supp. 643 (Sup. Ct. 1926) in which the court refused to appoint a successor trustee,
where the designated voting trustee was not eligible to act, on the ground that voting
trusts were not "true" trusts for this purpose.
85. Note, Flagg-Utica Corporation v. Baselice, 14 Misc. 2d 476, 178 N.Y.S.2d 860(Sup. CL 1958) in which the beneficial (non-record) owner of shares, voting by proxy in
favor of a sale of the essential properties of the corporation, was denied an appraisal on
the ground that the corporation had the right to rely on record ownership in determining
entitlement to vote.
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Limitations on the righkt to vote: Section 613 of the Business Corporation
Law implements the skeletal qualification set forth in paragraph (a) of Sec-
tion 612 that the right to vote is subject to limitations prescribed by the certifi-
cate of incorporation. In this, it serves precisely the function performed by the
first paragraph of Section 51 of the New York Stock Corporation Law-the
provisions being identical in form and substance. The section provides, in sam,
that the certificate of incorporation may strip a share of its voting right either
absolutely or conditionally or it may otherwise limit or define the respective
voting rights of the several classes (or series) of shares. Where such right to
vote is so denied or limited, the denial or limitation extends as well to any
provision of the chapter which prescribes a specified vote or consent of share-
holders for corporate action.86 So, for example, a shareholder generally denied
the right to vote by provision of the certificate of incorporation would, as a
general rule, not have voting rights in a proposed sale of all or substantially all
the corporate assets under Section 909 of the Business Corporation Law, or
merger or consolidation under Section 903 thereof.
The denial or limitation of the right to vote by provision of the certificate
of incorporation is, under Section 613, expressly made subject to any contrary
provision of the chapter. Such "contrary provisions" are found in Section 804
of the Business Corporation Law. These provide that "notwithstanding any
provision in the certificate of incorporation" the holders of shares of a class
(or series) shall be entitled to Vote s7 and to vote as a class8s in any case in
which an amendment of the certificate of incorporation would: (1) exclude or
limit their right to vote on any matter, except as such right may be limited by
voting rights given to new shares then being authorized of any existing or new
class (this is the counterpart of the second paragraph of Section 51 of the New
York Stock Corporation Law); (2) change, classify or reclassify their shares
under subparagraphs (b), (10), (11) or (12)89 of Section 801 (the effective
86. This provision originated in an amendment, in 1951, to N.Y. Stock Corp. Law§ 51. Prior thereto, an express provision in the certificate of incorporation was required
to exclude a shareholder's right to vote with respect to any matter for which a special
statutory shareholders' consent was prescribed.
87. Shares of any class or series of a class (see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 804(b)) which
are adversely affected by the amendment in the manner prescribed in Section 804(a) are
authorized to vote on the amendment, whether or not otherwise entitled to vote. In such
case, their shares are to be considered for quorum purposes (see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 608) and are to he deemed "outstanding" for purposes of determining whether the
requisite majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote have supported the amend-
ment (see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 803(a)).
88. Shares of any class or series of a class (see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 804(b)) which
are adversely affected by the amendment in the manner prescribed in Section 804(a) are
likewise authorized to vote as a class on the amendment, whether or not otherwise entitled
to vote as a class by the provisions of the certificate of incorporation. In such case, the
assent of a majority of the outstanding shares of such class or series is required to validate
the amendment.
89. These amendments involve classifications and reclassifications, presently authorized
under N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 35(3), which include such vital changes as the reduction
of the par value of authorized shares, the elimination or other adverse affect upon accrued
undeclared dividend rights, redemption rights, preemptive rights and the like. Generall-
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counterpart of the third paragraph of Section 51 of the New York Stock Cor-
poration Law), or provide for the conversion of their shares into shares of
another class or series, or alter their existing conversion rights, if any such
action would adversely affect such holders; (3) subordinate their rights by
authorizing shares having preferences which would be in any respect superior
to their rights (the counterpart of the third paragraph of Section 51 of the
New York Stock Corporation Law).
Voting trust agreements: Section 621 of the Business Corporation Law
perpetuates the policy in New York of authorizing voting trust "pooling"
arrangements by shareholders.90 It is the counterpart of Section 50 of the New
York Stock Corporation Law, construed by the Court of Appeals in In re
Morse9l to be a preemptive statute. This case, which presumably will continue
to serve as controlling precedent for voting trusts under Section 621 of the new
law, held that voting trust agreements do not stand or fall on common law
principles (which, in any case, appear never to have definitively settled the ques-
tion of the validity of such trusts) but are dependent for their validity upon
the statute embodying the ostensible public policy of the state in this area.
Accordingly, voting trust agreements to be valid must conform strictly to the
requirements of the statute which, in terms, authorizes only a transfer to the
voting trustee, under such an agreement, of the shareholder's voting rights.
Any attempt to vest other facets of the shareholder's beneficial ownership in
the voting trustee would apparently invalidate the trust (at least to the extent
of the unauthorized vesting).92 In In re Bacon,93 the Court of Appeals subse-
quently underlined the rule of strict construction by refusing to imply the right
of trustees to vote a (virtual) dissolution of the corporation from the share-
holders' transfer, without more, of the right to vote. The Court suggested that
the right of trustees to vote a dissolution (or presumably to take any other
extraordinary action) would have to be expressly spelled out by the terms of
the voting trust agreement.
Certain other basic features of the voting trust concept are invariable and
will continue to govern voting trust arrangements adopted pursuant to the new
law. It is, for example, axiomatic that the voting trust device be utilized for
legitimate ends and not contravene charter or statutory provisions, or con-
speaking, the accomplishment of a change authorized by these subdivisions of Section 801
provides a correlative right of appraisal to the shareholder adversely affected (see N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 806(b) (6)).
90. Note, the general "pooling" arrangement, authorized by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 620(a), which provides that shareholders may agree "that in exercising any voting rights,
the shares held by them shall be voted as therein provided, or as they may agree, or as
determined in accordance with a procedure agreed upon by them."
91. 247 N.Y. 290, 160 N.E. 374 (1928).
92. The Court suggested in the Morse case that components of the shareholder's full
share ownership, other than the right to vote, might be validly separated away from his
beneficial ownership-but not through the medium of the voting trust. Cf. Brentmore
Estates v. Hotel Barbizon, 263 App. Div. 389, 33 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1st Dep't 1942).
93. 287 N.Y. 1, 38 N.E.2d 105 (1941). See also Byington v. Piazza7 131 App. Div.
895 (1st Dep't 1909).
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template some oppression or wrong to shareholders or creditors.94 In Eisenberg
v. Central Zone Property Corp.,95 the Court of Appeals recently struck down
a voting trust which the majority shareholders sought to impose on the minority
shareholders against their will. The court stated that the voting trust was being
used in contravention of statute and in violation of the majority shareholders'
fiduciary duty to the minority. Other aspects of the voting trust, likewise of
continuing applicability under the new law, are such matters as the irrevocability
of the voting trust agreement (except perhaps with the unanimous consent of
the voting trust certificate holders), 96 the ready transferability of the voting
trust certificates,97 and the removability of derelict voting trustees by proceed-
ings in the supreme court.98
The basic structure of Section 621 corresponds very closely to the existing
statute in providing for: (1) a written voting trust agreement; (2) a duration
for such agreements not to exceed ten years;98a (3) the transfer to the voting
trustees only of voting rights; (4) the issuance by the voting trustees of voting
trust certificates in exchange for the shareholders' shares; (5) the maintenance
by the trustees at their office (or at a place designated in the agreement) of
correct and complete books and records of account relating to the trust and a
record listing the voting trust certificate holders, available for inspection by
the certificate holders; and (6) the filing of a duplicate voting trust agreement
in the office of the corporation9" which, along with the record of voting trust
certificate holders, shall be available for inspection by shareholders of record
and certificate holders (in person or by agent or attorney) in the same manner
as are the records of the corporation under Section 624 (the general inspection
statute).
However, despite the similarity in basic features between the new statute
and the existing one, some important variations are noteworthy:
(a) The "open-end" voting trust requirement has been eliminated. Under
the current statute "every other stockholder may transfer his stock to the same
trustee or trustees and thereupon shall be a party to such agreement." In In re
94. See In re Morse, supra note 91 at 298, 160 N.E. at 376, in which the Court stated
that the purpose of a voting trust must be legitimate. See Dal-Tran Service Co. v. Fifth
Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., supra note 70 at 356, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 557. See generally, Bal-
lantine, Voting Trusts-Their Abuses and Regulation, 21 Texas L. Rev. 139 (1943); Gose,
Legal Characteristics and Consequences of Voting Trusts, 20 Wash. L. Rev. 129 (1945).
95. 306 N.Y. 58, 115 N.E.2d 652 (1953).
96. See In re Morse, supra note 91 in which the Court stated that voting trusts are
irrevocable for the prescribed duration. Minnesota provides for revocability of voting
trusts by the holders of a majority in interest (see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 301.27). See Ballan-
tine, supra note 94 at 153, 164, 165.
97. See Union Trust Co. v. Oliver, 214 N.Y. 517, 108 N.E. 809 (1915).
98. See In re Allen, 178 Misc. 541, 35 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 264 App.
Div. 764, 35 N.Y.2d 717 (1st Dep't 1942), appeal denied, 288 N.Y. 738 (1942).
98a. Note, N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 130(c)(2) providing for a 5-year voting trust.
99. See DeMarco v. Paramount Ice Corp., 102 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1950) holding
that a failure to file the voting trust agreement does not invalidate the agreement but
merely renders it unenforceable until there has been compliance.
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Morse, °00 the Court of Appeals suggested that, quite apart from the express
requirement of the statute, such a provision would be indispensable to the
validity of a vote-control device like the voting trust because the public policy
of the state would not tolerate setting one group of shareholder "ins" against
another group of shareholder "outs," thereby creating the possibility of internal
corporate dissension. In eliminating the open-end trust requirement, the legis-
lature apparently did not perceive any serious danger of consequent intra-
corporate antagonism and was not notably impressed by the court's assessment
of policy needs. It was undoubtedly motivated by such considerations as the
impact of the Securities Act of 1933 on open-end voting trusts (the voting
trustee would be an "issuer" under the Act) and the desirability of allowing
this vote-control device (like others) to be governed, in this respect at least,
by ordinary contract principles and by the principle of delectus personarae.
(b) The duration of the trust may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding ten years by one or more certificate holders, by an agreement in writ-
ing at any time within six months before the expiration of the voting trust
agreement as originally fixed or as extended under the section. It is not clear
whether the foregoing provision for extending an existing voting trust agree-
ment, set forth in paragraph (d), would otherwise be judicially recognized in
light of the tendency to construe voting trust statutes strictly.' 0 ' In Kittinger
v. Curchill Evangelistic Ass'n, Inc.,102 a provision in a voting trust agreement
authorizing the voting trustees to extend the voting trust arrangement for an
additional ten-year term was held invalid, the court sustaining the validity of
the agreement for the authorized ten-year period. 10 3 In another case, 04 an
attempted oral extension of a voting trust agreement was assumed to be invalid.
Since the agreement may be extended by less than all of the original parties
thereto, paragraph (d) provides additionally that the extension agreement shall
not affect the rights or obligations of persons not parties to it.
Various provisions affecting voting trusts have been incorporated into other
sections of the new law. These provisions are mainly declaratory of rights
recognized judicially.
(a) Under paragraph (b) of Section 624 voting trust certificate holders
are expressly declared to be shareholders under that section, entitled to inspect
the general books and records of account, minutes and stock book of the cor-
poration. 10 5 The right to such an inspection had been recognized by the Court
100. Supra note 91.
101. See In re Morse, supra note 91; DeMarco v. Paramount Ice Corp., supra note 99.
102. 151 Misc. 350, 271 N.Y. Supp. 510 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 244 App. Div. 876, 281
N.Y. Supp. 680 (4th Dep't 1944).
103. For the proposition that the voting trust will be sustained for the permissible
period, see, also, Mannheimer v. Keehn, 41 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1943); same opinion,
officially reported, 30 Misc. 2d 584 (1962), modified, 268 App. Div. 813, 102 N.Y.S.2d 698
(4th Dep't 1944).
104. Wygood v. Makewell Hats, 265 App. Div. 286, 38 N.YS.2d 587 (1st Dep't 1942),
motion dismissed, 290 N.Y. 656, 49 N.E.2d 619 (1943).
105. Some conflict appears in the cases as to whether the right to inspect the voting
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of Appeals in In re Zlota Baczkowska v. 2166 Operating Corp.'0 6
(b) Under Section 626 and paragraph (b) of Section 720, voting trust
certificate holders are included among the persons authorized to sue derivatively.
Their right to do so has likewise been judicially sustained. 0 7
(c) Although no explicit reference to voting trustees is made therein, it
is inferable that voting trustees come within the terms of paragraph (c) of
Section 612 which authorizes shares held by a trustee and registered in his
name to be voted in person or by proxy. The implications of authorizing a
trustee to delegate his voting rights have been previously discussed under the
"qualification of voters" heading. As indicated in a previous discussion under
the same heading, it is likewise quite clear that voting trustees are governed
by paragraph (h) of Section 612 dealing with the subject of deadlock among
fiduciaries in the voting of shares under their control.
Proxies: Section 609 of the Business Corporation Law deals with the
mechanics of the proxy-the "heartbeat" of the modern corporate complex.' 05
It restates, without significant substantive change, existing statutory provisions
in Section 19 of the New York General Corporation Law and Sections 47 and
47-a of the New York Stock Corporation Law dealing with the mechanics of
voting by proxy. The section contains the familiar provisions that: (1) every
shareholder entitled to vote (or to register assent or dissent without a meeting)
may vote by proxy signed by him or his attorney-in-fact; (2) the maximum
duration of a proxy shall be eleven months unless otherwise provided in the
proxy; (3) the proxy shall be revocable at the pleasure of the shareholder
issuing it, subject to paragraphs (f) and (g) (dealing with subject of
irreVocable proxies); (4) authority to exercise a proxy shall not be revoked by
the death of the issuing shareholder unless prior to its exercise the corporation
receives written notice of such death; 10 9 (5) except as otherwise provided in a
written agreement, a pledgee who is registered on the corporate books shall
trust "stock" book is an absolute or qualified right. Compare, Bresnick v. Saypol, 57
N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1945), modified on other grounds, 270 App. Div. 837, 61 N.Y.S.2d
376 (1st Dep't 1946) in which the right was held to be qualified with In re Spanierman,
58 N.Y.S.2d 322, aff'd, 269 App. Div. 1023, 59 N.Y-.2d 400 (Ist Dep't 1946) holding that
general good faith need not be shown-but only compliance with the conditions imposed by
the statute itself. See, for a basic discussion of this conflict, the section in this paper
dealing with the right of inspection.
106. 279 App. Div. 775, 109 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Ist Dep't 1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 811, 109
N.E.2d 470 (1952). Note, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1316 which makes special provisions
for the inspection of the voting trust "stock" book in foreign corporations.
107. See Hayman v. Morris, 36 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
108. This paper is not the proper occasion for an extended discussion of the revolu-
tionary role played by the proxy in the development of the modern corporation. For
excellent materials and discussion of this area, see Baker & Cary, Corporations 157-248
(3d ed. 1959). Attention is directed to Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.,
309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955) for the New York view on the allocation of the
expenses of a proxy contest (including a discussion of the availability of corporate funds
for the reimbursement of the expenses of successful insurgents).
109. This provision changes the existing statute which provides that death shall not
revoke a proxy unless the corporation receives either written notice or "through an officer
or director, has actual knowledge of such death."
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
issue a proxy to the pledgor upon demand; and (6) no shareholder shall sell
his vote or issue a proxy for any sum of money or anything of value except as
authorized in paragraph" (f) (dealing with irrevocable proxies) or Section 620.
(dealing with agreements between shareholders as to voting, and control of
directors).
Paragraphs (j) and (g) deal with the subject of irrevocable proxies and
effectively retain the substance of Section 47-a 10 of the New York Stock Cor-
poration Law. Irrevocable proxies, not recognized in New York judicially, are
authorized to be issued to: (1) a pledgee; (2) a purchaser of the shares; (3) a
creditor who extends or continues credit to the corporation in consideration
thereof; (4) a person in exchange for services contracted as an officer of the
corporation; and (5) a person designated under an agreement as to voting of
shares pursuant to paragraph (a) of Section 620.111 Paragraph (g) declares that
such irrevocable proxies shall become revocable after the pledge is redeemed,
the contract of sale performed, an agreement relating to voting of shares
terminated and, after a maximum period of three years, where the proxy was
issued in consideration for extending or continuing credit to the corporation
or the performance of services as an officer of the corporation. Under paragraph
(h), continuing a parallel rule under Section 47-a of the New York Stock Cor-
poration Law, an irrevocable proxy may be revoked by a subsequent purchaser
without notice of its existence, unless the fact that there is an outstanding
irrevocable proxy appears plainly on the certificate representing the share.
Cumulative voting: Section 618 of the Business Corporation Law, dealing
with the subject of cumulative voting in the election of directors, is identical in
both form and substance with Section 49 of the New York Stock Corporation
Law. It is mainly notable that New York policy has remained constant in
this area in two important respects: first, the adoption of the cumulative
voting device in aid of minority shareholder representation on the board remains
optional"2 ; and, second, it can be made available only by provision in the
certificate of incorporation; .a by-law provision therefor will not suffice, 1
3
110. Ushered into the New York law in 1953 under a recommendation of the Law
Revision Commission (see N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 1953 Legis. Doc. No. 65(G)
233-262). New York courts had rejected the doctrine, prevailing in some states, of the
irrevocable proxy "coupled with an interest" (see In re Germicide Co., 65 Hun 606, 20
N.Y. Supp. 495 (1st Dep't 1892); Sullivan v. Parkes, 69 App. Div. 221, 74 N.Y. Supp. 787
(1st Dep't 1902). But cf. Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun 230, 32 N.Y. Supp. 627 (4th Dep't 1895).
111. This constitutes the sole variation from the existing statute, and is made necessary
by the new vote-pooling arrangement provided under Section 620(a).
112. Cumulative voting is made mandatory in a large number of states by consti-
tutional provision (13 states) and by statute (7 states).
113. See Thistlewaite v. Thistlewaite, 200 Misc. 64, 101 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
In re Schack (Crown Heights Hosp.), 183 Misc. 563, 49 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct. 1944). Note
the interesting case of In re Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, 116 N.YS.2d 106 (Sup.
Ct. 1952), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 940 (1st Dep't 1953) holding that the adoption of a provi-
sion in the certificate of incorporation for cumulative voting had the effect of overriding
an existing by-law which authorized a majority of the shareholders to remove a director
without cause. These provisions being incompatible, the by-law had to give way.
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although in Daum v. Kinsman (In re American Fibre Chair Seat Corp.), M the
Court of Appeals supported the right of a shareholder to vote cumulatively in
an election of directors, where prior thereto the shareholders had unanimously
adopted a by-law resolution providing for cumulative voting but the corporate
officers had neglected to file the necessary amendment to the certificate of
incorporation.
Familiar techniques for diluting cumulative voting strength (such as,
the use of the staggered board;"15 extending the term of directors beyond a
year; filling vacancies by board action; removal of directors) have been recog-
nized and countered in the new law in the following practical and balanced
manner;"I 6
(a) Paragraph (a) of Section 703 provides for the election of directors
for a term of one year, except as authorized in Section 704 (dealing with
classification of directors).
(b) Paragraph (a) of Section 704 provides that no class in a staggered
board shall include less than three directors. This provision is perhaps a
preferable substitute for the Model Act provision that there shall be no classifi-
cation unless the board consists of at least nine members, and is aimed at making
it possible for a substantial minority group to elect a representative at each
annual meeting at which a class in a staggered board is up for election. It is
almost too obvious to require statement that no minority group, however large,
can elect a representative on the board when only two directors are to be
elected .11 7
Paragraph (c) of Section 704 provides that where the board is staggered,
and the number of directors is increased by the board (through by-law action
authorized under paragraph (b) of Section 702) and such newly created
directorships are then filled by the very board that voted the increase (as
authorized under paragraph (a) of Section 705), there shall be no classifica-
tion of the additional directors until the next annual meeting of shareholders.
This provision is designed to preclude any possible manipulation by directors
of the constitution of the board for an extended period so as to deprive share-
holders (particularly minority shareholders exercising cumulative voting rights)
of the most prized prerogative of share ownership-the selection of corporate
managers.
(c) Under subparagraph (c) (1) of Section 706, removal of directors,
whether with or without cause, is subject to the qualification that where provi-
114. 265 N.Y. 416, 193 N.E. 253 (1934).
115. Where cumulative voting is guaranteed by constitutional provision, a serious
constitutional question may arise as to the validity of a statute authorizing the use of the
staggered board device (see Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955). But cf.
Janney v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956).
116. It is recognized that there is really no adequate method of protecting cumulative
voting except by making it mandatory (which permits the least amount of dilution).
117. Note the discussion of the mechanics of cumulative voting in Baker and Cary,
supra note 108 at 203. See ,Williams, Cumulative Voting For Directors (1951).
521
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
sion for cumulative voting has been made: (1) no director may be removed
by the shareholders when the number of shares voted against the removal in
the proceedings therefor would have been sufficient, if voted cumulatively, to
have elected such director in an election of directors at which the same total
number of shares were voted and the entire board were being elected; and (2)
no director can be removed by the board (as authorized under paragraph (a)
of Section 709).
C. Right to receive payment for shares-the "right of appraisal"
Occasions for its exercise: When purchasing his share interest in the cor-
poration, the shareholder is presumed to contract with a view to the existing
body of state statutes affecting corporations, whether found in the general
corporation laws or elsewhere under state law, and subject, as well, to the state's
reserve power to amend or abolish any such statute. If the governing body of
statutes are in all respects legal and the reserve power is exercised conformably
with due process requirements, the shareholder's rights can be substantially
and vitally affected by the corporation without entitling the shareholder to any
corresponding ameliorative."18 However, New York has for many years chosen
to provide shareholders entitled to vote, whose contracts have been affected
qualitatively by certain corporate actions, with the alternative of accepting
the changed status and remaining in corporation solution or of being "bought
out" by receiving payment of the fair value of their shares, traditionally known
as the "right of appraisal.""19 This right of appraisal would appear to be purely
a creature of statute and to depend for its existence upon the legislative grant. 2 0
There is no concrete evidence in the New York cases that such right may be
granted, in the absence of statute, in the exercise of the equity powers of a
court. It has been held, accordingly, that the legislatively created right of
appraisal must be strictly construed and that a very close adherence by the
courts to the precise terms of the statute is required.' 2 ' When statutorily
provided, the right of appraisal generally constitutes the shareholder's exclusive
remedy. 22 The remedy is not exclusive, however, where elements of fraud,
bad faith and overreaching by directors or shareholder majorities are present,
118. See Garzo v. Maid of Mist Steamboat Co., 303 N.Y. 525, 104 N.E.2d 887 (1952).
119. The shareholder must be a "bona fide" one who does not purchase shares for
the purpose of harassing the other shareholders. It has been rather clearly held that one
who acquires his shares after notices have been sent of the shareholders' meeting, at which
action on a matter (subject to appraisal rights) is to be considered, will not be entitled
to appraisal (see In re Leventall, 241 App. Div. 277, 271 N.Y. Supp. 493 (1st Dep't 1934);
Dynamics Corporation of America v. Abraham & Co., 4 Misc. 2d 50, 152 N.Y.S.2d 807
(Sup. Ct. 1956), modified, 1 A.D.2d 1005, 153 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't 1956); Application
of Stem, 82 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Flagg-Utica v. Baselice, supra note 85.
120. Garzo v. Maid of Mist Steamboat Co., supra note 118.
121. In re McKinney, 306 N.Y. 207, 117 N.E.2d 256 (1954); In re Marcus (R. H.
Macy & Co.), 297 N.Y. -38, 74 N.E.2d 228 (1947); Anderson v. International Mineral &
Chemical Corp., 295 N.Y. 343, 67 N.E.2d 573 (1946).
122. Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561
(1949); Anderson v. International Mineral & Chemical Corp., supra note 121; Blumenthal
v. Roosevelt Hotel, 202 Misc. 988, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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or where the statutory procedures for appraisal are disregarded; in such case,
an injunction or action to set aside a consummated appraisal would be avail-
able.'2 3
While it has been suggested that the grant of the right of appraisal may
remove any doubts concerning the constitutionality of some of the more radical
changes in the shareholder's contract authorized by the 1943 amendment to
Section 35 of the New York Stock Corporation Law (and perpetuated in the
new business corporation law)12 4 the view has been expressed that the grant
of such right will neither validate nor render constitutional acts which in the
absence thereof would violate due process. In Garzo v. Maid of Mist Steamship
Co.,' 25 the Court of Appeals raised this question and expressly left it open
because the change involved in that case was "not so 'organic' or fundamental
as to give rise to constitutional doubt." One of the more radical amendatory
changes authorized-the elimination of accrued undeclared dividend rights-
was sustained in McNulty v. W. J. Sloane 2 6 as to its validity and constitu-
tionality in a comprehensive review of the effect of the 1943 amendment to
Section 35. The subsequent case of Arstein v. Robert Reis & Co.,'27 in which
an amendment eliminating accrued undeclared dividend rights was sustained
in the lower court on the authority of McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, was carried
to the United States Supreme Court on a constitutional ground but certiorari
was denied.
Although in the case of an elimination of accrued undeclared dividend
rights, the shareholder was held in the McNulty'2 case to be entitled to a
right of appraisal on the ground that the preferential rights of his outstanding
shares having preferences were adversely affected, other extreme changes in
preferential rights effected by amendments have been held not to entitle the
shareholder so affected to an appraisal of his shares. In In re Dresser,29 an
amendment that superimposed a new class of shares having preferences superior
to those of an existing class of preferred shares was held not to alter the exist-
ing shareholders' preferential rights and no right of appraisal was available.
The rationale for the affirmance of this case without opinion by the Court of
Appeals was supplied in the subsequent case of In re Silberkraus. 30 The Court
there explained that "[T] he right is distinct from the value of the right" and
123. Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 306 N.Y. 58, 115 N.E.2d 652 (1953);
Brown v. Ramsdell, 227 App. Div. 224, 237 N.Y. Supp. 573 (4th Dep't 1929); In re
Drosnes, 187 App. Div. 425, 175 N.Y. Supp. 628 (1st Dep't 1919); see also Starrett Corp.
v. Fifth Ave. & Twenty-Ninth St. Corp., 1 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
124. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 801(9),(10),(11).
125. Supra note 118.
126. 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.YS.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
127. 77 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 963, 79 N.Y.S.2d 314
(1st Dep't 1948), leave to appeal denied, 298 N.Y. 931, 81 N.E.2d 335 (1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 860 (1948).
128. Supra note 126.
129. 221 App. Div. 786, 223 N.Y. Supp. 864 (4th Dep't 1927), aff'd, 247 N.Y. 553,
161 N.E. 179 (1928).
130. 250 N.Y. 242, 165 N.E. 279 (1929).
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that the right of appraisal is available only when the "right" as distinguished
from the "value of the right" is affected by the amendment. But, as held in
the Dresser case, the mere creation of a new class of shares with prior prefer-
'ences to those of an existing preferred class, although it may affect the value of
the rights of shareholders of the existing class, does not alter the right itself.
"The old preferred," declared the court, "was not retired nor, in principle at
least, were the preferential rights displaced." The situation is different, how-
ever, when the amendment, in addition to creating a new class of preferred
stock, entirely eliminated the old class; upon retirement of the old class of
shares, their preferential rights fall. "Abolition is alteration," said the court,
and in such case, the right of appraisal exists. In In re Kinney,131 the Court of
Appeals reaffirmed, extended and further clarified the rule of the Silberkraus
case. In this case, a reclassification of the capital stock structure of the cor-
poration involved the creation of a new preferred class of shares with prior
preferences over existing preferred shares as to dividends and distribution of
assets upon liquidation (despite the existence of accrued undeclared dividend
claims of existing cumulative preferred shares), and the reduction of stated
no-par value common shares of $10 stated value to par value shares of $1 par
value. The Court declared that the legislature had authorized appraisal rights
"where an alteration changed the preferential rights within the corporation as
between different classes of shares." If there is no change in the relationship of
existing outstanding classes, the fact that both are subjected to a new class
with prior preferences does not involve a violation giving rise to the right of
appraisal. No alteration of a preferential right occurs where, as between the
different classes of outstanding shares, such rights as previously existed "are
left unchanged as between themselves, but are made subject to a new issue of
stock." In re Silberkraus was likewise clarified with respect to when an altera-
tion can be said to "adversely affect" the preferential right. Here the Court
appeared to shift ground considerably for it now took the different position
that questions of benefit or detriment were not relevant,132 but only the essen-
tial question of whether the relative preference positions of existing outstanding
classes would be affected by the amendment; find such an affect-and the
preferential right is altered irrespective of whether the change produces bene-
ficial results. As regards the amendment reducing the stated value of the no-
par value shares, the Court held that the preferential rights of the shareholders
having preferences had been adversely affected on the theory that prior to the
reduction the existing preferred shares were in position to benefit from the
earning power of the enhanced capital; that this was not the case after the
131. 279 N.Y. 423, 18 N.E.2d 645 (1929).
132. In the Silberkraus case, the court had stated that:
When as a matter of law, the conclusion cannot be avoided that the alteration has
produced advantages to the outstanding shares, the holder might not become
entitled to purely theoretical relief. When, however, the result of the alteration
is not clear, the wishes of the stockholder rather than the conception of the courts
should prevail.
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reduction of capital since the fund so obtained, being available for distribution
as dividends, the "cumulative preferred stock had lost its right to rely upon
this portion of the capital." This complex of cases beginning with In re
Dresser 33 and culminating in In re Kinney," 4 decided prior to 1943, reflect
the current rule in New York unless the 1943 amendments to Sections 35 and 38
of the Stock Corporation Law were intended to overrule them. There is no
indication of any such intention-indeed, objective proof that these authorities
were not intended to be disturbed by such amendments appears from a con-
sideration of the 1951 amendment of Section 51 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law. That amendment grants voting rights to any class of shares
without voting rights that is adversely affected by (1) an amendment reclassify-
ing the stock structure of the corporation and (2) to any class of share having
preferences that will be subordinated by the authorization of shares having
prior preferences. This would appear to be clear legislative recognition of the
continuing authority (as of 1951) of the Kinney case-for otherwise there
would be no need to delineate a second category of subordinated preferences
(which would ostensibly be subsumed under the first category of shares of a
class adversely affected by a reclassification pursuant to subdivision -three of
Section 35 of the Stock Corporation Law). Recent lower court cases continue
to rely on In re Kinney as a controlling precedent.
13
The foregoing rather extended (although necessarily incomplete) recital
of the current body of substantive law affecting the right of appraisal is moti-
vated by the circumstance that, with but limited exceptions, it has been carried
over and will remain effective under the new law. Hence, the right of appraisal
is granted, as under existing law, in the case of merger,'13 consolidation" T and
transactions involving all or substantially all the corporate assets, not made in
the regular course of the business actually conducted by the corporation 3 s
(Section 910 of the Business Corporation Law); the sale during liquidation
(after dissolution) of all or part of the remaining assets (after paying or
adequately providing for corporation liabilities) for securities (or a combination
of cash and securities) and a distribution of such securities among the share-
holders according to their respective interests'"9 (subparagraph (a) (3) (A)
133. Supra note 129.
134. Supra note 131.
135. See Brill v. Blakely, 281 App. Div. 532, 120 N.Y.S.2d 713 (lst Dep't 1953);
Sterling v. 16 Park Avenue, 132 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sup.. Ct. 1954), modified, 284 App. Div.
1033, 136 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1st Dep't 1954); Standard Brewing Co. v. Peachey, 202 Misc.
279, 108 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1951). It is well to note two changes made, in 1943, in
N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 38(11) (a) which provides appraisal right when preferential rights
are altered or abolished: (1) it was made applicable only to shares "having preferences"
(these include only preferred shares under N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 11); (2) the preferred
shareholders must be "adversely affected." Both of these changes have been carried over
into the new law (see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 806(b)(6)(A)).
136. See N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 85(7).
137. See N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 87, 91(7).
138. See N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 20.
139. See N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 105(9).
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of Section 1005); amendments to the certificate of incorporation, adversely
affecting the holder of shares, which alter or abolish (a) any preferential right
of outstanding preferred shares, (b) any provision or right in respect of the
redemption of outstanding shares (or in the event of the creation of such provi-
sion or right), (c) any preemptive right to acquire shares or other securities;
and (d) an amendment which excludes or limits the right of a holder to vote
on any matter, except as such right is limited by voting rights given to new
shares then being authorized of, any existing or new class140 (subparagraph (b)
(6) of Section 806). Likewise, under paragraph (k) of Section 623, the right
of appraisal is made exclusive, except that the shareholder may bring an ap-
propriate action to obtain relief on the ground that the action taken is illegal
or fraudulent. 141 Section 910 further retains existing law by providing that only
shareholders entitled to vote may claim appraisal rights142 (with the single
exception in the case of a parent-subsidiary merger under Section 905 where,
although no shareholder authorization is required for the merger, an objecting
shareholder of the subsidiary corporation is entitled to appraisal rights). 143
Other rules affecting appraisal, of purely judicial origin, will unquestionably
continue to have vitality under the new law to the extent that there is no evi-
dence -of a legislative intention to overrule them.' 44
Only two substantive variations from existing appraisal rights appear to
have been engendered by the new law:
(1) The right of appraisal currently available to an objecting shareholder
under Section 14 of the New York Stock Corporation Law in the event that
his preemptive right Has been disturbed by the creation of an employee stock
purchase plan has been eliminated. Under the formulation in the new law, un-
less otherwise provided by the certificate of incorporation, no preemptive right
is available where shares are issued to directors, officers or employees pursuant
to paragraph (d) of Section 505 (subparagraph (e) (2) of Section 622); but
under paragraph (d) of Section 505, there has been substituted for the right of
appraisal the requirement that, if the certificate of incorporation preserves the
preemptive rights of shares in such case, the issue of "incentive" rights or
options to directors, officers or employees of a corporation, or a subsidiary or
affiliate thereof, to purchase shares shall be authorized by a majority of all the
outstanding shares of such corporation entitled to vote and a majority of the
140. See N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 38(11).
141. See supra note 123 for authorities there cited.
142. In re Harwitz (Republic Pictures Corp.), 192 Misc. 91, 80 N.YS.2d 570 (Sup.
Ct. 1948). It is well to note in this context that under N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 51 (also
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 804(a)) a shareholder, not otherwise entitled to vote, may become
entitled to vote (and, hence, to the right of .appraisal) if pursuant to an amendment therein
described his rights are adversely affected.
143. This perpetuates the existing provision embodied in N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 85(7).
144. For example, the rule that shareholders not of record may exercise appraisal
rights (see In re Bacon (Susquehanna Silk Mills) supra note 93; Matter of Deutschmann,
281 App. Div. 14, 116 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dep't 1952); Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel,
supra note 122).
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shares entitled to exercise the preemptive rights (such vote to operate as a
release of such preemptive rights).
(2) Under subparagraph (a) (2) of Section 910, upon a transaction in-
volving the disposition of all or substantially all of the corporate assets, not
in the regular course of the business actually conducted by the corporation, the
right of appraisal otherwise granted under Section 910 to non-assenting share-
holders will not be available where the transaction is wholly for cash and the
shareholders' authorization thereof is conditioned upon the distribution of all
the net proceeds of such transaction to the shareholders according to their
respective interests within one year after the date of the transaction and is
likewise conditioned upon the (prior or subsequent) dissolution of the corpora-
tion. This change was induced by two considerations: first, to provide a statu-
tory basis at the state level for the tax advantages accruing under Section 337
of the Internal Revenue Code from a sale or exchange of corporate assets and
the distribution of the net proceeds thereof to the shareholders in complete
liquidation within a twelve-month period thereafter; and, second, to equate the
appraisal consequences of such a transaction (as is described above) with the
precisely parallel circumstances of the ordinary dissolution and liquidation
wherein no appraisal rights are accorded.
Procedure to enforce shareholders' right to receive payment for shares:
Under Section 623 of the Business Corporation Law, important changes have
been effected in existing law in the manner of enforcing an available right of
appraisal-although in its main outlines the procedure under the new law is
similar to Section 21 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, its current
counterpart.
(a) Perhaps the most significant departure from the present appraisal
procedure is the requirement that the shareholder seeking appraisal file
with the corporation not only a written notice of objection to the proposed
action, at or prior to the meeting at which shareholder approval is sought
(paragraph (a)), but also notice oj election to claim dissenter's rights (para-
graph (c)) after such shareholder approval has been obtained and notice of
this fact has been given by the corporation to each shareholder with a right to
dissent (paragraph (b)). The purpose of this dual filing requirement is (by
the notice of objection) to give the corporation the basis for an early assessment
of the initial reaction of the shareholders to the proposed action, its likelihood
of success and the advisability of scrapping it entirely or making necessary
adjustments, and (by the notice of election to claim dissenter's rights) to
postpone the decision to seek an appraisal until after the shareholders have
had an opportunity for fuller consideration at the shareholders' meeting of the
factors involved in the proposed action. Under present procedure, the claim
for an appraisal accompanies the notice of objection filed prior to the share-
holders' meeting.
(b) The section clarifies an area that is left to conjecture under the present
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statute by providing that a shareholder must dissent, if at all, as to all shares
registered in his name of which he is the beneficial owner. In the case of a
nominee or fiduciary, non-beneficial owners of record, a dissent filed by such
nominee or fiduciary in behalf of a particular beneficial owner whom he
represents must be as to all the shares of such owner, although the nominee
or fiduciary who represents more than one beneficial owner need not, if he
wishes to dissent on behalf of any such owner, file dissents for the remaining
owners (paragraph (d)).
(c) Initial responsibility is placed upon the corporation to initiate judicial
proceedings for appraisal in the event extra-judicial agreement on the value of
the shares cannot be reached (subparagraph (h) (1)). The shareholder is
authorized to commence such proceedings only upon the failure of the corpora-
tion to do so within the prescribed period of time (subparagraph (h) (2)). This
varies existing procedure and is motivated by the desirability of forestalling
multiple shareholder actions (normally consolidated in any case). Should the
corporation fail to assume its responsibility to commence the proceedings, the
penalty provided is that the court may consider such failure as a factor in
assessing the costs and expenses of the proceeding against the parties (sub-
paragraph (h) (7) (C)). All shareholders who have filed notices of election
to claim dissenter's rights (and who have not settled with the corporation)
must be made parties to the proceeding, which is thereby converted into an
action quasi-in-rem against their shares. The jurisdiction of the court is plenary
and exclusive (subparagraph (h) (3)).
(d) A qualitative variation from existing law is found in paragraph ())
which authorizes the satisfaction of appraisal rights from any corporate funds
unless the corporation is insolvent or would be rendered insolvent thereby.
Under existing procedure, "capital impairment" rather than equity insolvency
is the standard for satisfaction of appraisal rights and the corporation is au-
thorized to invade capital for such purpose to the extent only of the capital
represented by the shares so appraised-so that "the effect of any such pur-
chase ... shall not be to reduce the actual value of the assets of the corpora-
tion to an amount less than the total amount of its debts and liabilities, plus
the amount of its capital so applied" (Section 21(2) of the New York Stock
Corporation Law). If the corporation is insolvent (i.e., unable to pay debts
as they become due in the usual course of its business)' 45 when the right to
appraisal is established, paragraph (j) makes detailed provision for such
eventuality which, generally, allows the shareholder to withdraw his notice of
election (and be restored to his status as a shareholder with the' consequences
set forth in paragraph (e)), or to retain his status in the corporation with
prescribed consequences. The shift to the "insolvency" standard, coordinating
Section 623 with a parallel provision in subparagraph (b) (3) of Section 513,
reflects a legislative policy to allow minority shareholders to "buy-out" of a
145. See for the statutory definition of insolvency, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 102(8).
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corporation whenever they dissent from some extreme action taken by the
majority shareholders, even though the buy-out may involve utilizing the capital
contribution of such majority shareholders. One can hardly cavil at such a policy.
(e) The right of appraisal has a very narrow application to foreign cor-
porations under the new law. It is in terms applicable to such corporations only
in the case of merger or consolidation (paragraph (m)). Even in such case,
however, a duty is imposed upon a surviving or consolidated corporation, which
is, or is to be, formed under the law of a foreign jurisdiction, to satisfy any
appraisal rights arising by virtue of such merger or consolidation in favor of
dissenting shareholders of constituent domestic corporations only (subparagraph
(d) (2) (D) of Section 907). The appraisal rights of shareholders of constit-
uent foreign corporations will presumably depend upon the domiciliary law
of the surviving or consolidated corporation (or perhaps of the particular
foreign corporation involved if it is not the surviving or consolidated cor-
poration).
Section 623 provides that the shareholder is entitled upon appraisal to the
"fair value" of his shares (paragraph (g); subparagraph (h) (4)) but does
not provide any definitive clue as to the standard for appraising such value,
except for the suggestion that it shall be determined "as of the close of business
on the day prior to the shareholders' authorization date, excluding any apprecia-
tion or depreciation directly or indirectly induced by such corporate action
or its proposal." The appraiser is alerted against considering an artificial
market reaction to the proposed action in estimating the value of the shares.
In In re Fulton 46 the Court of Appeals held that there is no one factor which
alone controls the determination of fair value. Market quotations, while not
necessarily decisive, are entitled to great weight where there is a free and open
market on a recognized exchange, and the volume of the transactions and the
surrounding circumstances make such market value a fair reflection of the
judgment of informed buyers and sellers. 147 Where the shares are not listed
on any exchange but are bought and sold in the over-the-counter market, market
price is a less reliable index because unlisted stock transactions are not recorded
nor subject to regulation and control; all that is available as a matter of record
are the "bid" prices which vary considerably from ,the "asked prices." Hence,
in such case, market price should not constitute a controlling factor in the
determination of fair value.148 Under the influence of In re Fulton,149 the
146. 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931). See for a good discussion of evaluation for
share appraisals, Note, 6 Brooklyn L. Rev. 86 (1949).
147. In re Kaufman, Alsberg & Co., 15 A.D.2d 468, 222 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1st Dep't
1961); In re Deutschmann (American Tel. & Tel. Co.), 281 App. Div. 14, 116 N.Y.S.2d
548 (1st Dep't 1952); In re Marcus (R. H. Macy & Co.), 191 Misc. 808, 77 N.Y.S.2d 529
(Sup. Ct. 1948), modified, 273 App. Div. 275, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76 (lst Dep't 1948), aff'd, 302
N.Y. 881, 100 NX..2d 55 (1951); In re Behrens, 183 Misc. 736, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct.
1946), aff'd, 271 App. Div. 1007, 69 N.YS.2d 910 (1st Dep't 1961).
148. In re Silverman (Hoe & Co.), 282 App. Div. 252, 122 N.YS.2d 312 (1st Dep't
1953), rev'd on other grounds, 305 N.Y. 13, 110 N.E.2d 402 (1953).
149. Supra note 146.
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cases in New York apply the uniform rule that, in determining fair value for
appraisal purposes, consideration must be given to "investment value" and
"net asset" factors along with "market value"-although market value is prob-
ably the most influential factor where, as indicated above, the circumstances
are propitious for its use.1 50 In applying the "net asset" theory of value, courts
view the corporation in its "going-concern" character rather than in terms of
its dissolution. It is the value of the assets, used as a clue to price, by an
intelligent investor seeking to purchase a minority interest in a going concern,
which constitutes the basis for estimating value under this theory.'0 ' The
"net asset" approach has received its greatest support in cases where there is
no market for the shares in question, that is, in close corporation type cases. 10 2
D. Preemptive rights
The shareholder's right to preserve his relative voting and dividend
position in the corporation by preempting a pro-rata portion of new shares to
be issued by the corporation, recognized at common law, was first codified, in
1941, in Section 39 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, the most compre-
hensive statutory treatment of the preemptive right in the country. The essen-
tial structure and substance of this statute has been retained, with but a minor
addition, in Section 622 of the Business Corporation Law. Although the provi-
sions of the statute are made exclusive under paragraph (i) of Section 622, a
brief review of the common law background will aid in illuminating some of
the substantive features of the statute and in an understanding of residual
problems. The earliest definitive recognition of the preemptive right in New
York came in the landmark case of Stokes v. Continental Trust Co. 0 3 in which
the Court of Appeals treated the preemptive right as an inviolable "vested right
of property" which could be neither eliminated nor impaired without the
affected shareholder's consent. The Court settled the theory of the preemptive
right for New York in the following comment:
a stockholder has an inherent right to a proportionate share of
new stock issued for money only and not to purchase property for
the purposes of the corporation or to effect a consolidation, and while
he can waive the right, he cannot be deprived of it without his con-
sent except when the stock is issued at a fixed price not less than
par, and he is given the right to take at that price in proportion to
his holding, or in some other equitable way that will enable him to
150. In re Fulton, supra note 146; In re Marcus (R. H. Macy & Co.), supra note
147; In re Karlin (United Paramount Theatres), 202 Misc. 792, 111 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Sup.
Ct. 1951); see generally, Note, 16 Brooklyn L. Rev. 86 (1949).
151. In re Fulton, supra note 146; Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349
(Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1st Dep't 1946), appeal de-
nied, 296 N.Y. 1058 (1947); In re Behrens, supra note 147.
152. In re Marcus CR. H. Macy & Co.), 191 Misc. 808, 77 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
153. 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906).
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protect his interest by acting on his own judgment and using his own
resources.' 54
It will be noted that the right of the shareholder to maintain his ratio of con-
trol or equity in the corporation was held to exist where (a) new shares were
to be issued; (b) for cash (and not for property or to effect a consolidation);
and (c) at not less than the par value of the shares. The Court squarely up-
held the right of the corporation to fix the price at which the preemptive
right could be exercised at the fair value of the shares (considerably above
par) and established as the measure of damages for breach of the preemptive
right the difference between the market value of the shares on the day of the
sale to the ofitsider (banking house) and the price at which the corporation
had contracted to sell such shares to the bank. Shareholders are not relegated
to a suit for damages in the event the preemptive right is violated. They can
insist upon their right to a proportion of the shares, for "otherwise the ma-
jority could deprive the minority of -their proportionate power in the election
of directors and their proportionate right to share in the surplus ....
The prevailing notion that the preemptive right did not exist with respect
to originally authorized but unissued shares was reviewed and qualified by
the Court of Appeals in Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co.'l5 The
Court suggested that the proposition that original issue is not subject to pre-
emptive rights had been stated too broadly. It was true if originally au-
thorized shares were issued for ordinary going-concern purposes to raise
money to be used in the conduct of the business, but was not true if the
original issue had been reserved, in the early corporate projection, for pur-
poses of a possible future expansion of corporate activities. In the latter case,
the shareholders would presumably not have established their ratio of owner-
ship on the basis of the total original authorization. In addition, a preemptive
right in original issue, although not available as a general rule, is generated
when directors authorize the issue to themselves of originally authorized
shares for the primary purpose of converting their status from minority to
majority shareholders. "Such conduct," said the Court, ". .. is.inequitable in
the highest degree. It involves a breach of the duty of the directors as fidu-
ciaries representing all the stockholders, irrespective of any doctrine of pre-
emptive right . . . .Before acquiring stock for such a purpose, the directors
should offer it a fixed price to all the stockholders, sell at auction, or obtain
a waiver of their rights."' 56 This equitable doctrine that a preemptive right
may be created when directors breach their fiduciary duty to the shareholders
by an improper use of original issue-was applied by the Appellate Divi-
sion in Hammer v. Werner157 where the shares taken by the directors to con-
154. Id. at 299, 78 N.E. at 1094-5.
154a. Id. at 298, 78 N.E. at 1094.
155. 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930).
156. Id. at 279, 170 N.E. at 919.
157. 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N.Y. Supp. 172 (2d Dep't 1933).
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vert themselves into majority shareholders were treasury shares, normally not
subject to preemptive rights.
The foregoing common law authorities did not carefully delineate the
character of the voting control and dividend rights to be protected by the
exercise of the preemptive right. Should, for example, a non-voting preferred
shareholder with no interest in the balance of the surplus remaining after his
preference is paid be entitled to a pro-rata share of newly created shares of
his own class or a new class of preferred or common shares, or should con-
tingent voting shareholders be so entitled with respect to a new issue of shares
of their own class or voting shares of a new class? This problem area is care-
fully manicured in paragraph (a) of Section 622 which defines with precision
the kinds of shares that are entitled to exercise preemptive rights. These
are: (a) voting shares, described as shares possessing an uncontingent right
to vote for the election of one or more directors; . and (b) "equity" shares
with "unlimited dividend rights," described as shares possessing "the right
without limitation as to amount eitler to all or to a share of the balance of
current or liquidating dividends after payment of dividends on any shares
entitled to a preference." So defined, equity shares would clearly include com-
mon shares and participating preferred shares, but would not include ordinary
preferred shares which have no interest in the balance of current or liquidating
dividends after their preferences are accounted for. Under paragraphs (b)
and (c), except where a contrary provision is made in the certificate of incor-
poration, such equity and voting shares are entitled to exercise the pre-
emptive right as to subsequently issued equity shares, or shares or other
securities convertible into or carrying rights or options to purchase such
equity shares, and voting shares or shares or other securities convertible into
or carrying rights or options to purchase voting shares, as the case may be.
No preemptive right is available with respect to newly issued (non-equity)
preferred shares or contingent voting shares.
At the outset of the revision project, it was suggested by the New York
State Bar Association that "in failing to assign a priority as between preserva-
tion of relative voting rights and relative dividend rights, it (the present
Section 39 of the New York Stock Corporation Law) imposes requirements
which in practical situations prove unworkable.' '1r8 The practical problem of
effectively implementing the preemptive right when complex capital stock
structures are involved has been noted by the commentators-indeed, one
commentator has suggested preserving the preemptive right idea only for the
protection of voting rights and leaving the protection of dividend and assets
rights to judicial implementation on the basis of equitable principles.YO A
158. See joint Legislative Comm. to Study Revision of Corporation Laws, (First)
Interim Report to 1957 Session of N.Y. State Legislature, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 17 (1957),
at 84-85.
159. Frey, Shareholders' Preemptive Rights, 38 Yale L.J. 586, 583 (1929).
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number of states deny the exercise of preemptive rights unless specifically
prescribed by the certificate of incorporation. It has been suggested that the
latter approach is preferable because it permits the corporation to design the
preemptive right in a practical manner at the time each class of shares is au-
thorized.160 Such arguments aside, however, if the common law formulation
of the preemptive right is to be retained as a matter of policy-as it is in
Section 622-an entirely satisfactory solution of the question of priorities
does not seem feasible as a matter of policy choices or drafting convenience.
That is why paragraph (d) retains the general formulation of the existing
statute that "In case each of the shares entitling the holders thereof to pre-
emptive rights does not confer the same unlimited dividend right or voting
right, the board shall apportion the shares or other securities . . . in such
proportions as in the opinion of the board shall preserve as Jar as practicable
the relative unlimited dividend rights and voting rights of the holders at the
time of such offering. The apportionment made by the board shall, in the
absence of fraud or bad faith, be binding upon all shareholders." (Emphasis
added.) A solution of the problem of priorities as between voting and equity
shares is available to some degree by the device of selecting new securities
that skirt the preemptive right altogether, or by the creation, where feasible,
of new classes of shares perfectly parallel in all respects with existing classes.
In addition, by making the preemptive right subject to any contrary pro-
vision of the certificate of incorporation, Section 622 authorizes the limitation
or total elimination of preemptive rights in newly organized corporations. In
the case of existing corporations, the preemptive right may be excluded alto-
gether or limited by depriving a class of existing preemptive rights or of
a preemptive right in a newly created class by amendment of the certificate
of incorporation under Section 801, subject, however, to the right of appraisal
available under subparagraph (b) (6) (C) of Section 806 to shareholders
adversely affected thereby.16'
As indicated above, preemptive rights were made available at common
law only when new shares were to be issued for cash. In codifying the com-
mon law exceptions to the preemptive right paragraph (e) retains, with a
minor addition, existing statutory provisions. Thus, no preemptive rights are
available when new shares are issued for: (1) merger or consolidation pur-
poses; 1 62 (2) consideration other than cash (this. includes, but is not limited
to, the purchase of property and the payment of debts);163 (3) the satisfac-
160. Drinker, The Preemptive Rights of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 586, 614 (1930).
161. This could not be accomplished prior to the 1943 amendment of N.Y. Stock
Corp. Law § 35 authorizing the alteration or abolition of preemptive rights (see Stokes
v. Continental Trust Co., supra note 153; Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General Plastics,
Inc., 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N.Y.S.2d 415 (4th Dep't 1939), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 840, 21 N.E.
887 (1939)).
162. Supra note 153 at 299, 78 N.E. at 1094, 1095.
163. Id. at 298, 299, 78 N.E. at 1094. See also Musson v. New York & Queens El.
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tion of outstanding conversion and option rights; 164 (4) purposes of reor-
ganization under any applicable Act of Congress and (5) the satisfaction of
option rights under paragraph (4) of Section 505-a new exception. In addi-
tion, no preemptive rights may be exercised under paragraph (e) when
(6) treasury shares' 65 are issued by the corporation, or where (7) originally
authorized shares are issued within two years after filing the certificate of
incorporation. This latter provision (incorporated into Section 39 of the New
York Stock Corporation Law in 1941 and perpetuated in the new Law)
codifies Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co.166 to the degree that
originally authorized shares, retained by the corporation beyond the two-year
period after the filing of the certificate of incorporation are made subject to
preemptive rights (in a sense, it may be said that a conclusive statutory
presumption is created that such shares were intended to be reserved for
future expansion purposes). Since, under paragraph (i), the statutory pro-
visions affecting preemptive rights are exclusive, this aspect of the Dunlay
case (decided prior to the effective date of the statute) is surely subordinated
to the statutory provision. Quaere, as to the extent to which the statute
affects the other aspect of the Dunlay case that directors cannot utilize original
issue (not otherwise subject to preemptive rights) to convert themselves
into majority shareholders, and that shares so improperly utilized would be
subject to the prior rights of the shareholders? Presumably, the legislature
did not purport to affect the equitable powers of the court to control derelic-
tions by faithless fiduciaries.' 67 Nor has the legislature found it feasible to
deal legislatively with the problem that arises when directors (or majority
shareholders), in breach of their fiduciary duty, seek to dilute the minority
shareholders' preemptive rights (and consequent equity in the corporation)
by making a new offering of securities which the directors know the minority
shareholders are not in position to take up. Although an early appellate court
in Schramme v. Cowin'6" refused to provide relief in such a case on the grounds
that there had been no adequate showing of bad faith and that, in any event,
the minority shareholder was entitled to sell his "rights," in the recent case of
& P. Co., 138 Misc. 881, 247 N.Y. Supp. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1931) holding that no preemptive
right exists when shares are to be issued in payment of a corporate debt.
164. Venner v. American Telegraph & Telephone Co., 110 Misc. 118, 181 N.Y. Supp.
45 (Sup. Ct. 1920), afftd, 196 App. Div. 960, 188 N.Y. Supp. 856 (1st Dep't 1921);
Hackett v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 36 Misc. 583, 78 N.Y. Supp. 1087 (Sup. Ct. 1901).
165. Hammer v. Werner, supra note 157; Gillette v. Noyes, 92 App. Div. 313, 86
N.Y. Supp. 1062 (1st Dep't 1904); Borg v. International Paper Co., 11 F.2d 147 (2d
Cir. 1925) stated this to be the common law rule.
166. Supra note 155.
167. See also Hammer v. Werner, supra note 157, in which the court recognized that
treasury shares which the corporation had not retired nor held in the treasury for an
inordinately long time were not subject to preemptive rights upon issuance, but held, in
the particular circumstances, on the authority of the Dunlay case, that a preemptive right
did exist with respect to treasury shares sold by the directors to themselves in breach of
their fiduciary obligations to the minority shareholders. See also on this point, Sorin v.
Shabmoon Industries, Inc., supra note 53 at 416, 417, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
168. 205 App. Div. 20, 199 N.Y. Supp. 98 (1st Dep't 1923).
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Tashman v. Tashman,169 a lower court, citing the Dunlay case, enjoined the
new stock issue and held that the minority shareholder was entitled to a trial
of his allegation that the shares were issued solely for "the sinister purpose
of serving the personal ends of the directors.' 70
E. Right of Inspection
The development and rapid expansion of the publicly-held corporation,
characterized by the increasing separation of corporate ownership from cor-
porate control, has transformed the shareholder's common law right to inspect
the general books and records of the corporation into a vital expedient for
safeguarding his investment in the corporation. The right to inspect the gen-
eral books and records, currently found in Section 10 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law, is perpetuated in Section 624 of the Business Corporation
Law. As far back as 1899, the Court of Appeals, in In re Steinway,1 71 de-
dared that the statute had not preempted the common law right of inspection.
This rule is reinforced by the express provision in paragraph (f) of Section
624 that nothing contained in the statute shall impair the power of the courts
to compel the production for examination of the books and records of the
corporation. (It should be observed carefully that the reference in paragraph
(f) to "books and records" cannot be construed to include the "minutes of
the proceedings of the shareholders" or the "record of shareholders," both of
which are delineated and treated separately from "books and records" through-
out Section 624).
The common law remedy for compelling the production of the corporate
books and records for examination was the writ of mandamus, which has
been replaced by the current proceeding under Article 78 of the New York
Civil Practice Act. The availability of the remedy, at common law and pres-
ently under Article 78, rests in the sound discretion of the court, and will
normally be granted only when the inspection is sought, in good faith, for a
proper purpose that is germane to the status of the shareholder. In recent
cases the right of inspection has been granted for such purposes as: seeking
shareholders to intervene in a pending derivative suit to avoid the need to
post a bond as security for the corporation's expenses in the suit 7 2 (although
an inspection was denied in another recent case 7 3 where sought for the
purpose of discovering a "contemporaneous owner" to initiate a derivative
suit); to induce shareholders to approve a merger with one company rather
than a proposed merger with another;' 7 4 to persuade the shareholders,
169. 13 Misc. 2d 982, 984, 174 N.Y.S.2d 482, 483 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
170. See for discussions of this subject, Note, Judicial Control Over the Fairness of
the Issue Price of New Stock, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1133 (1958); Blais, Shareholder Pro-
tection From Share Watering Caused by Additional Issue of Stock, 19 Fac. of L. Rev.
(U. of Toronto) 43 (1961).
171. 159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E. 1103 (1899).
172. Ratzkin v. Harris, 219 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
173. In re Levy, 138 N.YL.J. 9, Col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Kings County) Oct. 30, 1957.
174. In re Huber, 26 Misc. 2d 563, 210 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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by proxy solicitation and otherwise, to oust incumbent directors and to
substitute a slate approved by the shareholder seeking the inspection;17 5
to verify the basis for the amounts set forth in the corpbration's annual re-
port.:7 6 Inspection has traditionally been made available, in propitious cir-
cumstances, for the purpose of evaluating a petitioner's shareholdings in the
corporation. 77 Contrariwise, inspection has been denied where sought for such
improper purposes as: blackmail; to satisfy idle curiosity; speculation; sale
of shareholder lists; aid in personal litigation unrelated to the corporation;
and, generally, for purposes inimical to the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. In recent cases, inspection was denied where sought solely for
the purpose of aiding the petitioner-executor to prepare federal and state tax
returns. 17 s
The burden of proof on the issue of whether the shareholder-petitioner is
seeking the right of inspection in good faith and for a proper purpose is im-
posed in the recent cases upon the respondent corporation, 17 although the
rule is not free from ambiguity. The cases appear to impose upon the peti-
tioner-shareholder the obligation of alleging in his petition, in the first in-
stance, the particular purpose for which he seeks an inspection. Presumably,
although he must plead such precise purpose, he does not have the burden of
proving it-the burden being cast upon the respondent corporation of dis-
proving the petitioner's allegation. The apparent reason for requiring peti-
tioner to set forth facts establishing a proper purpose is to fix a frame of ref-
erence against which petitioner's bad faith can be put in issue and tested. In
a recent case, affirmed without opinion in the Appellate Division, First De-
partment, In re Stoopack v. George A. Fuller Company, 80 the lower court
stated that the "petitioner is not required to show a specific purpose for the
desired inspection and that the inspection is necessary for the protection of
his interests and those of stockholders." This holding would appear to be at
variance with the general rule.
Although the shareholder's common law right to an inspection normally
depends on legal ownership of the shares, paragraph (b) codifies a recent
holding without opinion in the Court of Appeals, In re Zolta Baczkowska
v. 2166 Operating Corp.,181 by expressly providing that voting trust certificate
175. Murchison v. Alleghany Corporation, 27 Misc. 2d 290, 210 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup.
Ct. 1960).
176. Stoopak v. George A. Fuller Co., 18 Misc. 2d 977, 979, 190 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598
(Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 9 A.D.2d 605, 191 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1959).
177. Lewis v. Nat Lewis Retail Corp., 194 Misc. 427, 86 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct.
1949); In re Wygant, 101 Misc. 509, 167 N.Y. Supp. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
178. Bankers Trust Co. v. H. Rosenhirch Co., 20 Misc. 2d 792, 190 N.Y.S.2d 957
(Sup. Ct. 1959); Application of Pearson, 223 N.Y.S.2d 15 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
179. See Durr v. Paragon Trading Corp., 270 N.Y. 464, 469, 1 N.E.2d 967, 969
(1936); Tate v. Sonotone Corp., 272 App. Div. 103, 105, 69 N.Y. Supp. 535, 536 (1st
Dep't 1947); In re Hausner v. Hopewell Products, Inc., 10 A.D.2d 876, 201 N.Y.S.2d 252
(2d Dep't 1960).
180. Supra note 176.
181. 279 App. Div. 775, 109 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Ist Dep't 1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 811,
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holders shall be regarded as shareholders for all purposes of Section 624.
Record ownership is not indispensable to an inspection of the general books
and records, although, under paragraph (b), it may be required for an inspec-
tion of the "minutes of the proceedings of shareholder" and the "record of
shareholders."1 82 Of course, shareholder status must exist in order to qualify
the petitioner for the inspection. Where petitioner is shown to have sold his
shares to the corporation (although he remains registered on the books) ,183
or where petitioner has accepted payment of a liquidating dividend and sub-
sequently executed and filed a certificate of voluntary dissolution, 8 4 his status
as a shareholder is lost and the right to an inspection will be denied. No such
consequence follows from a mere pledge of corporated shares.S 5 Petitioner's
status as a shareholder is normally tested by a reference,186 although it has
been suggested that the determination of status can be made on papers alone.1s7
A lower court recently held that, for the purpose of determining the right of
an inspection, title to shares will not be tested in a plenary proceeding to
litigate ownership rights under a contract. Presumably, only present status
will be passed on for such purpose. 8 8
Section 624 is primarily concerned with the "minutes of the proceedings
of the shareholders" and the "record of shareholders" (commonly referred to
as the "stock book"). These corporate records are delineated from the general
books and records in two essentials: first, under paragraph (b), such records
may be inspected in person or by agent or attorney during usual business
hours' 89 only by shareholders of record for at least six months immediately
prior to the demand, or by any person who holds (or is authorized in writing
to inspect by holders of) at least five percent of all outstanding shares (as
contrasted with an inspection of the general books and records available to
any shareholder). 19° In implementing a parallel provision in Section 10 of
the New York Stock Corporation Law the courts have hewed very closely to
log N.E.2d 470 (1952). But cf., Brentmore Estates v. Hotel Barbizon, 263 App. Div.
389, 33 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1st Dep't 1942).
182. Neisloss v. Alleghany Corp., 141 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. Ct. 1955); see also
Joannou v. Joannou Cycle Co., 6 A.D.2d 592, 180 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1st Dep't 1958).
183. Rosenberg v. Steinberg-Kass, Inc., 6 A.D.2d 685, 174 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dep't
1958); Schor v. Barshor Realty Co., 218 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. 1961). But cf., Nash v.
Gay Apparel Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 978, 204 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1960), affirming 9 A.D.2d 345, 193
N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st Dep't 1959), reversing 16 Misc. 2d 176, 187 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
184. Schor v. Barshor Realty Co, supra note 183.-
185. Carthage Paper Makers v. Mutual Box Board Co., 2 A.D.2d 175, 153 N.Y.S.2d
759 (4th Dep't 1956).
186. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1295.
187. Joannou v. Joannou Cycle Co., supra note 182; Engelhardt v. Hertlein Special
Tool Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
188. Engelhardt v. Hertlein Special Tool Co., supra note 187.
189. This changes the existing statute which allows the corporation to limit the
inspection period to three hours daily.
190. It will be noted that the existing statute is changed by eliminating judgment
creditors from the category of persons entitled to inspect the stock book and the minutes
of the meetings of shareholders. The revisers' notes to Section 624 states that creditors
"should be able to obtain inspection pursuant to a court order in pending litigation."
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the requirement that the shareholder seeking to inspect the stock book be
registered;' 9 ' and, second, under paragraph (c) the right to inspect these
records is qualified, as it is under the existing statute, to, the extent that it
may be denied to a person who refuses to furnish an affidavit that the inspec-
tion is not desired for a purpose alien to that of the corporation and that he
has not engaged, within a period of five years prior to the demand, in the
business of selling "stock lists" of any corporation.
In granting a summary remedy in the Supreme Court for the enforcement
of the right to inspect the shareholder minutes and stockbook, paragraph (d)
departs radically from the sanction imposed by the present statute-a penalty
in the form of money damages against the corporation and the officers re-
sponsible for an improper denial of the right of inspection. The elimination
of the penalty and the creation of a new. statutory remedy would seem clearly
designed to resolve the problem that has arisen, in implementing the present
statute, as to the "absolute" or "discretionary" character of the right to
inspect the stock book. On its face, this right would appear to be granted
absolutely, subject, however, to the two built-in exceptions that it not be
sought for a purpose foreign to that of the corporation (a very broad ex-
ception that is almost co-terminous with the common law "improper purpose"
exception) and that it is not sought by a shareholder who is in the business
of selling stock lists. It would seem that a court, in a mandamus proceeding,
would have no discretion to deny such an inspection, short of satisfying itself
that either of the interdicted acts have occurred. So the Court of Appeals has
held in a dictum in In re Steinway19 2 and squarely in Henry v. Babcock &
Wilcox. 93 Intermediate appellate courts have likewise viewed the right as an
absolute one.' 9 4 The Appellate Division, First Department, has taken a con-
sistently contrary view on the premise that in a proceeding under Article 78
of the Civil Practice Act, since a purely discretionary remedy is invoked by
the petitioner, the court has an unregulated discretion to withhold the inspec-
tion upon a finding that the purpose for which it is sought is in any respect
improper and may investigate such purposes generally, unrestricted by the
particular exceptions embodied in the statute.195 It has been suggested that
the view taken by the Appellate Division, First Department, is consistent with
191. See cases cited supra, note 182.
192. Supra note 171.
193. 196 N.Y. 302, 89 N.E. 942 (1909). See also in this context, Cotheal v. Brower,
5 N.Y. 562 (1851).
194. In re Hurley v. National Bank of Middletown, 252 App. Div. 272, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 241 (2d Dep't 1937); People ex rel. Callanan v. Keeseville, A.C. & L.C.R. Co., 106
App. Div. 349, 94 N.Y. Supp. 555 (3d Dep't 1905); People ex rel. Clason v. Nassau
Ferry Co., 86 Hun 128, 33 N.Y. Supp. 244 (1st Dep't 1895).
195. Tate v. Sonotone Corp., 272 App. Div. 103, 69 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1st Dept 1947).
The majority view taken by the court in this case was subjected to a very sharp dissent
by the late Justice Cohn. The Tate case has recently been cited with apparent ap-
proval by the Court of Appeals in Breswick & Co. v. Greater New York Industries, Inc.,
308 N.Y. 1041, 127 N.E.2d 871 (1955), but on the issue of good faith in a proceeding
seeking an inspection of the general books of the corporation.
538
STATUS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS
the legislative intention to make the right to inspect the stock book absolute
only to the extent of the'penalty provided for its improper denial, but that
the legislature did not intend to fetter the recognized discretion of the Su-
preme Court in an Article 78 proceeding.19 8 While it is true that in the cases
in which the Court of Appeals has squarely held the right to be absolute the
remedy sought was the statutory penalty and not an inspection, in In re
Steinway,9M which involved a mandamus proceeding to compel an inspection,
the Court was moved to make the following pertinent comment: "The statute
merely strengthened the common law rule with reference to one part thereof,
and left the remainder unaffected. It dealt with but a single book, and as to
that it amplified the qualified right previously existing, by making it absolute
and extending it to judgment creditors." 98 (Emphasis added.) This language
would appear clear beyond peradventure. The history of the inspection statute
serves to justify the conclusion that the legislature intended the right to be
an absolute one. Both the Steinway and the Henry cases were decided under
the old Section 29 (laws of 1890), the predecessor of the current statute,
which provided merely that the stock book (which had been treated specially
by statute since 1818) should be available for inspection during three business
hours daily. In 1916, the statute was amended to include, for the first time,
the foregoing exceptions to the right to inspect the stock book. It would
seem a reasonable inference, the decisions in Steinway and Henry presumably
known to it, that the legislature intended to subject the previous absolute
right to the qualifications imposed under the 1916 amendment-but only to
these. There are surely good reasons for treating the stock book differently
from the general books and records. As the Court pointed out in the Steinway
case, "the stock book has no relation to the business carried on by a corpora-
tion; and the change was doubtless made to enable stockholders to promptly
learn who are entitled to vote for directors .... "199 The ready availability
of the stock book to afford shareholders quick access to fellow shareholders is
a highly desirable facet of corporate democracy. In any event, the change
wrought by Section 624 in eliminating the statutory penalty and substituting
a new statutory judicial remedy for the enforcement of the right to inspect
the shareholder minutes and stock book displaces the Article 78 (mandamus)
remedy-Lfor the rule is clear that mandamus will not lie where another remedy
is available or provided by law. After the effective date of the new law, a
shareholder denied the right to inspect the shareholder minutes or stock book
will seek to enforce his right under the special remedy provided in paragraph
(d) of Section 624. It would no longer seem possible in such a proceeding for
196. See People ex rel. Britton v. American Press Ass'n, 148 App. Div. 651, 133
N.Y. Supp. 216 (lst Dep't 1912). See also Henn, Corporations 327 (1961).
197. Supra note 171.
198. Id. at 263, 53 N.E. at 1107.
199. Id. at 264, 53 N.E. at 1107.
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the court to investigate the petitioner's purposes.generally-the sole qualifica-
tions on the right being set forth in paragraph (c).
Paragraph (e), the counterpart of Section 77 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law, gives any shareholder who requests it in writing the right
to the most recent balance sheet and profit and loss statement which have
been distributed to the shareholders or otherwise made public. An amendment
to paragraph (e) recommended for adoption at the 1962 session of the New
York State Legislatureooa would change this provision by giving the right to such
financial statements, as in paragraph (b), to shareholders of record for at
least six months immediately preceeding the demand or to any person holding
(or authorized in writing by the holders of) at least five percent of all out-
standing shares. In any event, the new law does not alter in any significant
substantive way the right to the financial statements of a corporation that is
afforded under existing law. A more dimensional review of the financial situa-
tion of the corporation is, of course, available via the inspection route pre-
viously discussed.
Section 1315, the counterpart of Section 113 of the New York Stock Cor-
poration Law, fashions a separate remedy in behalf of residents of the state
to inspect the "record of shareholders" of a foreign corporation doing business
in this state. It is to be noted that the section is restricted in its provisions
to the stock book only (it does not make any express provision for the general
books and records, or the minutes of meetings of shareholders, board and
executive committee, or for the right to financial statements as does Section
624). It is otherwise the precise counterpart of Section 624.
II. Subscriber and shareholder liability
It is axiomatic that shareholder immunity from liability for the debts
and obligations of the corporate entity-the "limited liability" concept-is
the keystone of the corporate system. When shares are issued by a corpora-
tion as "fully paid and nonassessable," the shareholder is normally secured
against liability for further losses incurred in the conduct of the business beyond
his original investment. Under the New York common law rule, a corporation
that had contracted to issue par value shares for less than their par value
(either in cash or property), as fully paid and non-assessable shares, was
bound by its contract and entitled legally only to the consideration for which
the shares were contracted to be issued 200 The fact that the statutory ad-
monition that "no shares of stock having par value shall be issued for money
in an amount less than the par value of such shares" had been violated did
not affect the rule. Nor did a trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, or creditor of
the corporation have better rights, under the common law rifle, than the cor-
199a. This amendment was approved by the New York Legislature.
200. Southworth v. Morgan, 205 N.Y. 293, 98 N.E. 490 (1912); Christenson v. Eno,
106 N.Y. 97, 12 N.E. 648 (1887).
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poration itself to recover from the subscriber the difference between his sub-
scription price and the par value of the shares.201 Of course, the subscriber
would be liable to the corporation or anyone suing in its right for any unpaid
portion of the consideration actually contracted to be paid for the shares-a
subscription to shares of a corporation creating a debt enforceable by the
corporation or persons legally capable of representing it. 20 2
The common law rule was modified in New York by Section 70 of the
New York Stock Corporation Law which imposes liability upon shareholders,
in the prescribed circumstances, in favor of corporate creditors. The common
law rule remains unaffected by this section insofar as the corporation or any-
one acting in its behalf is concerned. The statute makes every holder of shares
"not fully paid" personally liable to creditors of the corporation in an amount
equal to the amount unpaid on the shares held by him. Only those share-
holders are charged with liability who held the shares at the time the debt (to
plaintiff-creditor) was incurred. Accordingly, it has been held that a transfer
of shares prior to the time the debt was incurred will exonerate the transferor
from any liability under Section 70 to corporate creditors. -2 0 3 Although the
statute in terms makes every "holder" of shares liable to creditors, some con-
flict is reflected in the cases on the question of whether a subsequent bona fide
transferee of shares without notice that they were not fully paid is chargeable
under the statute if he is the "holder" of such shares when the debt is in-
curred. 20 4 While it would seem quite clear that Section 70 is designed to im-
pose liability on holders of "watered," "discount" or "bonus" shares, and is
not aimed at the subscriber who has contracted to pay full par .value for his
shares on installment or subject to call but has failed to meet the installment
payments or to honor the calls (since in such case, the subscriber is in any
event exposed to common law liability to the corporation, or its legal repre-
sentative, for the whole or any part of the unpaid consideration), evidence is
available in the cases that the latter type of subscriber is likewise within the
ambit of the statute and would be chargeable thereunder to the individual
creditor.205 Section 70 is thoroughly qualified by Section 73 of the New York
Stock Corporation Law. Under this section, only judgment creditors with
201. Christenson v. Eno, supra note 200.
202. Stoddard v. Lum, 159 N.Y. 265, 53 N.E. 1108 (1899).
203. Tucker v. Gillman, 121 N.Y. 189, 24 N.E. 302 (1890).
204. Compare Breck v. Brewster, 150 App. Dij. 202, 134 N.Y. Supp. 697 (1st
.Dep't 1912); by way of analogy, Briggs v. Waldron, 83 N.Y. 582 (1880) which held,
under an early statute making subscribers responsible for debts of the corporation, until
the entire subscription price was paid in, that a transferee of the shares was chargeable-
with Van Slochem v. Villard, 154 App. Div. 161, 138 N.Y. Supp. 582 (1st Dep't 1912),
aff'd (without discussion of this point), 207 N.Y. 587, 101 N.E. 467 (1913). Note, White
v. Jones, 167 N.Y. 158, 60 N.E. 422 (1901) which suggested in a dictum that perhaps a
transferee could not be charged.
205. See Business Advisory Bureau v. Stallforth, 262 App. Div. 162, 28 N.Y.S.2d
437 (1st Dep't 1941), afi'd, 289 N.Y. 792, 47 N.E.2d 48 (1943); Granger & Co. v. Allen,
214 App. Div. 367, 212 N.Y. Supp. 356 (4th Dep't 1925), aff'd sub. nora., Empire Pro-
duce Co. v. Allen, 244 N.Y. 587, 155 N.E. 907 (1927).
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execution against corporate assets returned unsatisfied may seek the benefits
of Section 70-and even such creditors must have originally owned contract
claims 20 6 which were to mature within two years from the time they were
contracted (ruling out, for the most part, bondholders and mortgage note-
holders). Furthermore, the statute provides that suit on the judgment must
be brought within two years after the shareholder sought to be charged has
ceased to be one (a shareholder ceases to be one for the purposes of this
section after he has transferred his shares, or after the dissolution, or ad-
judication of bankruptcy of the corporation). 207 To further complicate the
remedy, the Court of Appeals in Bottlers Seal Company v. Rainey208 held
that enforceability of rights under Sections 70 and 73 is possible only through
a suit in equity on behalf of all creditors entitled to the remedy against all,
shareholders liable under the statute, who are within the state and solvent.
The problem of watered, discount and bonus shares has, as a practical
matter, diminished in importance with the advent of no-par value shares (in-
troduced in New York-the first state to adopt this financing mechanism-
in 1912), the increased use, in capitalizing corporations, of low par shares,
and the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. These factors
account for the radical departure from existing law reflected in Section 628
of the Business Corporation Law.
(a) Paragraph (a) of Section 628 provides that a subscriber shall be
under no obligation to the corporation other than to pay the unpaid portion
of his subscription price, subject, however, to the qualification that the sub-
scription price "shall in no event be less than the amount of the consideration
for which (such) shares could be issued lawfully." This latter qualification
overrules the common law doctrine of Christenson v. Eno20 9 and Southworth
v. Morgan,2 10 alluded to above, which precluded the corporation from recov-
ering the balance of the consideration that should have lawfully been paid
upon the subscription for shares. Hence, under the new law, were the cor-
poration to issue shares, in violation of Section 504, for inadequate considera-
tion, recovery of the full lawful consideration would now be possible by the
corporation (or presumably by any person legally capable of representing it).
It is to be noted very carefully that the remedy is now given to the corpora-
tion exclusively. The creditor no longer has a remedy in his individual right
(and hence Sections 70 and 73 of the New York Stock Corporation Law have
been entirely superseded). In a suit under paragraph (a), any recovery by
206. See Assets Realization Co. v. Howard, 70 Misc. 651, 127 N.Y. Supp. 798 (Sup.
Ct. 1911), aff'd, 152 App. Div. 900, 136 N.Y. Supp. 1130 (4th Dep't 1912), aff'd, 211
N.Y. 430, 105 N.E. 680 (1914).
207. See Lang v. Lutz, 180 N.Y. 254, 73 N.E. 24 (1905); Business Advisory Bureau
v. Stallforth, supra note 205; Granger & Co. v. Allen, supra note 205.
208. 243 N.Y. 33, 153 N.E. 437 (1926).
209. Supra note 200.
210. Supra note 200.
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the corporation, or its representative, becomes a corporate fund for the benefit
of shareholders as well as creditors.
(b) Under paragraph (b), a bona fide transferee of shares or a subscription
for shares without knowledge that full consideration has not been paid is not
liable for the unpaid portion of such consideration; the transferor remains
liable. This provision, fashioned after Section 23 of the Model Act, rejects the
view that the share is "tainted" by a violation of Section 504 and imposes
liability upon the original subscriber only.21 ' To the extent, however, that a
subsequent transferee has knowledge of the impropriety of the original issue,
the shares are tainted in his hands and he is likewise assessable. The formula-
tion under the new law thus avoids the ambiguity engendered by the ex-
isting statute which imposes liability upon the "holder" (as contrasted with
the "subscriber") of shares.
(c) Paragraph (c) continues in almost their precise terms the provisions
of Section 72 of the New York Stock Corporation Law. In sum, it provides
that the pledgor of shares, and not the pledgee, shall be liable for any unpaid
consideration under paragraph (a), and that no person holding shares as a
fiduciary shall be personally liable, but the estate and funds controlled by
such fiduciary shall be liable under the Section.
Section 629 of the Business Corporation Law represents the shell that has
remained after the evisceration of Section 15 of the New York Stock Cor-
poration Law-New York's current "little bankruptcy Act. - 12 Under the
latter section, a transfer of shares made in contemplation of the insolvency of
the corporation is void. Under Section 629, the transfer is not void but the
transferor cannot thereby escape liability for any unpaid consideration under
paragraph (a) of Section 628. This section seems altogether superfluous since
the effect achieved by it would result in any case from a proper application of
the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 628.
The limited-liability principle is subject to what might be aptly described
as a "notorious" exception-the now celebrated Section 71 of the New York
Stock Corporation Law, which provides the sole basis for exposing a share-
holder of a New York corporation (it has been held inapplicable to foreign
corporations) 21 3 to liability beyond his original risk capital. This section,
dating back to 1848, had evoked little comment until it came into sharp focus
in 1952 when the holder of a single $10 nonvoting share in the New York
Compass was sued for "fringe" benefits in the amount of $130,000 by the
employees of the bankrupt newspaper. The suit was brought under the fore-
211. This paragraph of Section 628- is not likely to be invoked often since, under
paragraph (g) of Section 504, no certificate representing partly-paid shares may be issued
-as is currently possible under N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 74.
212. Section 15 of the N.Y. Stock Corp. Law was eliminated under great pressure
from the organized bar, which argued that ample remedies for corporate creditors were
provided by the federal bankruptcy act, the New York debtor-creditor law and other
federal and state laws.
213. Armstrong v. Dyer, 268 N.Y. 671, 198 N.E. 551 (1935).
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going statute which provides that laborers, servants or employees (construed
by the courts to include all non-executive corporate personnel) 214 may charge
the shareholders jointly or severally for unpaid debts, wages or salaries. By
an amendment in 1952, wages and salaries were defined to include every
variety of fringe benefits, including vacation, holiday and severance pay, and
contributions to pension or annuity funds. 215 The vice inherent in the statute
lies in its imposition of "several" liability--so that any shareholder, however
small his holdings in the corporation, may be personally liable for the full
judgment (which may be extremely large in view of the extended definition of
wages and salaries). Moreover, case law does not clarify the contribution
rights of the shareholder who has paid the entire judgment. May he hold only
those shareholders who have been notified, as provided by the statute, that
they are chargeable with payment of the unpaid wages and salaries, or would
any shareholder be required to contribute? In what amount may other share-
holders be charged? To what extent would the equitable doctrine requiring
joinder of all shareholders similarly liable (so as to work an equitable appor-
tionment of responsibility) be applicable? 216 Would contribution suits be
entertained in foreign jurisdictions against important shareholders residing
outside of New York and not amenable to suit here?217
Comments in legal periodicals 213 and statements by the organized bar
2 19
have called for the elimination of Section 71 as constituting a trap for the
unwary investor, and as inconsistent with the fundamental character of the
corporation as a business instrumentality designed to protect the investor
from the possibility of financial risk beyond his original investment. In testi-
fving at public hearings, spokesmen for labor tacitly conceded that Section 71
has rarely been invoked against shareholders of publicly-held corporations and
that perhaps it was unduly indiscriminate in its uniform application to all
214. See Bristor v. Smith, 158 N.Y. 157, 53 N.E. 42 (1899); Hill v. Spencer, 61
-N.Y. 274 (1874). These cases may have to be re-evaluated, however, in light of the 1952
amendment to N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 71.
215. Note the recent case of Greenberg v. Corwin, 222 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Sup. Ct. 1961)
in which the court sustained a suit brought by the union (on behalf of its employee-
members) under Section 71 to recover from the shareholders on a judgment which it
(the union) had procured against the corporation for contributions to the health and
welfare and retirement benefits funds, and for wages.
216. See Horowitz v. Winter, 129 Misc. 814, 222 N.Y. Supp. 233 (Munic. Ct. 1927)
in which the court held that the doctrine of Bottlers Seal Co. v. Rainey, supra note 208
had no application to a suit under Section 71.
217. See Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N.Y. 9, 42 N.E. 419 (1895) where a corporate
"double-liability assessment" statute of a sister-state was refused enforcement in New
York because it created rights uniquely adapted to enforcement in the equity courts of
the home state.
218. See Rogers and McManus, Stockholders' Booby-Trap: Partnership Liabilities
of Stockholders under Section 71, New York Stock Corporation Law, 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1149 (1953); Brownell, The Not-So-Limited Liability of Stockholders of New York Cor-
porations, 27 N.Y.S. Bar. Bull. 58 (1955).
219. See Joint Legislative Comm. to Study Revision of Corporation Laws (First)
Interim Report to 1957 Session of N.Y. State Legislature, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 17 (1957),
at 79, 82, 96.
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shareholders, but urged its retention, particularly in respect of the "chartered
partnership" type of enterprise, on the ground of its social utility and bene-
ficial effect generally upon the economic well-being of the community.
Section' 630 of the Business Corporation Law represents an attempted
compromise of the foregoing viewpoints. It retains' the essential unlimited-
liability character of Section 71 but mitigates some of its harsher aspects.
(a) Paragraph (a) restricts liability under the section to the ten largest
shareholders as determined by their beneficial interest in the corporation as of
the date when the services referred to in the section are performed. This
change is patently of little moment for shareholders in the typical family-
type (or very) dose- corporation, but there are a substantial number of
medium-sized non-public issue corporations whose shareholders will be bene-
fited.
(b) Paragraph (a) further confines the impact of Section 630 to cor-
porations "the shares of which are not traded ofi a national securities ex-
change or regularly traded in an over-the-counter market by one or more
members of a national or an affiliated securities association. -220 This pro-
vision eliminates one of the serious drawbacks to the incorporation of large
enterprises in New York, of which the organized bar has consistently com-
plained.
(c) In paragraph (a), time sequences for enforcing rights under the
section have been adjusted in favor of unpaid employees. The time for the
written notice, which must be given by the employee to the shareholders he
intends to charge, has been extended from thirty days (the current period
under Section 71) to ninety days after the termination of the employee's
services. However, if, within such ninety-day period, the employee demands
an examination of the record of shareholders under paragraph (b) of Section
624, notice must be given within sixty days after an opportunity to make
such an examination has been afforded. The time within which to enforce the
shareholders' liability has likewise been extended from thirty days (the current
period under Section 71) to ninety days after return of an execution un-
satisfied against the corporation upon a judgment recovered against it for
unpaid wages or salaries.
(d) Paragraph (c) makes the right to contribution explicit by entitling
any shareholder who has paid more than his pro-rata share of liability (as
determined by his beneficial interest in the corpbration) to contribution pro
rata from the other shareholders liable under the section to the extent of any
excess paid. Suit for such contribution may be brought jointly or severally.
It will be noted that the foregoing provisions of paragraph (c) resolve some
of the existing contribution problems discussed above. It is now clear that a
maximum of ten (largest) shareholders, if so many exist, can be charged with
220. Note the similar formula embodied in N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(c) dealing
with shareholder arrangements to "sterilize" the board of directors.
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liability (although it is not clear whether those shareholders (of the ten) who
have not been notified that they are to be charged, as provided in paragraph
(a), are "liable under the section"). The liability of the shareholder for con-
tribution will be measured by his pro-rata beneficial interest in the corpora-
tion, and an individual action for contribution may be brought against such
a shareholder to reach his "several" liability. This would indicate that the
equitable principle of mandatory joinder in contribution suits will not apply
in the enforcement of contribution rights under this section.
THE STATUS oF DIREcTORs
A prefatory statement concerning the underlying approach to directors
(and officers) adopted in the new law might not be amiss. A fine balance was
sought between the need for maximum flexibility in corporate operation and
for maximum protection of the shareholders' investment in the enterprise.
Perhaps the most basic characteristic of the modern publicly-held enterprise-
the separation of corporate ownership from corporate control-was kept in
clear perspective at all times. The proxy device has, after all, drastically
altered the essential character of the modern corporation. Yet, the realities of
modern corporate life could not ultimately be denied, and the conclusion was
inevitable that the "town meeting" conception of corporate democracy had to
give way in some measure to the need for flexible and expeditious operation-
with a consequent vesting in the corporate managers of larger areas of un-
regulated power. The over-all design of the new law as it affects the status of
directors (and officers) assumes the fundamental integrity of the ordinary
director-in whose honesty and competence the public has placed its trust
and confidence. Newspaper headlines occasionally reveal that the trust has
been misplaced. For this reason, the new law provides in the more sensitive
areas, such as indemnification and corporate finance, a fair degree of regula-
tion, and, in addition, sets forth in clear terms the sanctions imposable upon
directors who violate the public trust.
I. Directors' duty of diligence, care and skill; reliance on financial statements
The insistence by New York courts upon perpetuating the time-worn
standard that directors in discharging their responsibilities are summoned to
"the same degree of care and prudence that men prompted by self-interest
generally exercise in their own affairs" is a prime illustration of the tendency
to substitute slogans and cliches for hard thinking and, in the area of
business morality and ethics, to articulate a high-flown, abstract ideal that
bears little resemblance to reality. That the foregoing standard was originally
designed primarily to underline the fiduciary role of the director in relation to
the corporation and the body of shareholders, rather than to fix a rigid defini-
tion of the directors' duty of diligence and care, is evident in the circumstance
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that its first definitive formulation in Hun v. Cary221 involved a banking cor-
poration. When set forth in that case, in 1880, the standard might well have
applied to business corporations of any character (and very likely was so
intended)-for the statement of the standard was prefaced by the comment
that "when one deposits money in a savings bank, or takes stock in a corpora-
tion, thus divesting himself of the immediate control of his property, he ex-
pects, and has the right to expect, that the trustees or directors, who are
chosen to take his place in the management and control of his property, will
exercise ordinary care and prudence in the trusts committeed to them 2
(Emphasis added.)-the business corporation at that time being in a relatively
rudimentary state in that closer identity existed between ownership and
management and the "outside" director was a rather rare phenomenon. Yet,
one wonders whether it is a purely fortuitous circumstance that the pre-
ponderant number of cases, after Hun v. Cary, in which the standard was
resfated involved banking institutions, and that in Kavanaugh v. Common-
wealth Trust Co 23 the court was inclined to restate the rule in this qualified
way: "The law governing the duties of directors in financial institutions is
well settled. [The standard is then set forth.]" (Emphasis added.) The late
Justice Sheintag, in Litwin v. Allen,2 4 discussing in general terms the directors'
duty of care, was constrained to say that "undoubtedly, a director of a bank is
held to stricter accountability than the director of an ordinary business
corporation."
The point of the foregoing comment is that in applying the formula of
Hun v. Cary out of its context the courts have merely succeeded in foisting
on directors of the ordinary business corporation an inflexible standard that
is anachronistic in the modern corporate world. This observation was capsuled
very neatly by Justice Sheintag in the Litwin case:
It has been said that a director is required to conduct the business
of the corporation with the same degree of fidelity and care as an
ordinarily prudent man would exercise in the management of his own
affairs of like magnitude and importance. General rules, however,
are not altogether helpful. In the last analysis, whether or not a di-
rector has discharged his duty, whether or'not he has been negligent,
depends upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the
kind of corporation involved, its size and financial resources, the
magnitude of the transaction,' and the immediacy of the problem
presented. A director is called upon 'to bestow the care and skill'
which the situation demands. (Emphasis added.) 225
The retention by the courts of the old standard constitutes a judicial lag
reflecting inadequate perception of the incompatibility between such a stand-
221. 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
222. Id. at 71.
223. 223 N.Y. 103, 105, 119 N.E. 237, 238 (1918).
224. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
225. Id. at 678.
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ard and the development of the modem corporate complex, characterized by
the "hybrid" board consisting of the "outside" (advisor, business-connection,
prestige) director and the "inside" (management) director. Surely, the law
ought take account of the differing roles such directors are intended to (and
do in fact) perform (particularly where the corporation, in inducing his
presence on the board, represents to the director that his responsibility is
coextensive only with the precise function he is requested to perform). In-
deed, policy considerations may compel such an approach because, as com-
mentators and the courts have recognized, the outside director, highly reputed
in the financial community for general business acumen, may sit as an advisor
on a number of boards simultaneously and in such capacity renders invaluable
service to the national economy-particularly in cases where the board is
composed predominantly of management directors. The appellate court in
Kavanaugh v. Gould2- 6 recognized that to expect the same meticulous attention
to corporate affairs by all directors irrespective of their intended role is
necessarily to discourage competent business men from the performance of
this vital service. The court said: "Most of them are directors of more than one
corporation, and some of them of many. If they are compelled to supervise the
detail management of each corporation in which they are directors, or if they are
deemed to have constructive knowledge of such facts as would be acquired
by such supervision, it would be wholly impossible for them to accept such a
trust .... Plaintiff's contention is that they must not then accept the position
of director. The obvious answer to this contention is that the corporation
cannot afford to lose them. One of the best assets of a corporation is the
advice and assistance of men of business experience and of large business
connections upon its board. Their advice and assistance are of inestimable
value in all emergencies and in determining the policies of the corporations
and in counsel upon the more important questions that arise. Any construc-
tion of the law that would make it impossible for such men to accept positions
upon various boards of directors would seriously impair both the effectiveness
and stability of corporations, in fact be a little less than calamitous." 22 7 In
Bates v. Dresser,228 the Supreme Court drew the distinction between the out-
side and inside director and gave it practical implementation by imposing
liability in the circumstances on the inside director-president only. Likewise,
as far back as Cassidy v. Uhlmann229 the New York Court of Appeals de-
clared that "since a board of bank directors is composed of individuals it is
manifest that each director sustains a distinct relation, not only to his bank,
but to its stockholders and depositors. For obvious reasons the duties which
226. 147 App. Div. 281, 131 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (3d Dep't 1911).
227. Id. at 289.
228. 251 U.S. 524 (1920).
229. 170 N.Y. 505, 63 N.E. 554 (1902). See also Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653,
700-701 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Broderick v. Horvatt, 148 Misc. 731, 733, 266 N.Y. Supp. 341,
343-4 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
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attach to this relation cannot be precisely defined. They cannot be the same
under all circumstances; nor can they be imposed with unvarying exactness
upon all directors alike."
2 30
Section 717 of the Business Corporation Law purports to correct the
foregoing obliquities by establishing a standard of conduct for directors that
is more consonant with the realities of their situation, and that will provide
the courts with a workable tool by which to justify results that presently are
often at odds with the theoretical standard on which they are premised. As
the writer has suggested in the reviser's note to Section 717, the adoption of
the standard that "directors and officers shall discharge the duties of their
respective positions in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and
skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances
in like positions" will "allow the court to envisage the director's duty of
diligence, care and skill as a relative concept, depending on the kind of cor-
poration involved, the particular circumstances and the corporate role of the
director." The court should, under the new standard, be able to consider
comfortably such factors as whether the corporation is a banking institution
or common-garden-variety manufacturing concern; is the director compen-
sated, an officer, non-resident, primarily valued for his contributions as an
expert in a particular area. Has the director functioned only in an advisory
role for a number of years? Was this the basis on which he was induced to
sit on the board? Under a further provision of Section 717, adapted from
Section 43 of the Model Act, directors, acting in good faith, may in dis-
charging their duties rely on financial statements submitted by accredited
accountants or corporate fiscal officers. This provision, a practical expedient
in the nature of things, codifies existing case law.231 The reliance must, of
course, be in good faith. So, for example, the pattern of circumstances held
improper 'in a case like Gallin v. National City Bank of New York,2232 in
which directors authorized and accepted without question financial statements
involving an incentive compensation plan prepared by corporate officers who
stood to benefit from their own handiwork, would undoubtedly be construed
as lacking "good faith" under the formula set forth in Section 717. It should
be observed that no attempt was made in the new law to formulate a rule
authorizing directors to rely in good faith on the advice of counsel-as ap-
parently they may currently by the weight of judicial authority,233 although
230. Id. at 516, 63 N.E. at 556.
231. Mann v. Luke, 82 N.Y.S.2d 725, 728-9 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Diamond v. Davis,
62 N.Y.S.2d 181, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Myers v. Cowdin, 47 N.YS.2d 471, 476 (Sup. Ct.
1944); Epstein v. Schenck, 35 N.Y.S.2d 969, 980 (Sup. Ct. 1939). See also Winkelman v.
General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 500, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd sub nom., Singer v.
General Motors Corp., 136 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1943).
232. 155 Misc. 880, 281 N.Y. Supp. 795 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
233. Blaustein v. Pan American, Petroleum & Transport Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 299-300,
56 N.E.2d 705, 713 (1944); Gilbert v. Burnside, 13 A.D.2d 982, 983, :216 N.Y.S.2d 430,
432 (2d Dep't 1961). See also Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956).
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there is Court of Appeals authority to the contrary.2 4 It is almost too obvious
for comment that situations arise in which advice of counsel is indispensable
to corporate action. Differently, however, from the case of reliance on financial
statements (which is generally indispensable to corporate action by directors),
whether' directors may properly rely on the advice of counsel will normally
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. Accordingly, since this
area does not lend itself readily to general formulation, it was left to case by
case treatment at the judicial level.
A number of additional matters affecting the duty of directors are note-
worthy:
(a) Section 717 makes explicit the requirement that directors discharge
their duties with the degree of skill ordinarily exercised in similar circum-
stances by prudent men in like positions. This standard does not purport to
codify the intimation in Hun v. Cary2 3 5 that directors in assuming the respon-
sibilities of that office warrant the possession of ordinary expertise or know-
how. It was intended, however, to offset the suggestion made by the Court
of Appeals in propounding the "business judgment" rule that a director can
be exonerated from liability for errors made in the exercise of an honest, un-
biased judgment (presumably arrived at in the exercise of due care) 236 even
though the resulting action by the director riveals a total unfitness for the
office he has consciously and voluntarily assumed. Thus, in Everett v. Phil-
lips,23 7 the Court declared: "[y] et, however high may be the standard of
fidelity to duty which the court may exact, errors of judgment by directors
do not alone suffice to demonstrate lack of fidelity. This is true even though
the errors may be so gross that they demonstrate the unfitness of the directors
to manage the corporate affairs.12 3 8 (Emphasis added.) Tolerance of such an
abysmal standard of competence for managers of giant enterprises-involving
234. People v. Marcus, 261 N.Y. 268, 294, 185 N.E. 97, 105 (1933).
235. Supra note 221. The Court states:
[L]ike a mandatory to whom he has been likened, he is bound not only to ex-
ercise proper care and diligence, but ordinary skill and judgment. As he is bound
to exercise ordinary skill and judgment, he cannot set up that he did not possess
them.
This "warranty" language was criticized by Judge Learned Hand in Barnes v. Andrews,
298 Fed. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
236. See Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944) in which the
court said:
[Tihe question is frequently asked, how does the operation of the so-called
"business judgment rule" tie in with the concept of negligence? There is no
conflict between the two. When courts say that they will not interfere in matters
of business judgment, it is presupposed that judgment-reasonable diligence-
has in fact been exercised. A director cannot close his eyes to what is going on
about him in the conduct of the business of the corporation and have it said he
is exercising business judgment.
But cf., Lattin, Lattin on Corporations 241-242 (1959).
237. 288 N.Y. 227, 43" N.E.2d 18 (1942). See for a similar view of the businessjudgment rule, Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 604, 75 N.E.2d 305 (1947); Chelrob, Inc. v.
Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
238. Supra note 237 at 232, 43 N.E.2d at 20.
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stewardship over billions of dollars of public funds-is rather startling and
surely impermissible policy for this state. The imposition of a prescribed
standard of skill in Section 717 should set the matter straight. Nothing that
has been said is intended to suggest that the enactment of Section 717 has
entirely eliminated the business judgment rule. That rule remains unaffected
by the new law, except to the extent indicated by the foregoing comments.
(b) Other states that have adopted a statutory standard prescribing
the duties of directors preface the statement of such standard by providing
that "officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation-
ship to the corporation.. . " It will be noted that such a prefatory declara-
ration of the fiduciary relationship of the director to the corporation is absent
from Section 717. The reason for the omission is twofold: first, it permits
the invalid inference that no similar fiduciary duty exists towards the body
of shareholders, the minority shareholder group or, in some cases, the individ-
ual shareholders2 39 The suggestion made in some quarters that this dilemma
might be solved by expanding the statement of director's fiduciary rela-
tionship to the corporation to include shareholders was rejected on the ground
that this would unduly extend the duty of directors to the individual share-
holder as presently established under case law; second, it permits the unde-
sirable inference that the director is a true trustee, subject to the general
rules of the law of trusts. As the preceding discussion of the realistic
role of directors in the modern corporate situation has indicated, assimilat-
ing the director to the status of a true trustee would be inadvisable.
Attention is called in this respect to sub-paragraph (a) (1) of Section 1005
of the Business Corporation Law which states that directors in liquidating
a dissolved corporation "shall not be deemed to be trustees of its assets."
II. Delegation of the board's authority; Executive and other committees
In these days of mammoth, diversified corporate complexes operated on
the committee-line basis, it is particularly important that the outer limits,
if any, of permissible delegation by the board of directors of its authority
over corporate affairs to an executive committee or other committees be care-
fully spelled out. It need hardly be noted that it is patently impossible,
particularly in large publicly-held corporations, for the board itself to im-
plement on a routine basis such policy as it-formulates. Hence, the dele-
gation of routine and ministerial administrative powers to officers and agents
is indispensable and, of course, commonplace. In point of fact, even dis-
cretionary powers may be exercised by more highly-placed officers to the
239. It is, of course, abundantly clear that the directors owe a fiduciary duty to
the body of shareholders generally, the minority shareholders (see, for example, Eisenberg
v. Central Zone Property Corp., supra note 123), and, in some cases, even to the in-
dividual shareholder (see, for example, Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N.Y.
Supp. 768 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 567, 188 N.E. 67 (1933)..Cf., Section 10(b)
of Securities Exchange Act, 1934; Rule X-10B-5).
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degree that the courts have recognized the "prima fade" authority of the
president (or any officer assuming such status de facto) 240 to take any action
the board might have authorized or ratified. 240a This principle recently received
a rather unusual application in West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp.
241
in which the Court of Appeals sustained the authority of the president-director
to bring suit on behalf of the corporation to surcharge the two remaining
directors for dereliction of duty on the ground that such power is impliable
where the board has not previously acted to interdict the suit2 42 (although it
is too obvious to require comment that had the board deliberated in the case
the suit would not have been brought).243 Although existing statutes do not
make express provision for the creation of executive or other committees, 43a
the exercise of such power as an administrative expedient was recognized
judicially very early,2 44 and sustained under the statutory grant of authority
to the directors "to appoint such officers and agents as its (corporation's)
business shall require." The rationale for sustaining such subdelegation by
an apparent corporate agency was explained in the landmark case of Hoyt v.
Thompson's Executor2 45 as resting on the basic principle that the directors are
not truly agents of the corporate body receiving their authority from the
shareholder-owners, but rather that "... the powers of the board of directors
are, in a very important sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do
not confer nor can they revoke those powers. They are derivative only in the
sense of being received from the State in the act of incorporation." '-4
Limits have been set judicially'on the implied power of the president
to undertake activity in the management of corporate affairs that involves
the exercise of discretion and judgment normally within the sole competence
of the board. Thus, in Heaman v. E. N. Rowell Co.,2 47 the president was held
without impliable authority to bind the corporation to a contract hiring an
employee for life-although the Court suggested that such authority might
have been vested in the president expressly by the board. The Court of Appeals
has seemingly never blocked out the extent to which the board is authorized
to vest basic policy-making power (extraordinary power as contrasted with
240. See Rothman & Schneider, Inc. v. Beckerman, 2 N.Y.2d 493, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118
(1957).
240a. Hardin v. Morgan Lithograph Co., 247 N.Y. 332, 160 N.E. 388 (1928).
241. 6 N\.Y.2d 344, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1959).
242. See Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.
2d 790 (1949) in which the Court of Appeals held the president without power to initiate
suit on behalf of the corporation where the board had considered the advisability of
bringing suit and had not authorized it (because it was deadlocked).
243. See In re Paloma Frocks, Inc., 3 N.Y.2d 572, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958), where
Sterling Industries, Inc. was distinguished on the ground that the advisability of bringing
suit had not been considered by the board and rejected (as in Sterling Industries).
243a. Except for N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 31 which refers to "the board of directors
or any committee thereof." See N.Y. Membership Corp. Law § 20.
244. Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor, 19 N.Y. 207 (1859).
245. Ibid.
246. Id. at 216.
247. 261 N.Y. 229, 185 N.E. 83 (1933).
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power to make decisions involving the exercise of some discretion or judgment)
in corporate officers or the executive committee. In theory, such extraordinary
(policy-making) power ought not be exercised by a committee constituting less
than the entire number of authorized directors since, under Sections 27 and 28
of the General Corporation Law and parallel provisions of the new law, 24 7a
management power over corporate affairs is vested in the directors, regularly
convened as a board, and it has been consistently held that Section 27 embodies
fundamental public policy 2 48 Certainly, in the light of this policy, the executive
committee should be subordinate to the full board, which ought have the right
in every case to override any policy decisions made by the committee. Such,
indeed, was held to be the case in Commercial Wood and Cement Company v.
Northhampton Portland Cement Company.24 9 Insofar as the New York courts
have expressed any views on the question posed above, they have uniformly
taken the position that extraordinary powers cannot be delegated to the
executive committee. 250 This rule was stated most forthrightly by a lower court
in Fensterer v. Pressure Lighting Co.251 as follows: "The vesting in an executive
committee of the powers of the full board of directors as to the 'management of
the business and affairs' of the company cannot be construed to empower the
executive committee to remove from office statutory officers of the company
who have themselves been elected for a prescribed tenure by the full board
of directors. Assuming that such a power is one which the statute might
authorize to be delegated-and this I doubt-such a delegation may not be in-
ferred from less than a clear expression of the legislative intent and an explicit
provision of the by-laws and resolution. Such an expression as 'the powers of
the board of directors in the management of the business and affairs of the
company' may be held to delegate 'ministerial,' 'current', 'ordinary' and 'routine'
powers, but not power to inaugurate radical reversals of or departures from
fundamental policies and methods of conducting the business as prescribed by
the directorate." (Emphasis added). The decisive New York precedent sus-
taining the propriety of board delegation of its authority to an executive
committee, Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor,25 2 itself distinguished between "or-
dinary" and "extraordinary" business for this purpose, and although it inter-
preted "ordinary business" very broadly, making it coterminous with "the
varied and extensive affairs in which it was authorized by its charter to en-
gage," there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the Court recognized any
247a. See, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 701, 708.
248. See Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174,
77 N.E.2d 633 (1948); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
249. 190 N.Y. 1, 82 N.E. 730 (1907).
250. See First National Bank v. Commerdal Travelers' Home Ass'n of America,
108 App. Div. 78, 95 N.Y. Supp. 454 (3d Dep't 1905), aff'd, 185 N.Y. 575, 78 N.E. 1103
(1906); Fensterer v. Pressure Lighting Co., 85 Misc. 621, 149 N.Y. Supp. 49 (City Ct.
1914), appeal denied, 167 App. Div. 904 (1st Dep't 1915).
251. Supra note 250.
252. Supra note 244.
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authority in the committee to establish fundamental policy for the corporation.
The suggestion that language in Manson v. Curtis253 to the effect that "the
directors convened as a board are the primary possessors of all the powers
which the charter confers, and like private principals they may delegate
to agents of their own appointment the performance of any acts which they
themselves can perform, and that the recognition of this principle is abso-
lutely necessary in the affairs of every corporation whose powers are vested in a
board of directors"254 (Emphasis added.) may have relaxed the foregoing rule is
not convincing-if only because the precedent cited to sustain the court's com-
ment is Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor. The exercise by an executive committee
of extraordinary power has been denied where it sought to: issue corporate
shares (although the committee had been vested with the power of general
direction and superintendence of the affairs of the company and with full
authority for constructing, repairing, equipping and operating the railroad);25r
discharge statutory officers designated by the full board;2 56 vote its own com-
pensation;2 557 bind non-assenting shareholders to a merger;258 bind the corpo-
ration to a selling agency for a period of five years (the court suggested that
the exercise of such extensive power could not be implied) .259
Aside from the limitations imposed judicially on the permissible scope
of executive committee powers, the evidence is strong that the boards of
many corporations jealously reserve extraordinary powers to themselves. This
reservation normally takes the form of a provision in the constating resolution
or by-law to the effect that "the authority of the committee is restricted to
the ordinary and usual business of the company," or "the executive committee
shall possess and exercise the authority of the board in the management of the
affairs of the corporation only to the extent that specific directions shall not
have been given by the board," or "the executive committee shall transact
the ordinary business of the corporation during the interval between meetings
of the board, subject at all times to the control of the board.1200 Most often
the restriction takes the form of specifically enumerated exceptions to the
committee's authority involving such matters as: adoption, amendment or
repeal of by-laws; declaration of dividends; filling of vacancies in the board
or committees; election or removal of officers; amendment of the certificate
of incorporation; recommendation to shareholders of any action requiring their
253. 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
254. Id. at 322, 119 N.E. at 562.
255. Ryder v. Bushwick Railroad Co., 134 N.Y. 83, 31 N.E. 251 (1892).
256. Fensterer v. Pressure Lighting Co., supra note 250.
257. Marshall v. Industrial Federation of America, 84 N.Y. Supp. 866 (App. T.
1903).
258. Blatchford v. Ross, 54 Barb. 42 (N.Y. 1869).
259. Commercial Wood and Cement Co. v. Northampton Portland Cement Co.,
supra note 249.
260. See American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Jnc. and National Industrial
Conference Board, Inc., Corporate Directorship Practices (Studies in Business Policy,
No. 90), 67 (1959).
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approval; issuance of additional shares; embarking on major financing; fixing
compensation of directors and officers. It is customary for the committee to
report on its actions to the full directorate, and many by-laws stipulate that
any action taken'by such committee shall be subject to modification or abroga-
tion by the full board. 61
The foregoing account of the current status in New York of the execu-
tive committee should serve to point up the importance of Section 712 of
the Business Corporation Law, which gives statutory recognition to the execu-
tive committee and other committees 2 62 Paragraph (a) authorizes the board
to act through a committee of at least three directors, if the certificate of
incorporation or the by-laws so provide, pursuant to a resolution adopted by
a majority of the entire board (which is defined in paragraph (a) of Section
702 as "the total number of directors which the corporation would have if
there were no vacancies"). Of course, the essence of Section 712 lies in its
flat statement that such executive or other committee "to the extent provided
in the resolution or in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws, shall have
all the authority of the board . . . ," subject to the enumerated exceptions.
That this formulation was designed to authorize delegation to the executive or
other committees of extraordinary (policy-making) powers-which the language
declares so directly-is evidenced by its scrupulous avoidance of the former
Model Act language "shall have and may exercise all of the authority of
the board of directors in the management of the corporation. .. " This latter
language (eliminated from the Model Act in the 1959 amendments thereto)
had been included in preliminary drafts of Section 712, but was excluded from
the prefiled version of the (1960) Study Bill because of its tendency to suggest
that only a restrictive delegation of ordinary and routine management powers
was intended to be authorized. Further evidence of the legislative intention to
allow a more dimensional delegation to committees of the board's authority is
to be found in the character of the exceptions to such delegation embodied in
the section. These include corporate policy matters of great importance (of the
kind which, as indicated above, boards of many companies tend to reserve to
themselves in any event) such as: (1) the submission to shareholders of any
action that needs their authorization under the chapter (this would include
mergers, consolidations, disposition of all or substantially all the corporate
property, amendments of the certificate of incorporation, loans to directors,
ultra vires guarantees, director, officer or employee incentive share option
plans, informal dissolution, contracts or transactions involving interested direc-
tors and their corporations, indemnifications of directors and officers, and share
distributions in certain cases); (2) the filling of vacancies in the board or any
261. Id. at 68-69.
262. Although stress is placed in this discussion on the executive committee, the
importance of other committees, such as the finance and audit committees, in organiza-
tions run on the committee-line is not unrecognized. I
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committee; (3) fixing the compensation of the directors for serving on the
board or any committee; (4) the adoption,' amendment or repeal of by-laws;
and (5) amending or repealing any board resolution by its terms unamendable
or unrepealable. Although the foregoing exceptions to the delegation power
of the board are extensive, many vital matters affecting corporate policy re-
main within the area of permissible delegation, such as the declaration of
dividends, the issuance of shares, major corporate financing, the designation
and removal of officers, the hiring, firing and compensation of corporate
personnel, and the like. It is important to note in this respect that, as formu-
lated in Section 712, aside from the enumerated statutory exceptions, the
executive committee will be conclusively presumed to have all the authority
of the full board except as to particular areas of authority expressly excluded
from the delegation in the certificate of incorporation, by-law or resolution
creating the committee. Hence, committee action is corporate action and ir-
reversible a such by the full board, except as the board may have reserved the
right to amend or revoke the acts of committee that it appoints. Since, however,
under paragraph (c), any committee designated by the board serves at its
pleasure, the board would as a practical matter have the power to remove any
committee and, if third party rights are not involved, undo any act of such
committee of which it does not approve.
The extent to which the full board should be chargeable with the impro-
prieties of a committee that it selects presents a problem of not inconsiderable
difficulty, the solution of which depends in good measure upon the view
taken of the relationship between the board and its committees. If such rela-
tionship is viewed in terms of principal-agent (a natural assumption since,
under paragraph (c), the committee is expressly stated to serve at the pleasure
of the board), the board should, technically, be responsible for any dereliction
by its agent (the committele) despite the most extreme care taken in selecting
it. If, however, the committee, once designated, is viewed as an independent
body, aplausible. argument can be advanced that the board should be responsi-
ble only for failure to exercise proper care in selecting such committee. This
latter assumption carries the necessary consequence that the full board might
escape responsibility for many important actions, affecting vital corporate
policy within the area of permissible delegation, by the simple expedient of
creating a three-man committee. Public policy considerations would appear to
require some compromise of these opposing views, and the ultimate responsibility
of the particular director (who is not on the committee) for actions taken by
the committee might well be made to depend upon his role in corporate manage-
ment. The "outside" director should clearly not be burdened with the need to
supervise details of management by.which established policy is administered,
although the extent of the duty of the "inside" (management) director in this
respect is not so clear.263 Similar considerations very likely apply to the com-
263. See Bates v. Dresser, supra note 228.
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mittee's formulation of minor areas of corporate policy inevitably involved in
the routine of corporate administration. But, surely, there can be no argument
with the proposition that the entire board owes a continuing duty of super-
vision over, and should bear continuing responsibility for, the major areas of
corporate policy, such as dividend declarations and financing mechanisms,
despite the permissible delegation of such policy-formulating power to a com-
mittee of its choice. The mere circumstance that the new law authorizes (prob-
ably for the first time in New York) the delegation of major policy-making
power to a committee does not justify the abdication by the board of, what
in Section 717 is declared to be, its duty to discharge its office "in good faith
and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions." Case law is not
to the contrary.264 The highest courts have uniformly taken the view that the
board in delegating authority to committees or officers does not thereby cast off
its responsibility for general supervision over, and formulation of, major policy
matters. This position was taken forthrightly in Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth
Trust Co.,265 in an elaborate opinion in which the lower court commented as
follows:
Directors, not members of the executive committee, are not excused
from liability because they committed their duties to the executive
committee and relied upon them to examine the loans and collateral.
The stockholders elected the directors, not the executive committee;
and, if the directors saw fit to rely on the executive committee, it was
their own reliance and their own risk. They may delegate the work,
not their responsibility. 2
66
Although it is true that the lower court judgment was reversed and a new trial
ordered in Kavanaugh v. Gould,267 the position taken by the lower court,
imposing responsibility on non-committee members of the board for improper
loans and other distributions tolerated by the committee, was sustained by the
result reached in the Court of Appeals 268 when the matter finally got there
for decision. In any case, a dose reading of the majority opinion in Kavanaugh
v. Gould does not reveal any theoretical opposition to the residual responsibility
of the board for major corporate policy. While the majority there disagreed
with the lower court's general statement that the board "may delegate the
work but not the responsibility" and took the square position that the board
would, as a matter of the general law of trusts, not be responsible for the
264. See Cassidy v. Uhlmann, supra note 229; Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust
Co., supra note 223; see also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1890) ; Warner v. Pennoyer,
91 Fed. 587 (2d Cir. 1898).
265. 64 Misc. 303, 118 N.Y. Supp. 758 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
266. Id. at 316, 118 N.Y. Supp. at 767.
267. 147 App. Div. 281, 131 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (3d Dep't 1911), reversing, Kavanaugh
v. Commonwealth Trust Co., supra note 265.
268. Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., supra note 223, reversing, 169 App. Div.
905, 153 N.Y. Supp. 1122 (3d Dep't 1915) (same case, which had gone back for new trial
after the reversal in Kavanaugh v. Gould, supra note 267).
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negligent performance of the work that it may permissibly delegate, it is
abundantly dear, contextually, that the court's reference to "work" was to
"routine" management of the corporation, and to "delegation" was to the
delegation of ministerial duties of management-not major policy formulation
(not involved factually in the case).
The foregoing discussion should serve to illuminate the inclusion in
paragraph (c) of the provision that "the designation of any such committee and
the delegation thereto of authority shall not alone relieve any director of his
duty to the corporation under Section 717." This formulation is designed to
afford the court sufficient flexibility, in fixing responsibility for improprieties
committed by a committee, to recognize the continuing duty of the board in
respect of the important areas of corporate policy but to restrict, to members
of the committee only, responsibility for negligence and breach of duty in
the execution of corporate policy and in the routine of daily administration of
the corporate affairs. This flexibility would extend as well to the definition of
the relative duties under Section 717 of "outside" and "inside" directors. The
formulation found in Section 38 of the Model Act, which had been incorporated
into the (1960) Study Bill, that "The designation of any such committee and
the delegation thereto of authority shall not operate to relieve the board of
directors, or any member thereof, of any responsibility imposed by law" was
rejected, after more mature deliberation, as too broad a statement of the
residual responsibility of the board for the acts of the committee. Such a
standard, if taken by the courts at face value (and no reason appears why it
should not be), would require the imposition of liability upon the full board
for any improprieties of the committee in its day-to-day conduct of the business
of the corporation, and would have the necessary consequence of discouraging
men of affairs from manning the boards of corporations in this state.
III. Directors' Rights; Interested Directors; Indemnification
A. Interested directors
The notoriety attendant upon the rash of "conflict of interest" situations
in public life and, particularly, in large public-issue corporations underlines the
need for a precise definition of the extent to which a director may deal with his
corporation in relation to a matter in which the director is personally interested.
This question, a facet of the duty of loyalty owed by the director to his cor-
poration, has been complicated by an early ill-conceived identification of the
corporate director with the strict (or technical) trustee. In Munson v. Syracuse,
Geneva and Corning Railroad Co.,2 69 plaintiff sought to compel the specific
performance of a contract he (and his associates) had made with the defendant
corporation (of which plaintiff was a director). The contract involved the sale
of railroad properties and rights of way owned by Munson and his associates
269. 103 N.Y. 58, 8 N.E. 355 (1886).
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to the corporation. The court's refusal to grant specific performance was justi-
fied by the rationale embodied in the following comment:
• .. the contract . is repugnant to the great rule of law which
invalidates all contracts made by a trustee or fiduciary in which he is
personally interested, at the election of the party he represents. There
is no controversy as to the facts bringing the case as to Munson within
the operation of the rule. He and his associates were dealing with a
corporation in which Munson was a director, in a matter where the
interests of the contracting parties were or might be in conflict. The
contract bound the corporation to purchase, and Munson, as one of
the directors, participated in the action of the corporation in assuming
the obligation. .. He stood in the attitude of selling as an owner
and purchasing as trustee. The law permits no one to act in such in-
consistent relations. It does not stop to inquire whether the contract
or transaction was fair or unfair. It stops the inquiry when the rela-
tion is disclosed, and sets aside the transaction or refuses to enforce
it, at the instance of the party whom the fiduciary undertook to rep-
resent, without undertaking to deal with the question of abstract
justice in the particular case- It prevents frauds by making them, as
far as may be, impossible, knowing that real motives often elude the
most searching inquiry, and it leaves neither to judge nor jury the
right to determine upon a consideration of its advantages or disad-
vantages, whether a contract made under such circumstances shall
stand or fall ... The law cannot accurately measure the influence of
a trustee with his associates.. . . The value of the rule of equity, to
which we have adverted, lies to a great extent in its stubbornness and
inflexibility. (Emphasis added.)2 7 0
The foregoing "great rule of law" doctrine was restated by the Court of Appeals
as recently as 1952 in the case of In re People (Bond and Mortgage Guarantee
Co.)271 (which, however, involved improprieties by attorneys for (strict)
trustees who had been appointed for the benefit of holders of first mortgage
certificates in a corporate reorganization). It should be noted, however, that
the reaffirmance of the Munson doctrine in In re People (Bond and Mortgage
Guarantee Co.) was the basis for a sharp dissent in the significant Appellate
Division, Second Department case of La Vin v. La Vin;T2 which shall be dis-
cussed later.
Although the Munson doctrine was tacitly reaffirmed as a controlling
precedent by the Court of Appeals in a number of cases,2 7 3 "cross-currents and
eddies" in other opinions by the same court muddied the stream, and served to
confound the practising bar. Thus, in Converse v. Sharpe,274 it was held that
270. Id. at 73, 74, 8 N.E. at 358.
271. 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.2d 721 (1952).
.272. 283 App. Div. 809, 128 N.Y.S.2d S18 (2d Dep't 1954), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 790,
121 N.E.2d 620 (1954).
273. See New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102
(1926); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378(1918).
274. 161 N.Y. 571, 56 N.E. 69 (1900).
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a director could in good faith loan money to his corporation and take corporate
securities as collateral (even though it later developed that the corporation
was in fact insolvent when the loan was made). The Court relied on Twin-Lick
Oil Company v. Marbury275 in which the Supreme Court had declared that
there was no rule forbidding a director "from loaning money to the corporation
when the money is needed, and the transaction is open and otherwise free from
blame." In Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 276 the Court refused to
enjoin the consummation of a transaction in which a director-shareholder sold
a water-works extension that he had built and owned to his water-works
corporation. The Court was able to say, without either mention of, or attempt
to distinguish the Munson case, that "this is not the case of a trustee entering
into a contract with himself or purchasing from himself, where the contract is
liable to be repudiated at the mere will or even the whim of the cestui que trust.
Having the rights of an absolute owner of this extension, Mullins was at liberty
in making such contract in regard to its disposal as he should see fit, so long,
of course, as he did not, while acting in his own interest on the one side, also
act on the other in the capacity of trustee or representative, so that his interest
and his duty might conflict. In this case Mullins did not so act." -77 This
comment, coming right on the heels of the decision in Munson, is rather per-
plexing unless it be assumed that the Munson case has no force as a precedent
where the interested director does not participate (as he did in Munson) in
the decision of the board approving the contract. An attempt to reconcile the
Munson and Gamble cases on this ground was flatly rejected by the Court in
Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas and Electric Co. 278 in the following interesting
statement by Judge Cardozo: "We think the evidence supports the conclusion
that the contracts are voidable at the election of the defendant. The plaintiff
does not deny that this would be true if the dual director had voted for their
adoption (Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C.R.R. Co.). But the argument is that
by refusing to vote, he shifted the responsibility to his associates, and may
reap a profit from their errors. One does not divest oneself so readily of
one's duties as trustee. The refusal to vote has, indeed, this importance: It
gives to the transaction the form and presumption of propriety, and requires
one who would invalidate it to probe beneath the surface .... But 'the great
rule of law' (Andrews, J., in Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C.R.R. Co .... ) which
holds a trustee to a duty of constant and unqualified fidelity is not a thing
of form and phrases. A dominating influence may be exerted in other ways
than by a vote."2 7 9 (Citation omitted.) How, indeed, in light of Munson, can
one explain the following language of the Court of Appeals in Billings v.
275. 91 U.S. 587 (1875).
276. 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890).
277. Id. at 97, 25 N.E. at 201, 202.
278. Supra note 273.
279. Id. at 488, 489, 121 N.E. at 379, 380.
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Shaw:2 0 "The illegality of a profit made by a director arises almost wholly
by reason of some undisclosed and secret bias on his part against the interest
of the corporation of which he is a director. If a profit is made in a transaction
that is honest in itself, and is open and fully disclosed, and the transaction is
consummated after an honest statement of the facts to the board of directors
at a meeting, and to the stockholders at a stockholders' meeting there is no
reason for criticism or for charging such director with any profits that he
may make. s281 The position reflected in the foregoing language of Billings v.
Shaw was later squarely implemented in New York Trust Co. v. American
Realty Co.,28 2 in which a director was allowed to retain a profit he had made
from a sale of timberland that he owned to his corporation on the ground that
although the corporation might have rescinded the contract (citing the Munson
case for this proposition), it could not "repudiate the obligations of a contract
made with a director and at the same time retain its benefits. If contract with
the director was valid, the corporation must pay the agreed price; if invalid,
the corporation must rescind or repudiate the contract in its entirety ...
Profit made is the fruit of his ownership, and not his agency .... If the con-
tract which fixed the amount of the seller's profits is not rescinded or void,
the fact that the profits are so large that they might be called 'exorbitant'
is ordinarily immaterial. '283
The authorities discussed above involved transactions between the director
and his corporation in which the subject matter was property owned by the
director in his personal right. A line of cases appeared very early which
involved transactions between corporations having common directors-the "in-
terlocking directorate" situation. These cases, originally decided compatibly
with Munson, soon departed from the rigidity of the doctrine. In an elaborate
opinion at special term in 1884, Metropolitan Elevated Railway Co. v. Man-
hattan Elevated Railway Co.,284 the Court reviewed the precedents in depth
and found that they imposed upon the director transacting the business of the
(corporate) trust the responsibilities of a strict trustee. When urged to distin-
guish between corporate transactions involving common directors and those in
which the director contracts with his corporation as to a matter in which he is
personally interested, the Court concluded "I can see no difference in principle
between the case of a director contracting with his corporation and that of
directors of one corporation contracting with themselves as directors of another
corporation. The evils to be avoided are the same; the temptations to a breach
of trust are the same; the want of independent action exists, and the divided
allegiance is just as apparent." 28 5 However, in Sage v. Culver, decided in
280. 209 N.Y. 265, 103 N.E. 142 (1913).
281. Id. at 280, 103 N.E. at 147.
282. Supra note 273.
283. Id. at 217, 218, 155 N.E. at 105.
284. 11 Daly 373 (N.Y. 1884).
285. Id. at 503.
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1895, a derivative action was brought against the directors-majority share-
holders of a railroad corporation alleging in part that the defendants had taken
a lease for their corporation at exorbitant rentals from another railroad in
which they were likewise directors and majority shareholders.286 Without even
a wisp of reference to Munson or earlier precedents, the Court stated: "When
a trustee or the officer or director of a corporation deals with himself, as an
individual, or in the character of trustee, director, or officer of another corpora-
tion, with respect to the funds, securities or property of the corporation, the
transaction is at least open to question by the corporation, or, in a proper case,
by its stockholders, and the trustee is bound to explain the transaction, and
show that the same was fair, and that no undue advantage has been taken by
him of his position, for his own advantage, or the advantage of some other
corporation in which he has an interest.... When it appears that the trustee
or officer has violated the moral obligation to refrain from placing himself in
relations which ordinarily produce a conflict between self-interest and integrity,
there is, in equity, a presumption against the transaction, which he is required
to explain. '28 7 (Emphasis added.) There is, in the foregoing comment, no intima-
tion that a transaction involving an interested director and his corporation or
between corporations having common directors is voidable at the option of the
corporation adversely affected-but only that a presumption of possible im-
propriety is created thereby which the interested director has the burden of
explaining. In Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas and Electric Co., 2 88 involving a
suit for the specific performance of a contract between a corporation owned by
one Maynard and another corporation of which he was a director, Judge
Cardozo, speaking for the Court, paid lip service to Munson but actually held
the contract unenforceable against the corporation (or avoidable by it) only
after a thorough factual analysis of its fairness to the corporation. There was
no suggestion in the case that the transaction was automatically avoidable by
the corporation irrespective of its fairness-quite the contrary, for the Court
was moved to say "(W)e think the evidence supports the conclusion that the
contracts are voidable at the election of the defendant." (Emphasis added.)
The evidence, going beyond the mere inconsistent position of the common
director, probed the special character of the transaction, the influence exerted
by Maynard on the corporate officer in charge of the transaction and other
relevant factors. Finally, in Everett v. Phillips,289 an action was commenced
to compel the directors of the Empire Power Corporation to collect loans that
had been made to the Long Island Lighting Company. The defendants were
on the boards of both corporations in which they owned controlling share
interests. When it was argued that the transactions between the corporations
having common directors was voidable without regard to their fairness to
286. 147 N.Y. 241, 41 N.E. 513 (1895).
287. Id. at 247, 41 N.E. at 514.
288. Supra note 273.
289. 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
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Empire Power, the court said: "It is argued, however, that the transactions in
which the defendants acted as directors both of the Empire Power Corpora-
tion and the Long Island Lighting Company should be set aside because the
dual position of these directors precluded an unprejudiced exercise of judgment.
The dual position of the directors making the unprejudiced exercise of judgment
by them more difficult, should lead the courts to scrutinize these transactions
with care (Sage v. Culver...). It does not, however, alone suffice to render the
transactions void... .,,0 (Emphasis added.) The court also held that a provi-
sion of. the certificate of incorporation of Empire Power expressly authorizing
the directors to act even with respect to matters in which they have a dual
interest "has the effect of exonerating the directors, at least in part, 'from
adverse inferences which might otherwise be drawn against them.' ,29oa
At least insofar as transactions between corporations 'having common
directors are involved, the "prophylactic doctrine" 9:1 of Munson was, if not
directly oyerruled, effectively relegated to limbo by Everett v. Phillips. This
was recognized by the federal court in Piccard v. Sperry,22 where in a suit to
surcharge a director of the Sperry corporation for profits derived from. bring-
ing his corporation into contractual relations with another corporation of which
he was president and principal shareholder, the court viewed the New York
law-in the conflict of interest area as follows: "To the extent that Munson v.
Syracuse, G. & C.R.R. Co. may be said to impose a more rigid standard, it
yields to-the more moderate view expressed by both prevailing and dissenting
opinions in Everett v. Phillips." 93 (Citations omitted.) The New York appel-
late courts, in a line of cases involving factual patterns of both the Munson
and Phillips variety, have with undeviating uniformity followed the lead of
the Phillips case. A number of these cases were affirmed without opinion by
the Court of Appeals.2 94 One of the most recent of these, and perhaps the most
revealing because of the split it induced in the court on the law governing the
conflict of interest issue, is La Vin v. La Vin295 which involved an action by a
minority shareholder to set aside a lease made by defendants (directors-
majority shareholders) to a third party, from which the defendants had alleged-
ly~extracted personal gain. The majority relied squarely on Everett v. Phillips
in holding that a showing of personal benefit to a director from a corporate
290. Id. at 236, 237, 43 N.E.2d at 22.
290a. Id. at 237, 43 N.E.2d at 22.
291. This phrase has been attributed to Professor Ballantine.
292. 48 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 152 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1946).
293. Id. at 467.
294. La Vin v. Ia Vi, supra note 272; Martin Foundation, Inc. v. Phillips-Jones
Corp., 283 App. Div. 729, 127 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't 1954), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 972, 120
N.E.2d 230 (1954); Garbarino v. Utica Uniform Co, 269 App. Div. 622, 58 N.Y.S.2d
136 (4th Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 794, 66 N.E.2d 579 (1946). See also Tomarkin v.
Vitron Research Corp., 12 A.D.2d 496, 206 N.Y.S.2d 869 (2d Dep't 1960); Wohl v.
Miller, 5 A.D.2d 126, 169 N.Y-S.2d 233 (1st Dep't 1957); In re Curran, 203 Misc. 956,
120 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Surr. Ct. 1953); In re Meyer's Estate, 119 N.Y.S.24 737 (Surr. Ct.
1953).
295. Supra note 272.
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transaction does not as a matter of law invalidate it, and that a declaration of
invalidity based upon bad faith and unfairness to the corporation involved a
question of fact which had been decided in favor of defendants by the trial
court. The dissenting (presiding) justice refused to concede that Munson had
been eviscerated by Phillips, particularly in light of Munson's very recent
indorsement by the Court of Appeals in In re People (Bond & Mortgage
Guarantee Co.),296 and sought to distinguish Phillips on a number of grounds
including the circumstance that the certificate of incorporation of Empire
Power Corporation in that case authorized intercorporate transactions by
common directors.
Analysis of the foregoing crazy-quilt of authority reveals that Munson v.
Syracuse, Geneva and Corning Railroad Co. 2 17 stands in "lofty" isolation in
the conflict of interest arena. This is hardly surprising in light of its unrealistic
equation of the corporate director and the strict (technical) trustee. The courts
realized around the turn of the century, when business was in its rapidly ex-
panding state and property interests were proliferating, that enterprises in
difficulty might have to turn for assistance to their managers (Converse v.
Sharpe)29 s or enter into profitable or necessary transactions involving property
owned by such managers personally (New York Trust Co. v. American Realty
Co.).2s9 In such case, although the interested director is a fiduciary and must
transact business with his corporation scrupulously, the effect of imposing the
strict trusteeship formula of Munson is to throttle many such transactions in
their very inception. It is very likely that Munson has not been formally
overruled in its application to corporate-interested director transactions be-
cause of its salutary indirect effect upon such transactions, and because of its
general tendency, as an extant precedent, to underline the fiduciary responsi-
bility of the director.
Section 713 of the Business Corporation Law, modeled after a California
statute,300 was drafted with a view to stabilizing the law affecting conflict of
interest questions. In paragraph (a), the essential approach of Everett v.
Phillips is adopted by the provision that no contract or transaction between a
corporation and its director or between a corporation and another firm in which
its director is likewise a director or officer or financially interested shall be either
void or voidable for this reason alone, or for the reason alone that the corporate
director was present at a meeting of the board or committee which approved
the contract or transaction or that his vote was counted for such purpose.
However, to insure that the conflict of interest will not alone suffice to set
aside the transaction, any one of the following three conditions must be met:
(1) Under subparagraph (a) (1) if the interest or common directorship is dis-
closed or known to the board or committee, such contract or transaction nay
296. Supra note 271.
297. Supra note 269.
298. Supra note 274.
299. Supra note 273.
300. Cal. Gen. Corp. Law § 820.
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be approved by such board or committee by a sufficient vote without counting
the vote of the interested director. Under paragraph (b), common or interested
directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting
at which the contract or transaction is approved. Although this latter provi-
sion would appear to depart from the common law rule in New York,3° °a it has
the advantage of making essential corporate-interested director transactions
possible, which could not have been considered at all under the common law
rule because no quorum could be convened. This result is of particular moment
for the close and medium-size corporations where directors are often, the princi-
pal owners of the enterprise and corporate financing may depend upon loans
from the owners. (2) Under subparagraph (a) (2), if the interest or common
directorship is disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote, such
contract or transaction may be approved by vote of the shareholders (which,
under paragraph (b) of Section 614 of the Business Corporation Law, would
require for this purpose "a majority of the votes cast at a meeting of share-
holders [at which a quorum is present] by the holders of shares entitled to
vote thereon"). This provision for shareholder authorization of corporate-
interested director transactions is compatible with the common law rule, set
forth in such cases as Continental Securities v. Belmont,30' that "irregular" or
"voidable" (as contrasted with illegal or fraudulent) transactions could be
"ratified or confirmed by a majority of the body of stockholders as the ulti-
mate parties in interest and thus make them binding on the corporation." The
same authorities make it abundantly clear, however, that such ratification or
confirmation would not validate any fraud, misapplication of funds, or over-
reaching by interested directors, at least so as to bind the minority shareholders
who had not assented thereto. Subparagraph (a) (2) contains the additional
provision, at variance with the common law rule,30 2 that for the purpose of
obtaining such shareholder approval "the share of such interested director or
directors shall not be shares entitled to vote." In addition to stripping such
shares of voting rights, the effect of this provision is to exclude the shares owned
by interested directors from being counted in determining the presence of a
quorum (since under paragraph (a) of Section 608 of the Business Corporation
Law, a quorum is constituted by the holders of a majority of the shares entitled
to vote-which would necessarily exclude the shares of interested directors
denominated "shares not entitled to vote" in subparagraph (a) (2)). Sinc
shares of interested directors could not be counted toward a quorum at share-
holders' meetings, this latter provision of subparagraph (a) (2) might have
the unfortunate effect in some cases of preventing the consummation of such
300a. See Enright v. Hecksher, 240 Fed. 863 (2d Cir. 1917); Butts v. Wood, 37 N.Y.
317 (1867). Cf., Piccard v. Sperry, supra note 292.
301. Supra note 36.
302. See Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., supra note 276., It is interesting to
note that the director-shareholder is not barred from exercising his franchise as a share-
holder under the California statute which inspired Section 713.
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transactions as sales, mergers and consolidations in certain close or medium-
size corporations in which the interested directors own a substantial majority of
the shares but cannot control the minority shareholders whose presence would
be indispensable to a quorum. This possibly burdensome consequence, in addi-
tion to depriving the interested director of his franchise as a shareholder, would
seem an unduly high price to exact for a policy aimed at preventing the interested
director from exerting an influence as a shareholder on the vote of the share-
holder body affecting the transaction in which he is interested-particularly
when it is considered that Section 713 is concerned solely with the voidability
and not the validity (or director-liability consequences) of such corporate-
interested director transactions.303 (3) Despite the absence of any disclosure
of the interest or common directorship, the contract or transaction will not be
void or voidable by reason thereof "if the contract or transaction is fair and
reasonable as to the corporation at the time it is approved by the board, a
committee or the shareholders." (Emphasis added.) This provision embodies
the essential holding of Sage v. Ctlver304 and Everett v. Phillips30 to the effect
that an action to set aside the contract or transaction ought to fail if the
interested director can sustain the burden of demonstrating that he has not
taken improper advantage of his special position in the corporation and that,
in general, the transaction is one which the corporation could profitably, and
would likely, have made in the same way with a stranger. An assessment of
the corporate need for the transaction and the adequacy of the consideration
received by the corporation therefrom, in light of all relevant surrounding
circumstances, will, of course, be of prime importance. The failure of the
director to disclose his interest and the general influence he exerts on the board
will be involved at least tangentially in determining whether the transaction
should be set aside.
It is extremely important to recognize that the sole function Section 713
is designed to subserve is simply to eliminate the Munson3'" case as a con-
trolling precedent, and to establish beyond question that a contract or transac-
tion between a director and his corporation or between corporations having
common directors shall not be void or voidable for this reason alone if either
of the "disclosure" criteria or the "fairness" test is met. Mere compliance
with the disclosure requirement would not, however, prevent the avoidance of
such contract or transaction for fraud or other impropriety. In fact, the
experience with the California statute, almost the verbatim counterpart of
Section 713, indicates that the "fairness" test will probably be held to blanket
the statute; that is, despite technical compliance with the disclosure require-
ment (which will prevent avoidance of the contract or transaction by reason
303. An amendment to Section 713 eliminating the second sentence of subparagraph(a) (2), which disallows the interested director from voting as a shareholder, has been
approved at the 1962 session of the New York Legislature.
304. Supra note 286.
305. Supra note 289.
306. Supra note 269.
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of the director's interest), the contract or transaction may still be set aside
if unfair to the corporation when approved. This was the square holding in
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co. 307 where the court in construing
the California statute held the fiduciary responsibilities of the interested direc-
tors of transcendent importance, and stated that "even though the requirements
of section 820 are technically met, transactions that are unfair and unreason-
able to the corporation may be avoided." Section 713 does not purport to
deal with the validity of the contract or transaction, and mere disclosure of
a director's interest will not alone serve to validate such a contract or
transaction where there is evidence that the disclosure was not full and
fair, unfair advantage was taken by the interested director, or some other
impropriety or fraud characterized his dealings with the corporation. Nor
will members of the board who breach their duty as defined in Section 717 in
approving such a contract or transaction be exonerated from liability for their
conduct because there has been a technical compliance with Section 713. In
Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co.,308 an appellate court in California in-
validated a contract between an interested director and his corporation on the
ground that there had been an improper delegation under the contract of the
board's function to govern. The court quoted the Remillard case to the effect that
"neither section 820 of the Corporation Code nor any other provision of
the law automatically validates such transactions simply because there has
been a disclosure and approval by the majority of the stockholders. That
section does not operate to limit the fiduciary duties owed by a director to
all the stockholders, nor does it operate to condone acts which, without the
existence of a common directorate, would not be countenanced. That section
does not permit an officer or director, by an abuse of his power, to obtain an
unfair advantage or profit for himself at the expense of the corporation. °30 9
There can be little doubt that Section 713 will receive a similar construction
from the New York courts.
Paragraph (c) of Section 713 marks a signal departure from existing
case law in New York affecting the right of the board to fix the compensation
of directors. The Court of Appeals has held that in the absence of some
provision of statute, by-law, or charter, directors have no authority to
vote salaries to thenmselves as a mere incident of their office.3 10 The legal
predicate for this position is the fiduciary role in which the directors are
cast in respect to the corporation which interdicts their dealing with corporate
funds for their personal benefit, at least where not sanctioned to do so-a facet
of the "conflict of interest" doctrine.311 It is the general rule under existing
307. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d -66 (1952).
308. 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953).
309. Id. at 170, 171, 260 P.2d at 831.
310. See Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914).
311. Butts v. Wood, supra note 300a; Carr v. Kimball, 153 App. DiV. 825, 139 N.Y.
Supp. 253 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd, 215 N.Y. 634, 109 N.E. 1068 (1915).
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law that a director, assuming office without any agreement as to compensation,
is presumed to have undertaken to perform the duties of his office gratuitous-
ly;3 12 but this assumption is not applicable where the director is requested to
perform duties that are atypical to directorship and outside the customary
routine of that office.313 In such case, a contract for compensation will be
implied and the board may with impunity vote compensation to the director
performing unusual work, although no authority may exist generally for
compensating directors. While it would seem that the board, not authorized to
vote compensation to its members, should not be permitted to achieve this
result indirectly by voting salaries to directors in their capacity as officers of the
corporation under the board's conceded authority to select officers and fix
their compensation (and this appears to be the import of the older cases),3 1 4
recent cases appear to have relaxed this rule (in the trend away from the
rigidity of the Munson case discussed above); they have held that voting
such compensation to members of the board in their capacity as officers is
neither void nor voidable as such but rather requires careful scrutiny--and
would be voidable only if made in bad faith or fraudulently.3 1
Much of the foregoing case law would appear to have been superseded
and rendered obsolete by the provision in paragraph (c) which declares flatly
that "unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation or the by-
laws, the board shall have authority to fix the compensation of directors for
services in any capacity." Questions as to the extent to which existing case
law remains controlling may still arise where the certificate of incorporation
or the by-laws state generally that the board shall have no power to fix the
directors' compensation. Will a contract for compensation be impliable in
such case for unusual services performed by a director, or will the board be
competent to compensate directors for services performed as corporate officers?
Although paragraph (c) is included -in the section dealing with the subject
of "interested directors" for obvious reasons, it is not intended that the
authority of the board to fix the compensation of directors shall be subject
to the provisions of paragraph (a) dealing specially u4th the voidability of
interested director contracts or transactions, or with the quorum provision of
paragraph (b) (although it is to be assumed that the director whose salary
is being considered at a directors' meeting may be counted toward a quorum
and be able to vote on the question). Compensation transactions, which, of
course, involve a possible conflict of interest, are in a sense sui generis because
each director is similarly interested and the interest is in every case known
to the board. Thus, application of the disclosure provisions in paragraph (a)
in such case would be patently incongruous, and to require the director to
312. Bagley v. Carthage, 165 N.Y. 179, 58 N.E. 895 (1900).
313. Fox v. Arctic Placer Mining & Milling Co., 229 N.Y. 124, 128 N.E. 154 (1920).
314. Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., supra note 310.
315. Garbarino v. Utica Uniform Co., supra note 294; Martin Foimdation, Inc. v.
Phillips-jones Corp., supra note 294.
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abstain from voting on his own compensation would constitute an affectation
of virtue bordering on hypocrisy. The plethora of litigation on the subject and
the "juicy" cases that have resulted therefrom make it almost too trite to ob-
serve that adequate remedies are available against directors who vote them-
selves excessive compensation, whether in the form of salaries, bonuses, op-
tions or the like. In sum, the legislature in enacting paragraph (c) has given
evidence of its faith in the essential integrity of the average board, and of its
understanding that competition for talented managers is so keen in the current
corporate market that boards of domestic corporations must have the necessary
flexibility to compete successfully.
It is perhaps appropriate in closing this area of discussion to mention
Section 714 of the Business Corporation Law which provides that loans to
directors by the corporation may be validated only by vote of the shareholders.
The shares of the director to whom the loan is made are not "shares entitled
to vote" (which, as indicated in the discussion of Section 713, precludes count-
ing the borrowing director's shares toward a quorum at the shareholders'
meeting for the approval of the loan and deprives the interested director of
his franchise). If the shareholder authorization requirement is not met, the
transaction is not void, but the directors guilty of the violation are made
responsible for this breach of duty by the express provision of subparagraph
(a) (4) of Section 719, to the extent and under the terms set forth in such
section. The foregoing provision modifies the common law rule in this state
which imposed no limitations on the authority of the board to make loans to
directors other than to surcharge the directors approving such a loan for any
impropriety in its making. The board would, under existing law, have to
justify the loan transaction as a proper exercise of its implied powers. It will,
under the formulation in Section 714, obtain some security in the transaction
through the requisite majority shareholder approval.
B.. Indemnification of directors
The current New York statutory scheme for indemnification of direc-
tors, officers and employees, first enacted in 1941 in reaction to the now
celebrated case of New York Dock Co. v. McCollom,3 16 developed under
the 1945 amendments into perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed
treatment of the subject anywhere in the country. The common law back-
drop against which these statutes were set reveals a number of relatively
unsettled areas which, as the ensuing discussion will indicate, are not
resolved but rather accentuated by the present provisions for indemnifi-
cation. The McCollom case was decided in the context of an action brought by
the corporation to have the court declare that it was not obliged to indemnify
certain of its directors for expenses incurred by them in a successful defense
of a derivative suit. The court declared that the corporation was -under no
316. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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common law obligation in such case to indemnify its directors on the ground
that the possibility of such suit was a risk undertaken as a necessary incident
of directorship, and that there was no showing of a benefit to the corporation
in the successful defense of the suit. The absence of a common law obligation
to indemnify was affirmed without opinion by the Court of Appeals in Bailey
v. Bush,317 and commented on with apparent approval by Judge Desmond in
his opinion in Schwartz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.318 The highly impor-
tant question of whether a corporation is authorized, in the absence of a statute,
to voluntarily indemnify its directors for expenses incurred in the (successful or
unsuccessful) defense of an action brought against them as directors has never
been satisfactorily settled, although the weight of judicial authority would
appear to support such voluntary indemnification by the corporation as a
common law right.319 The only case that would appear to have grappled with
this question squarely is Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 3 20 in which a deriva-
tive action was brought against directors who had voluntarily paid the fines of
two (defendant) directors on their plea of nolo contendere when sued under
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and had used corporate funds to defray their
own expenses incurred in the defense of such prosecution. The court sup-
ported these payments (in the nature of voluntary indemnification) on the
ground that the defense of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act prosecution sufficiently
involved the interests of the corporation to warrant the employment of counsel
to defend it, and that the payment of the (defendant) directors' fines entailed
a clear benefit to the corporation. The Socony-Vacuum case was cited with
apparent approval by Judge Fuld in Schwartz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.
Moreover, the late Justice Carswell, who cast the deciding vote in the Schwartz
case, suggested that Section 63 of the General Corporation Law, authorizing
indemnification by certificate of incorporation provision, by-law or resolution,
was a "... regulation of the common-law right of freedom of contract and is
merely declaratory thereof." (Emphasis added.)
(a) Exclusivity of Statutory Provisions
The foregoing discussion is intended as background material for proper
consideration of Section 721 of the Business Corporation Law which in terms
makes the provisions of Article 7 for indemnifying directors and officers
317. 293 N.Y. 735, 56 N.E.2d 739 (1944).
318. 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953).
319. The common law right of the corporation to voluntarily indemnify is not too
clear. In support thereof are such cases as: Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc.
202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st
Dep't 1944); by passing suggestion, Bailey v. Bush Terminal Co., 46 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup.
Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 899, 48 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd, 293 N.Y.
735, 56 N.E.2d 739 (1944). See, too, the opinion of Justice Carswell in Schwartz v. Gen-
eral Aniline & Film Corp., supra note 318. See generally, Jervis, Corporate Agreements
to Pay Directors' Expenses in Stockholders' Suits, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 1192 (1940). Contra,
New York Dry Dock v. McCollum, supra note 316.
320. Supra note 319.
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exclusive of any other right the director or officer may have acquired by
contract or otherwise from the corporation. The section provides that no
right to indemnification the director may have acquired "shall be valid unless
consistent with this article." This provision is, of course, designed to override
the non-exclusivity provision found in Section 63 of the General Corporation
Law to the effect that "such right of indemnification shall not be deemed exclu-
sive of any other rights to which such director, officer or employee may be
entitled apart from this statute." (Emphasis added.) (It is interesting to note
in passing that a precisely worded non-exclusivity provision in the Model Act
was eliminated therefrom in the 1959 amendments of the Act.) The vice
inherent in the current non-exclusivity provision is that it authorizes (or toler-
ates) the loosest kind of corporate indemnification policy-even payment of
indemnification to derelict directors found to have violated the standard of
conduct embodied in Section 63 ("except in relation to matters as to which it
shall be adjudged . . . that such officer, director or employee is liable for
negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties") to the manifest
detriment of, at least, the minority shareholders. For, if a common law right
to voluntarily indemnify exists, what prevents the corporation from freely
contracting with a director that he shall be entitled to indemnification in any
case, despite a judicial determination that he has been guilty of negligence or
some other misconduct, or from purchasing insurance with corporate funds to
provide for such indemnification even where the director is adjudged guilty of
wilfull misconduct? After all, the right to be indemnified in such case would
be acquired by the director "apart from the statute," and whether the non-
exclusivity clause in Section 63 is qualified by the standard of conduct embodied
therein has, oddly enough, never been adjudicated. Does all this seem out-
lanaish? In 1942, Bates and Zuckert published a highly illuminating report in
the Harvard Business Review32 ' on a study they had made of 169 resolutions
and amendments to by-laws and certificates of incorporation proposed to share-
holders during the period between 1938 and 1941 (the bulk of them in 1941)
for the indemnification of directors. One hundred corporations were involved
in these proposals, 98 of which had securities listed on national exchanges; 96
solicited proxies and used a proxy statement; and at least 90 were companies
with national reputations. The report underscored the inadvisability of per-
petuating an "open" or non-exclusive system of indemnification. It reveal ed
an excessive amount of irresponsibility in corporate management and a conse-
quent need to tighten the strictures on management's freedom to indemnify-
The authors commented as follows:
What finally, may seem startling to those who have not studied the
resolutions closely, is that a very great many, if not an overwhelming
majority of them, may be intended to give indemnity in suits which
321. Bates and Zuckert, Directors' Indbmnity: Corporate Policy or Public Policy,
20 Harv. Bus. Rev. 244 (1942).
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are not successfully defended. If this were not the case, it would be
difficult to explain the standard established for denying indemnity
(such, to take one extreme case, for example, as providing indemnity
against all liabilities to which subject, explicitly whether or not negli-
gent, except when caused by wilfull misconduct). And some proposals
explicitly purport to give indemnity for "judgment" and "money
damages." . . . If the proposals are carefully examined to see what
management apparently wants by way of indemnity, what shall we
conclude? Extensions of the scope of these agreements removes much
of the ring of truth from the original cry that managements seek only
protection from "unfounded suits." It must be inferred that managers
are attempting to escape responsibilities attaching to their offices, or
accepting their frequently announced disclaimer that such is not their
purpose, that they are trying to establish new standards and procedure
-perhaps a "law corporate"--to supplant substantive law with which
they are not in agreement and a judicial process in which they have
no confidence that justice will be done. How else can one explain the
ultimate provisions for reimbursement even when judgments have been
obtained against directors and officers.322 (Emphasis added.)
The statutory provisions for indemnification, adopted in 1941 and there-
after amended, have not served to ameliorate in any appreciable way the
serious conditions exposed in the Bates and Zuckert report-because of the non-
exclusivity clause incorporated in the original indemnification section, 27-a of
the General Corporation Law and perpetuated in its successor, Section 63.
Corporations have relied strongly on this clause to justify reimbursing directors
and officers in some rather questionable cases, such as, for expenses incurred
and amounts paid in defending and settling threatened derivative suits (never
actually commenced), for amounts paid (as contrasted with expenses incurred)
in settlement of pending derivative suits without court approval, and the like.
No doubt the practice continues in some corporations of assuring reimburse-
ment, by prior contract, to directors and officers against whom judgment is
obtained for their negligence or other misconduct. The extent to which this
practice continues is surely difficult to estimate, although no reason is perceived
why corporations would have discontinued such practice in light of the non-
exclusivity clause in the present statute. It is anticipated that Section 721
of the new law will tend to eliminate such improprieties. A statutory provision
(such as the current non-exclusivity clause) that admits of the possibility of
broader indemnification than it is thought necessary to affirmatively sanction
by statutory standard is both anomolous and dangerous. The adoption of an
exclusive system of indemnification that restricts corporations to a prescribed
standard is surely salutary, and should occasion no hardship to corporations
in this state in view of the explicit provision made for indemnification in non-
derivative suits against directors and officers. As further discussion will amplify,
directors and officers subjected to any suit in such capacity, whether civil or
322. Id. at 256, 258.
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criminal, will be reimbursable for litigation and other expenses, including
attorneys' fees (and, in the case of the defense of non-derivative suits, for the
amount of a judgment or fine suffered by them, or amounts paid in settlement)
either by court award or voluntary corporate action, in relation to matters as
to which they have not been adjudged to have breached the prescribed standard
of conduct. No reasonable director should in good conscience expect more.
(b) Kind of Action or Proceeding in Which Indemnification is Authorized;
Standards of Conduct Prescribed
The present statutes .do not carefully delineate the types of actions or
proceedings in which indemnification is authorized. The failure to clarify this
area was perhaps the crucial factor in the denial of indemnification in In re
Schwartz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.3 2 3 to plaintiff-director who had been
prosecuted criminally for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and had
pleaded nolo contendere. Judge Desmond held squarely that the draftsmen of
Article 6-A (Sections 63-68 of the General Corporation Law) had contemplated
only the traditional derivative action in framing the indemnification legislation
-on the basis of the contextual juxtaposition of these (indemnification)
sections to other sections of the law related to derivative actions, and because
these sections were legislated into existence in 1945 along with the "contempo-
raneous ownership" amendment to Section 61 of the General Corporation Law
and the famous "security for expenses" statute, Section 61-b of the General
Corporation Law (both enactments being clearly geared to the derivative suit).
Justice Carswell's decisive opinion in the Schwartz case was premised on a
construction of (the procedural) Section 65 which demonstrated that the
legislature could not have contemplated reimbursing directors for the defense
of criminal prosecutions. Moreover, the present statutes do not clarify indemni-
fication rights in a large category of suits, brought by third persons against
corporate directors and officers in their capacity as "agents" of the corporation,
that do not fall into the derivative action mold, in the defense of which the
defendant director or officer may be required to expend large sums of money.
Professor Bishop, in an elucidative article in the Harvard Law Review,3 24
emphasizes that the common law entitled an agent to be reimbursed by his
principal for costs and expenses incurred when acting within the course of his
employment and for the best interests of his principal. He argues eloquently
that this principle should apply to corporate personnel when sued, not by the
corporation, directly or indirectly, for breach of a duty to it, but by a third
party for the consequences of acts done as a director, officer (or employee) of
the corporation in the honest belief that he is acting in the best interests of
the corporation.
The new law authorizes indemnification of directors and officers in both
323. Supra" note 318.
324. Bishop, Current Status of Corporate Directors' Right to Indemnification, 69
Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1956).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
derivative (Section 722) and non-derivative (Section 723) categories.3 2 Al-
though Section 722 is the almost verbatim counterpart (with the non-exclusivity
clause omitted) of the present Section 63 of the General Corporation Law, an
important difference should be noted in the way the prescribed standard of
conduct is stated. The standard is described in the new law as "breached
(his) duty to the corporation under section 717" as contrasted with "is liable
for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties" in the present
law. The more generic statement of the standard in the new law, adopted by
the Model Act in its 1959 amendments, would seem more appropriate to the
essential character of the derivative suit, and has the added advantage of
conforming the standard of conduct for indemnification to the definition of the
directors' duty to the corporation spelled out with some particularity in Sec-
tion 717. Section 723 is a new formulation for this state. It affords indemnifi-
cation rights to directors and officers charged in non-derivative actions or
proceedings with tortious or criminal conduct, breach of contract, or the like
that has resulted from activity in the course of employment, undertaken for
the benefit of the corporation. Such suit may have resulted in a judgment or
verdict against the director or officer who, nonetheless, may have conducted
himself in the good faith belief that he was acting properly in the best interests
of the corporation (and may, indeed, have been encouraged in that view by
corporate management as a whole). Included in such category of non-derivative
actions or proceedings may be suits brought to enforce criminal sanctions
imposed by federal acts, such as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the various
Federal Securities Acts, as well as similar state civil and penal laws. The
sanctioned conduct may well have represented the implementation of a fixed
corporate policy, and the defendant director or officer may have been advised
by (eminent) corporate counsel that his activity was perfectly legal. It is
difficult to comprehend why the often enormous expenses of litigation incurred
(and judgmenst or fines suffered) in the defense of such suits and, in a sense,
in defense and vindication of corporate policy should not be reimbursable.
Accordingly, Section 723 overrules Schwartz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.
by expressly providing that directors and officers may be indemnified for the
defense of a criminal action or proceeding. The section would likewise authorize
corporate reimbursement of expenses incurred by a director or officer who may
have been summoned to appear before investigating or examining public bodies
relative to activities in behalf of the corporation, although such proceedings
may not involve a determination of civil or criminal liability.325a
The standard of conduct prescribed to qualify a director or officer for
325. The indemnification provisions of the (1961) Business Corporation Law have
been reorganized without any substantive change pursuant to an amendment which was
approved at the 1962 session of the New York Legislature. The effect of this "re-
grouping" of materials will be reflected hereafter in the appropriate footnotes.
325a. Note, Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Products, Inc., - Del.
Ch. -, 164 A.2d 437 (1960) where indemnification was allowed for defense of status
as a director.
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indemnification in non-derivative suits has been tailored to the realities of such
suits. The issue in such suits not being whether the director has breached his
duty to the corporation (as it is in derivative suits), the "duty to the corpora-
tion" standard employed in section 722 to qualify for indemnification in deriva-
tive suits is not strictly appropriate. Rather, the question is whether, in acting
as he did, the director or officer pursued his responsibilities in the good faith
belief that he was accommodating the best interests of the corporation (i.e.,
performing his duty to the corporation), although it might eventuate that what
he had done was not in fact in the best interests of the corporation and,
indeed, may have caused it injury. Thus, in implementing corporate policy, a
director or officer may have acted negligently or otherwise improperly and
thereby exposed himself and his corporation to liability under a federal securi-
ties act, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act or a state's blue-sky laws, and yet qualify
for indemnification because he has, in the language of Section 723, "acted, in
good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably believed to be in the best
interests of the corporation and, in criminal actions or proceedings, in addition,
had no reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful .. .
(c) Degree of Success Required For Reimbursement
It is too obvious to require belaboring that where a director or officer has
successfully defended an action or proceeding against him on the merits, after
full litigation of the issues, he should be entitled to indemnification as a matter
of right, unless a corporate policy against indemnification (expressed in certifi-
cate of incorporation provision, by-law, resolution contract, or by other proper
corporate action) was in effect and binding on the director or officer at the
time of the accrual of the cause of action or proceeding brought against him.
This is the dear import of dparagrapk (a) of Section 725- of the Business
Corporation Law. Conversely, if such director or officer has been adjudged
fully liable on all counts for breach of duty to his corporation in a derivative
suit, or is found to have violated the prescribed standard of conduct in his
activities resulting in a non-derivative suit brought against him, reimburse-
ment of litigation costs and expenses is dearly not warranted and so the courts
have held.m7 There are, however, a number of situations, intermediate the
foregoing extremes, in which either full liability on all counts is riot adjudged in
the action or proceeding, or a successful defense is available on some technical
ground (not on the merits), or the suit is terminated by settlement-which
present perplexing questions as to the right of the director or officer to indemni-
fication in the particular case. Typical of these situations are the following:
(1) liability of defendant is adjudged on each count of the complaint but for
less than the relief demanded; (2) liability of defendant is adjudged on one
326. This is now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 724(a).
327. See Apfel v. Auditore, 223 App. Div. 457, 228 N.Y. Supp. 489 (1st Dep't 1928),
aft'd, 250 N.Y. 600, 166 NX. 339 (1929). See Washington, Litigation Expenses of Directors
in Stockholders! Suits, 40 Coum. L. Rev. 431, 433 (1940).
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or more, but less than all, counts of the complaint; (3) liability is not ad-
judged to exist on the ground that the statute of limitations has expired, or
plaintiff has failed to post security for expenses, or plaintiff has participated
in the wrong of which he complains and is foreclosed in equity from proceeding
with the suit, or the suit has lapsed or been discontinued by plaintiff without
settlement; (4) although defendant has been adjudged fully liable, his defense
has resulted in a tangible benefit to the corporation; (5) there has been a
settlement or compromise with or without court approval.
In appraising the right of directors and officers to be indemnified in cer-
tain of the above enumerated situations, New York courts have reached variant
results in implementing their power to indemnify under present Sections 64
and 67 of the General Corporation Law, the latter section authorizing the
court to indemnify upon a finding that "the applicant, his testator or intestate
was successful in whole or in part, or that the action against him has been
settled with the approval of the court. . . ." Thus, in Tichner v. Andrews,328
indemnification was awarded where the action was dismissed for failure of
plaintiff to provide security for expenses under Section 61-b of the General
Corporation Law; and, similarly, in Dorman v. Humphrey,329 indemnification
was allowed where the complaint had been dismissed because the statute of
limitations had expired, the court indicating that to recover indemnification
the defendant need not be exonerated on the merits of charges of misconduct
but only be free of an adjudication of misconduct. Courts will, under the new
law, be required to reach the same result in the foregoing cases by virtue of
paragraph (a) of Section 725330 which provides ". .. a director or officer who
has been wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of a civil
or criminal action or proceeding shall be entitled to indemnification ... .
(Emphasis added.) The phrase "or otherwise" is designed to cover cases, like
Tichner and Dornan, where defendant has been wholly successful by reason of
a technical defense to a suit. There is really no escape from this result, for,
otherwise, the court, permitted to pursue the investigation of defendant's guilt,
would be authorized to discredit a valid defense provided by law. Question
may arise as to the extent to which Diamond v. Diamond3 3 1 will retain vitality
as a precedent and serve to qualify the apparently conclusive language of
paragraph (a) set forth above. In the Diamond case, a derivative action was
dismissed upon a finding that plaintiff had participated in the wrong of which
she complained. An award of indemnification, made by the court because there
had been no adjudication of misconduct and defendant had been wholly suc-
cessful in her defense, was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that
328. 193 Misc. 1050, 85 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1949), appeal dismissed, 275 App.
Div. 749, 90 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1st Dep't 1949).
329. 278 App. Div. 1010, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142 (4th Dep't 1951). See also Austrian v.
Williams, 120 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
330. Supra note 326.
331. 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954).
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there was evidence in the findings below of defendant's complicity in the secret
withdrawal of corporate funds (ostensibly to defraud the government of cor-
porate and personal income taxes). The Court stated that "[but] 'adjudged' is
not so completely a word of art or of such technical meaning ... that we can-
not seek out the obvious legislative intent. Section 64, changing the common-
law rule that each party pays his own lawyer, is to be construed strictly. See,
Schwartz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.... Rewarding faithless officers and
directors was no part of its purpose. In all reason and common sense, this
defendant has been, in the affirmed findings below, 'adjudged... liable for...
misconduct in the performance of his [her] duties'." 332 (Emphasis added.) The
rule of the Diamond case has recently been followed by the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department in the interesting case of People v. Uran Mining Corpora-
tion333 which involved a suit under the Martin Act to enjoin the corporation
and others (including one Colby) from continuing certain fraudulent securities
practices. The complaint was dismissed on the merits as to Colby but the
court denied his application for payment of his expenses in defending the suit
on the ground that Colby had not been made a party defendant by reason of
his having been a director or officer of defendant corporation (as required by
the express language of Section 64 of the General Corporation Law). The
merits of the application were not otherwise considered. The Appellate Divi-
sion, disagreeing with the reasons, affirmed the result below. Finding that
Colby had been made a party to the suit in his capacity as director and officer
of Uran, and that the People's action under the Martin Act was civil in nature
(so that Schwartz v. General Aniline & Film Corp. was not controlling), the
court applied the doctrine of the Diamond case to the effect that the legisla-
ture in enacting Section 64 did not intend to reward faithless officers and
directors, and held that "proof of applicant's good faith is a basic requirement.
This proof is completely lacking. Indeed, the record clearly compels an opposite
conclusion." There is every reason to believe that the courts will continue to
adopt this fundamentally equitable approach to indemnification under the new
law. Nothing in Article 7 interdicts it.
Other cases reflect variant judicial attitudes, in the exercise of the dis-
cretion to indemnify, where there has not been complete vindication of the
director or officer on the merits. In Cachules v. 116 East 57th Street,334 with-
out referring to Section 64, the court disallowed indemnification on the ground
that although defendant had succeeded in clearing himself of some of the
charges in the complaint, the net result was a judgment in favor of the cor-poration against him. In Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,335 the complaint
alleged that defendant directors had made an improvident contract with a
fellow director, Cohn, and had employed and paid counsel to represent Cohn
332. Id. at 267, 120 N.E.2d at 821.
333. 13 A.D.2d 419, 216 N.Y.S.2d 985 (4th Dep't 1961).
334. 127 N.Y.S.2d 795, 799 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
335. 117 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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in negotiating the contract. Cohn (who bad apparently not been served with
process in the action) offered a compromise which was approved by the court.
The court allowed the defendant directors indemnification, stating that "Sec-
tion 64 of the General Corporation Law provides and authorizes reimbursement
and compensation and no reason manifests itself why the successful defend-
ants should not have the benefit of this enactment."3 36 (Emphasis added.) It
will be noted that the settlement in this case resulted in a judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. In Marco v. Sacks, 337 the court, citing Tichner v. Andrews,338 asserted
in dictum that a vindication on the merits is not a necessary precondition for
an assessment of costs and expenses against the corporation under Section 64.
The circumstance that the corporation has received a benefit as a result
of the defendant director's conduct of the defense in the derivative action has
been seized on as the basis for assessing the costs and expenses of the litigation
against the corporation. In Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co.,3 39 action was
brought against the directors to compel them to disgorge misappropriated funds
and for the appointment of a receiver of all the assets of the corporation (also
made a party defendant). The defendant directors used corporate funds to
pay their own litigation expenses in the action. The directors were held liable
in a substantial amount, but the receivership was denied. In a subsequent
suit to recover from the directors the corporate funds used to defray their
expenses in the previous suit, the use of such funds was upheld and the direc-
tors exonerated because the corporation had received a benefit in having avoided
a receivership. In Albreckt, Maguire & Company v. General Plastics, Inc.,3 40
a similar "benefit" theory was indulged to support the assessment of litigation
expenses against the corporation. A minority shareholder had brought suit to
enjoin a threatened violation of his preemptive rights by a new stock issue.
An injunction was granted, but the attempt to charge defendant directors
with the entire cost of the litigation was thwarted. The court held that the
individual directors had acted in good faith, the corporation was a necessary
party, and the interests of the corporation were sufficiently concerned to
warrant the employment of counsel to defend the suit in its behalf. Note, like-
wise, in this context, Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,341 where the court's
decision rested in part on the circumstance that in pleading nolo contendere
defendant-directors had conferred a benefit upon the corporation. The court
336. Id. at 814.
337: 201 Misc. 928, 932, 106 N.YS.2d 522, 527 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App.
Div. 1085, 113 N.Y.S.2d 449 (2d Dep't 1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 912, 110 N.E.2d 737 (1953).
338. Supra note 328.
339. 153 App. Div. 697, 139 N.Y. Supp. 236 (Ist Dep't 1912), modified 212 N.Y.
121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914); 181 App. Div. 75, 168 N.Y. Supp. 251 (Ist Dep't 1917), aff'd,
227 N.Y. 656, 126 N.E. 908 (1920).
340. 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N.Y.S.2d 415 (4th Dep't 1939), aft'd, 280 N.Y. 840, 21
N.E.2d 887 (1939).
341. Supra note 319. See also Warnecke v. Forty Wall Street Bldg., Inc., 16 Misc.
2d 467, 183 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.YS.2d 653, 696 (Sup.
Ct. 1941); Kirby v. Schenck, 25 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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held, citing Godley and General Plastics, Inc. as supporting precedents, that
the directors were not chargeable with the litigation. expenses of the defense
although it was unsuccessful.
The foregoing, somewhat detailed, recital of judicial precedent has been
undertaken because it is expected that these authorities will retain some vitality
under the new law. Under Section 724342 of the Business Corporation Law,
courts are vested with power to award indemnification to the extent authorized
in Sections 722 and 723-and even where the corporation has failed to make
provision for, or- refused in a specific case to authorize, such indemnification.
Under this formulation, since corporations are authorized under Sections 722
and 723 to indemnify in cases where the director or officer has not been wholly
successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of the suit or where the
suit has been settled or compromised, courts are vested with similar authority.
Sections 722 and 723 retain the formula found in the present statutes that
indemnification may be made "except in relation to matters" (Emphasis added.)
as to which the director or officer has been adjudged to have breached the
prescribed standard of conduct. Hence, indemnification may be made by the
corporation and awarded by the court in relation to matters as to which the
director or officer has not been adjudged to have violated the prescribed
standard. This authorization would encompass settlements as well as ad-
judicated cases in which the director or officer has been (partially) successful
in defeating some, but not all, counts of the complaint. Cases in which the
defendant has lost on all counts, but the damages are appreciably lower than
the relief demanded, or an incidental benefit has been conferred on the cor-
poration,, do not readily qualify for indemnification under the foregoing
formula-although precedents such as the Godley, General Plastics and Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co. cases discussed above provide evidence that the existing formula
has been stretched by the courts to encompass-even such cases.
(d) Policy Considerations Affecting Indemnification Under the New Law
Derivative suits: As the Bates and Zuckert report reveals, some corpora-
tions make provision for reimbursement of directors and officers extensive enough
to include expenses incurred and amounts paid in the settlement of claims and
threatened derivative suits, and amounts paid in settling pending derivative
suits with or without court approval. The authors had this comment to make
about the practice of reimbursing the cost of defending and settling threatened
suits:
The second class of situations referred to is that involving claims and
threatened suits in which actual legal steps are never initiated. A suit
that is never more than threatened can reasonably result in very little
expense and therefore cannot be the thing over which directors are
really worried; and it is too nebulous a thing around which to erect
342. Now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 725 (see supra note 325).
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safeguards and standards. In many instances, moreover, the cor-
poration itself would be under the threat of being made a party to the
suit or would be contingently liable on its indemnity if the suit were
instituted and successfully defended, so that if the threat were taken
seriously, it could be the normal concern of company counsel on behalf
of the company to examine the claims asserted.343
There would appear to be little room for argument with the conclusion drawn
by the authors that the gossamer line between the threat to institute a deriva-
tive suit and its actual commencement by mere service of a complaint is too
slender a reed upon which to construct adequate controls and safeguards against
impropriety. On balance, the policy position reflected in subparagraph (j)
(1) of Section 725344 disallowing reimbursement of expenses incurred in de-
fending or amounts paid in settling threatened derivative suits would seem
quite correct. It must be kept in clear perspective that what is here involved
is a threatened suit premised on the faithlessness of the very directors and
officers who, were a different position taken, would be empowered to divert
the suit through the use of corporate funds. The argument, sometimes made,
that the corporation can, at the threat stage, forestall at small cost the com-
mencement of unfounded suits which, if instituted, might involve it in sub-
stantial expense is not readily subject to verification. On the other hand,
authorization to indemnify in such case would make available a too facile
mechanism for avoiding the most prohylactic remedy against unfounded deriva-
tive suits-the doctrine of Clark v. Greenberg34 5-that any recovery by plaintiff-
shareholder in a derivative suit belongs to the corporation. This doctrine,
codified in paragraph (e) of Section 626 of the Business Corporation Law,
likewise illuminates the provision embodied in subparagraph (f) (2) of Sec-
tion 7253-6 that amounts paid (as contrasted with expenses incurred) in the
settlement of pending derivative suits with court approval cannot be reimbursed.
Since plaintiff-shareholder must account to the corporation for any recovery in
the derivative suit, it would seem altogether incongruous to authorize the
amount paid in settlement of the suit by the presumably derelict director to be
returned to him by way of reimbursement. In similar vein, subparagraph (f)
(3) of Section 825,346a precluding any reimbursement for the expenses and
costs of defending pending derivative suits settled without court approval is
consistent with (and in aid of) the fundamental policy embodied in paragraph
(d) of Section 626 of interdicting the noxious practice (to the extent that it
remains) of settling derivative suits without court approval.
Non-derivative suits: The same considerations that prompted a rather
restrictive indemnification policy in derivative suits do not legitimately apply
343. Supra note 321 at 260.
344. Now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 722 (a) (see supra note 325).
345. 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
346. Now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 722(b)(1).
346a. Now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 722.
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to non-derivative suits brought against directors and officers. The legal predicate
of such suits is not the defendant's breach of duty to the corporation. It is
rather the violation of some duty owed to the plaintiff, whether he be a con-
tractee with the corporation whose rights have been disturbed by defend-
ant officer or director, a person injured by defendant's negligent operation of
a company vehicle, or the state or federal government alleging some infraction
of its laws. In such cases, the defendant-director or officer is cast essentially
in the role of an "agent," and if he can establish that he has met the prescribed
standard of conduct (i.e., has acted in good faith for a purpose which he
reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation and, in
criminal proceedings, had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was un-
lawful), the director or officer should be entitled to reimbursement for expenses
incurred and amounts paid (by way of judgments, fines, or settlements) in
defending either threatened or pending suits of the non-derivative variety. The
policy factors that militate against authorizing indemnification of threatened
derivative suits (where the complaint alleges defendant's breach of duty to
the corporation) are patently inapplicable in non-derivative suits (where the
complaint alleges improprieties committed by defendant on behalf of the cor-
poration and ostensibly in its interest).
In general: A number of policy considerations that apply generically to
indemnification in derivative and non-derivative suits alike, and whether in-
demnification is made by voluntary corporate action or by court award, should
be noted.
(a) The new law expressly authorizes the corporation to pay to directors
and officers the expenses of litigation in advance of its final disposition (para-
graph (b) of Section 725) 347 and the court to award such litigation expenses
pendente lite (paragraph (c) of Section 725). 348 These provisions constitute
statutory recognition of a practice fairly common among corporations in this
state. In light of the often burdensome expenses of such litigation, they would,
on balance, seem desirable policy expedients because of their tendency to en-
courage the assumption of stewardship responsibilities in domestic corporations.
It should be noted that under paragraph (d) of Section 725,349 such advance
payments of litigation expenses must be repaid by the director or officer in the
event he is ultimately found not to be entitled to indemnification, or, where
indemnification is granted, to the extent the expenses allowed by the corpora-
tion or awarded by the court exceed the indemnification to which he is entitled.
(b) Unless the director or officer is wholly vindicated on the merits or
otherwise, no indemnification may be made by the corporation for the defense
of either a derivative or a non-derivative suit except upon a post hoc finding,
by a quorum of disinterested directors, or in the absence thereof, by either the
347. Now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 724 (c).
348. This provision, oddly enough, remains § 725(c) under the regrouping.
349. Now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 726(a).
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board upon written opinion of independent legal counsel or by the body of
shareholders, that the director or officer has in the specific case met the pre-
sribed standard of conduct. (Similar approval is required for pre-payment of
litigation expenses by the corporation.) The purpose of these provisions is to
require a determination of entitlement in each case after the event so as to
identify the corporate group that assumes responsibility for such determination,
and to eliminate the practice of absolutely binding the corporation by agree-
ment with the director or officer before the event. Under a proposed amend-
ment to subparagraph (a) (10) of Section 202,350 the corporation will have the
general power to indemnify corporate personnel, but any contract to indemnify
a direct6r or officer entered into prior to the litigation in which expenses and
costs are incurred will necessarily be subject to all provisions of Article 7
affecting indemnification, including the requirement of board or shareholder
approval after the event. However, the director or officer, entitled to re-
imbursement, who is improperly denied payment by a hostile board (that has,
for example, unseated an incumbent board after a proxy fight) will have an
enforceable contract right.351
(c) The indemnification sections of the new law omit any specific reference
to the rights of corporate "employees" to indemnification, such as is found in
the existing statutes. Indirect reference to the indemnification rights of such
employees is found in Section 721 which provides that "nothing contained in
this article shall affect any rights to indemnification to which corporate person-
nel other than directors and officers may be entitled by contract or otherwise
under law." 352 (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the proposed amendment to sub-
paragraph (a) (10) of Section 202, referred to above, gives every domestic
corporation the general power "to indemnify corporate personnel." (Emphasis
added.) There is no doubt that the right of corporate employees to reimburse-
ment of expenses and costs of litigation is recognized at common law in non-
derivative suits. Although the courts have had little occasion to consider the
right of employees to indemnification in derivative suits (the incidence of such
suits against employees as such being very rare), there is little reason to antici-
pate denial by the courts of reimbursement rights to employees in such suits.
On the other hand, the inclusion of "employees" within the coverage of the
indemnification sections would be incompatible with the general pattern of
Article 7 of the Business Corporation Law which is devoted exclusively to
directors and officers. More particularly, the standard of conduct prescribed
for indemnification in derivative suits is geared to the "duty to the corpora-
tion under section 717." The duty to the corporation as defined in that section
would seem altogether too stringent and too "fiduciary" for proper application
to ordinary corporate employees.
350. This has been approved at the 1962 session of the New York Legislature.
351. Of course, the director or officer has the statutory right in any case, despite
the corporate refusal to indemnify him, to seek indemnification judicially (see (new) § 725).
352. Supra note 350.
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(d) Other provisions, carried over from existing law, should be mentioned.
Section 725 provides that no indemnification shall be made in any case where it
appears that it would be inconsistent with the law of the home state of a
foreign corporation which prohibits or otherwise limits such indemnification
(subparagraph (g) (1)) ,3 or that such indemnification would be inconsistent
with any condition affecting indemnification imposed by a court in approving
a settlement (paragraph (g) (3)). 54 Pargaraph (h) of Section 725355 pre-
scribes notice to the shareholders, within a designated priod, of any indemnifi-
cation that is made otherwise than by court order or action by the shareholder.
Finally, paragraph (i) of Section 725356 makes the indemnification provisions
of Article 7 applicable to foreign corporations doing business in this state, except
to the extent that such corporations qualify for exemption under Section 1320
of the Business Corporation Law.
IV. Liability of Directors
Liability in certain cases: In sharp contrast with its diffuse treatment
under the existing statutes, Section 719 of the Business Corporation Law,
adopting the pattern and, in part, the content of Section 43 of the Model Act,
packages very neatly all of the specific instances under the new law in which
liability is imposed upon directors for misconduct. These are only four in
number and include: (1) declarations of a dividend or other distribution of
cash or property in violation of Section 510; (2) reacquisitions of corporate
shares in violation of Section 513; (3) -distributions of assets to shareholders,
during the liquidation period after dissolution, without satisfying the claims of
all known creditors; (4) loans to directors contrary to Section 714. It will
be noted that the new law omits three areas of specific liability currently
imposed on directors under: Section 15 of the Stock Corporation Law35 7 (the
New York "trust fund" statute which prohibits the transfer by a corporation
of any of its property to officers, directors or shareholders for the payment of
any debt or upon any consideration other than full value in cash or property
while the corporation is insolvent in the equity sense, and preferential trans-
fers, with intent to prefer, to creditors who receive such transfers with knowl-
edge they were made with intent to give them a preference); Section 59 of the
Stock Corporation Law"'8 (which prohibits directors or officers from making
loans to shareholders, discounting notes or other evidences of indebtedness, or
353. Now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 726(b)(1).
354. Now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 726(b)(3).
355. Now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 726(c).
356. Now N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 726(d).
357. See supra note 212.
358. Criminal responsibility remains. See N.Y. Penal Law § 664(3) (director con-
curring in, or voting for, receipt or discount of any note or other evidence of debt in
payment for shares is guilty of a misdemeanor); § 664(4) (or, with intent to do so,
allows any shareholder to withdraw any part of his capital contribution, is likewise
guilty of a misdemeanor).
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from receiving the same in payment of an installment or any part thereof due
on any shares, or from receiving or discounting any note or other evidence of
indebtedness to enable a shareholder to withdraw any part of his capital
contribution); Section 61 of the Stock Corporation Lav,9 (which imposes
liability upon directors and officers for issuing any certificate, report, or public
notice that is false in any material misrepresentation. Liability is imposed on
directors and officers who sign such false statements).
Under paragraph (a) of Section 719, liability is imposed on directors who
vote for or concur in the foregoing corporate actions. Paragraph (b), designed
to define when a director can be said to have concurred in any such action,
creates a presumption of concurrence for directors present at a meeting at
which an action specified in paragraph (a) is taken-which becomes conclusive
unless a dissent from the action taken is registered at the meeting or promptly
thereafter. A similar presumption affects directors absent from the meeting
who do not record a dissent within a reasonable time after learning of the
action taken. The absentee director would presumably be obliged to make some
effort to learn of the -action taken at the meeting within a reasonable time
thereafter. These provisions are patently aimed at inducing active participa-
tion by directors in the deliberations of the board and an affirmative discharge
by them of stewardship responsibilities. A precisely parallel provision is present-
ly found in Section 58 of the Stock Corporation Law which exonerates a direc-
tor from liability for an improper declaration of a dividend or other distribution
of assets to shareholders if he has registered his dissent from the action in the
minutes of the meeting or, if absent, has communicated his dissent therefrom
to the corporation within a reasonable time after learning of the action.
Similarly, Section 667 of the Penal Law imposes a "presumption of assent" on
directors who do not register a formal dissent from actions taken which are
made criminal under the provisions of Article 64 of the Penal Law.
Attention should be directed at this point to paragraph (e) of Section 719
which provides that a director cannot be charged with liability under the
section if he is found, in the circumstances of the case, to have discharged his
duty to the corporation under Section 717. It will be recalled, from a previous
discussion of this subject under the heading "Directors' duty of diligence, care
and skill; reliance on financial statements," that in discharging his duties as
defined in Section 717 a director may rely in good faith on financial statements
represented by accredited accountants and corporate fiscal officers to fairly
reflect the financial condition of the corporation. A parallel provision is em-
bodied in Section 58 of the Stock Corporation Law which exonerates directors
from liability for improper dividend declarations and other distributions of as-
359. There has not been a single case litigated under this section since 1912 (when
the annual report, which had to be signed by responsible corporate officers, was written
off the books). It is felt that the content of this section is amply covered by N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 720 (currently N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 60), or by common law principles
of liability.
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sets to shareholders if they can affirmatively show that "they had reasonable
grounds to believe, and did believe, that such dividend or distribution would notimpair the capital of the corporation." Presumably, under the existing formula-
tion, directors would sustain their burden if, acting in good faith, they relied on
financial reports of accredited accountants or corporate officials. Paragraph
(e) was included expressly in Section 719 (it would seem naturally impliable
in any case), for the same reason that the foregoing provision was included in
Section 58 of the Stock Corporation Law-to preclude, beyond peradventure,
a construction of Section 719 (such as was given to the former Section 58 in
cases like Quintal v. Greenstein)3 60 that a violation of the statutory strictures
creates automatic liability,' without regard to good faith and the absence of
negligence.
Under paragraph (a) of Section 719, the remedy for the enforcement of
the joint and several liability of the directors is given exclusively "to the cor-
poration for the benefit of its creditors or shareholders to the extent of any
injury suffered by [them] .. 2' as a result of the action taken. This important
innovation was induced by the extremely confused state of existing case law
as to the availability of a suit by an individual creditor to recover in his own
right from derelict directors a corporate fund that rightfully belongs to all
creditors and shareholders similarly injured. For example, in Buttles v. SmithI 61
the Court of Appeals upheld the right of an individual creditor, acting in his
own behalf, to set aside transfers of corporate property made in violation of
Section 15 of the Stock Corporation Law on the ground that the wrong to the
creditor by such transfer is independent and distinct from the wrong to the
corporate debtor. Although the reasoning in support of the result in the Buttles
case is not altogether satisfactory (and no wrong to the corporate debtor was
urged in the complaint), the principle was followed in the later case of Menkes
Feuer, Inc. v. The Peoples Bank of Joknstown.z  In the recent case of Shaw
v. Jewd Radio Corporatina the Appellate Division, Second Department vir-
tua1ly nullified the importance of these precedents by explaining that the
general rule of damages, in suits under Section 15 of the Stock Corporation
Law and kindred statutes, is "the amount of money which he [the plaintiff]
would have received as a creditor if no preferential payments and transfers
had been made and if the subject corporation's assets had been distributed to
all its creditors in proportion to the respective amounts of their just claims."36'
(E..mphassadded.) The court went on to explain that damages in the amount
360. 142 W= 854, 256 N.Y. Supp.'462 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aft'd, 236 App. Div. 719,
257 N.Y. Supp- 1034 (Ist Dep't 1932).
361. 281 N.Y. 226, 22 N.E.2d 350 (1939).
362. 268 App. Div. 809, 48 NYS.2d 593 (3d Dep't 1944), af'd, 294 N.Y. 748, 61
N.E2d 746 (1945).
363. 6 AJ).2d 707, 174 N.YS2d 315 (2d Dep't 1958). See also, on the same point,
Newflldd v. Ettlinger, 22 Misc. 2d 769, 194 N.Y-S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1959), appeal dis-
missed, 10 A.D.2d 947, 205 N.YS.2d 908 (Ist Dep't 1960).
364. Id. at 708, 174 N.YS.2d at 318.
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of a plaintiff's entire claim (not limited to a pro rata share) are awarded only
in exceptional cases, as where "an actual levy had been made on the property
in question by virtue of an execution issued in pursuance of a money judgment
in favor of the plaintiff against the debtor corporation." The court might well
have added that careful scrutiny of frequently cited precedents which support
the proposition that an individual creditor may recover his full claim, such as
Buckley v. Stansfield, 65 reveals that the plaintiff in these cases was the sole
corporate creditor or, if other creditors existed, their rights were not shown to
be adversely affected. In Hastings v. H. M. Byllesby & Co.,3 60 where a trustee
in bankruptcy brought an action in behalf of creditors for the relief provided
in subdivisions 1 and 2 of Section 60 of the General Corporation Law (basically,
actions sounding in negligence, conversion or waste), the Court of Appeals,
distinguishing Buttles v. Smnith3 67 (where the action was grounded on Section 15
of the Stock Corporation Law and subdivision 5 of Section 60 of the General
Corporation Law which provides for an action to set aside an improper transfer
of corporate property), held that actions brought under subdivisions 1 and 2
of Section 60 belong to the corporation and relief thereunder cannot be sought
in behalf of the creditors in their individual rights. In Rieser v. Baltimore &
O.R. Co.,308 a federal court in the southern district of New York, understand-
ably confused, was moved to comment that "it may be seriously questioned
whether in fact the Buttles case represents a 'wrong to the creditor . . .
independent and distinct from any wrong to the corporate debtor,' in contradis-
tinction to the claim in the Hastings case which 'arises only indirectly from
the damage or injury to the corporation and is repaired when the damage or
injury to the corporation is repaired.' Both claims may well have stood on the
same ground so far as their derivative or independent nature is involved. If so,
then the Hastings case may not be distinguishable but may have overruled pro
tanto the Buttles case."3 69 (Emphasis added.) The confusion is compounded
when one finds that a single creditor cannot recover his full claim in a suit
brought against directors for an improper dividend declaration under Section
58 of the Stock Corporation Law, but must bring a representative action in
equity in behalf of all creditors similarly affected; 37 0 yet, as recently squarely
held in American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Frye,SU a. single
creditor may recover his full claim against derelict directors for improper loans
to shareholders in violation of Section 59 of the Stock Corporation Law, despite
the existence of other bona fide claims against the corporation. The Court in
365. 155 App. Div. 735, 140 N.Y. Supp. 593 (4th Dept 1913), aft'd, 214 N.Y. 679,
108 N.E. 1090 (1915). See also Whalen v. Strong, 249 App. Div. 792, 292 N.Y. Supp.
385 (4th Dep't 1930), aff'd, 275 N.Y. 516, 11 NY.2d 321 (1937).
366. 293 N.Y. 404, 57 N.E.2d 733 (1944).
367. Supra note 361.
368. 123 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 228 F.2d 563 (2d Clr. 1955).
369. Id. at 52.
370. See Shaw v. Ansaldi Co., Inc., 178 App. Div. 589, 165 N.Y. Supp. 872 (1st
Dep't 1917); Johnson v. Nevins, 87 Misc. 430, 150 N.Y. Supp. 828 (Sup. CL 1914).
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the Frye case placed a remarkably high premium on the litigation-alertness of
plaintiff-creditor, stating that "the right of action, of course, is not exclusive,
but the fact that the recovery may benefit the alert creditor exclusively is the
result, not of the exercise of the.right of action but the consequence of the
inaction of other creditors similarly situated. A possible recovery by a plain-
tiff of the full benefit of the statute to the exclusion of each of the other
creditors similarly situated, should not operate to defeat his right of action.2'3 72
So cavalier a sacrifice of outstanding creditors' claims on the altar of a single
creditor's swiftness to litigate strikes one as an altogether cynical and callous
approach to creditors' rights. The legislature, in enacting Sections 719 and
720 of the Business Corporation Law, has rejected this approach by a policy
declaration that any recovery in a suit brought against erring directors, on
whatever ground and by whomever brought, belongs to the corporation for the
benefit of all creditors and shareholders injured as a result of the directors'
misconduct. This, indeed, is as it should be-for, any misapplication of funds
by directors, whether by negligence, conversion, waste, improper conveyance
of corporate assets, or other misconduct, is in the last analysis a misuse of
corporate funds, title to which is in the corporation and which, in equity,
should belong to all creditors and shareholders who can stake out legitimate
claims thereto. It might be well to note at this point that, under paragraph
(b) of Section 720, an action may be brought for the relief provided in para-
graph (a) of Section 719 by, among others, a judgment creditor on behalf of
the corporation. In such case, any recovery by the creditor becomes a corporate
fund in which he will share ratably with other creditors (and perhaps share-
holders).
Paragraph (d) of Section 719 incorporates the most extensive system in
the.,country for the subrogation of directors who have been surcharged under
paragraph (a) of Section 719. Subparagraph (d) (1) codifies the common law
rule that the director who has suffered a judgment may recover an improper
dividend or distribution of assets from the shareholders who received corporate
funds knowing the dividend or distribution violated Section 510 of the Business
Corporation Law. Since the corporation could have "set aside an illegal con-
veyance . ..of corporate assets, where the transferee knew of its illegality"
under subparagraph (a) (2) of Section 720, the director, having made the
corporation whole, is subrogated to the corporation's right of action against the
transferee-shareholders. This is altogether proper because the injury to share-
holders in the misapplication of corporate assets by. the director is fully re-
paired by the director's payment of the judgment against him. Similar subroga-
tion rights are afforded, under the remaining provisions of paragraph (d), to
directors, surcharged under the correlative liability provisions of paragraph (a)
of Section 719, against; sellers of shares to the corporation who know that
371. 8 N.Y.2d 232, 203 N.YS.2d 850 (1960).
372. Id. at 237, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
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such sale violated Section 513 (subparagraph (d) (2)); shareholders who
received an improper distribution of assets during corporate liquidation (sub-
paragraph (d) (3)); and directors who received an improper loan in violation
of Section 714 (subparagraph (d) (4)). In all of the foregoing cases, having
made the corporation whole, the director's equity-is deemed superior to that
of the recipient of the unlawful distribution of corporate assets.
Liability generally: In addition to spelling out the liability of directors
for misconduct in specific cases, the new law perpetuates, with minor changes,
the form and substance of Section 60 of the General Corporation Law. Para-
graph (a) of Section 720 exposes the directors and officers to a suit by the
corporation for the following relief: to compel the defendant to account for
neglect of, or failure to perform his duties (subparagraph (a) (1) (A)), or for
conversion, loss or waste of corporate assets (subparagraph (a) (1) (B)); to
set aside an illegal distribution of corporate assets where the transferee knew it
was illegal (subparagraph (a) (2)); and to enjoin proposed illegal distribution
of corporate assets (subparagraph (a) (3)).373
Paragraph (b) of Section 720, the counterpart of Section 61 of the General
Corporation Law, provides that an action for the relief provided in paragraph
(a) and Section 719 may be brought by the corporation, or by a receiver,
trustee in bankruptcy, officer, director or judgment creditor thereof, or, in a
derivative suit under Section 626, by a shareholder, voting trust certificate
holder, or the owner of a beneficial interest in shares.
The very delineation in paragraph (b), in defining who has the capacity to
sue for the relief provided in the section, between suits brought by, or for, the
corporation and suits brought in the right of the corporation suggests the distinc-
tion that has been carefully drawn by the courts between the (corporate)
statutory action and the derivative action.37 4 The assumption is inherent in
the creation of the "statutory" action that the decision in a given case as to
whether or not relief will be sought is to rest with the entire board. Where the
board cannot act because a quorum of disinterested directors is unavailable or,
for some other reason, does not choose to act, then a single director (or officer,
or judgment creditor) is authorized to act for the corporation. Indeed, the
Court of Appeals suggested in Tenney v. Rosenthal37 5 that a single director
373. Omitted from Section 720 are the provisions in N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 60(3)
and (4), dealing with the suspension and removal of directors and officers for misconduct
by action of the Attorney General. Provision for the amotion of a director is found in
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 706(d), and for the amotion of an officer in § 716(c). An officer
who is elected by the shareholders (see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(b)) can be sus-
pended by the board but cannot be removed except with the consent of the shareholders
(see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 716(a)).
374. See West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., supra note 241 at 350, 160
N.E.2d at 626 where the dissenting opinion clearly distinguishes the statutory action
from the derivative action; Tenney v. Rosenthal, supra note 31 where the very decision
turns upon this distinction. See also Peets v. Manhasset Civil Engineer's Inc., 4 Misc. 2d
683, 68 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See generally, for a comprehensive discussion of
the area, Note, Director's Statutory Action in New York, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 199 (1961).
375. Id. at 211, 160 N.E.2d at 467.
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would have no capacity to sue for the corporation in absence of the statutory
authorization. The presumptive authority of the president, qua corporate
officer, to bring the statutory action for the corporation has already been
sufficiently discussed under the heading "Delegation of the board's authority;
executive and other committees. '376 The extremely important consideration is
that a suit by a single director (or officer) for the corporation is not derivative
(in the technical sense). Hence, in bringing such suit, the director (or officer)
is not burdened with such matters as the necessity for a demand upon the
board (or the shareholders as a body),377 "contemporaneous ownership" rule,37 8
"security for expenses, ' 379 or the like3S--although he. must, of course, allege
that he was a director at the time the action was commenced.38 1 This vital
distinction between the director's (or officer's) statutory action and the deriva-
tive suit is highlighted by the judicial recognition that the pendency of a direc-
tor's action will not bar the commencement of a shareholder's derivative action
brought in vindication of the same wrongs by the derelict directors or officers.382
CONCLUSION
The subject matter of this paper is patently too extensive for the useful
kind of summing-up that is customary upon the completion of a law review
commentary. In designing its new law, New York drew freely on the most
elucidative sources of corporate statutory material-in the Model Act (which
was originally utilized as the structural base for drafting the new law) and the
corporate laws of other states. Conformably with the local idiosyncrasies of
New York's corporate statutory heritage (which, in some cases, had become
so thoroughly inured in the technical arsenal of local practitioners that the
statutory legacy could not be renounced), the draftsmen of the new law (with
the indispensable assistance of the organized bar) have sought to fashion a
modern and forward-looking product. It is a fair observation, which, one trusts,
376. See discussion at notes 240-243, supra.
377. Katz v. Braz, 188 Misc. 581, 66 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 271 App.
Div. 970, 69 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1st Dep't 1947).
378. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626, entitled "Shareholders' derivative action...
(similarly, N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61).
379. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 627, entitled "Security for expenses in shareholders'
derivative action ....." (similarly, N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61-b).
380. Directors who acquiesce in the wrong to the corporation by defendant-directors
are not estopped from bringing the statutory action for the corporation (see Williams v.
Robinson, 9 Misc. 2d 774, 169 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct. 1957)). The rule is otherwise in a
shareholder's derivative suit (see cases cited for this proposition at note 29 supra; but
cf., Goldberg v. Berry, 231 App. Div. 165, 247 N.Y. Supp.. 69 (1st Dep't 1930) which
held that no estoppel existed even in shareholder derivative suits where less than all of
the shareholders had acquiesced in the wrong. See also, on this point, Williams v. Robin-
son, supra).
381. Tenney v. Rosenthal, supra note 31. Of course, as the Tenney case holds, the
director need not remain one in order to maintain the suit (see discussion of this point
at note 31, supra).
382. Lowenstein v. Diamond Soda Water Mfg. Co., 94 App. Div. .383, 88 N.Y. Supp.
313 (1st Dep't 1904).
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is supported by the perhaps over-lengthy review in this paper, that New York
has rather succeeded in this objective, and has realized a system of corporate
statutes which balances sensitively the need for maximum freedom of manage-
ment in corporate operation, maximum security of the shareholders' investment
in the enterprise, and the protection of creditors' rights and public interest
generally.
